The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
Open accessAbstract
Cheap talk games have been widely used to analyze situations in which a policy maker needs expert advice. In previous work, agent uncertainty has almost always been modeled using a single-dimensional state variable. In this paper we prove that the dimensionality of the uncertain variable has an important qualitative impact on results and yields interesting insights into the \\mechanics " of information transmission. Contrary to the unidimensional case, with more than one dimension full transmission of information in all states of nature is typically possible, provided a very simple and intuitive condition is satis¯ed. What really matters in transmission of information is the local behavior senders ' indi®erence curves at the ideal point of the policy maker (receiver), not the proximity of players ' ideal point. This may explain the apparent con°ict between informational theories of committees and the empirical evidence on the poor alignment of preferences between the Floor and committees in legislative organizations.
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Citations
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Cited by
ADAMS, R. B., & FERREIRA, D. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01206.x · Cited by 2,401
Authority and Communication in Organizations
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When Does Coordination Require Centralization?
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Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design
Kamenica, E. (2019) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025739 · Cited by 404
Metadata
- Authors
- Battaglini, M.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2002-07
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1379-1401
- ISSN
- 0012-9682
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W2040570331
- Cited by
- 484
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 20.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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