Cited by 1,569Electoral Systems and Political ParticipationMedia Influence and PoliticsPolitical Theory and Democracy

How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation

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DRUCKMAN, JAMES N., PETERSON, ERIK, SLOTHUUS, RUNE·2013·American Political Science Review

Abstract

Competition is a defining element of democracy. One of the most noteworthy events over the last quarter-century in U.S. politics is the change in the nature of elite party competition: The parties have become increasingly polarized. Scholars and pundits actively debate how these elite patterns influence polarization among the public (e.g., have citizens also become more ideologically polarized?). Yet, few have addressed what we see as perhaps more fundamental questions: Has elite polarization altered the way citizens arrive at their policy opinions in the first place and, if so, in what ways? We address these questions with a theory and two survey experiments (on the issues of drilling and immigration). We find stark evidence that polarized environments fundamentally change how citizens make decisions. Specifically, polarization intensifies the impact of party endorsements on opinions, decreases the impact of substantive information and, perhaps ironically, stimulates greater confidence in those—less substantively grounded—opinions. We discuss the implications for public opinion formation and the nature of democratic competition.

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  • La polarización dentro de las elites causa la polarización pública, o en determinados segmentos a través de exposición mediática y discursos públicos.

    “La polarización dentro de las elites causa la polarización pública, o en determinados segmentos a través de exposición mediática y discursos públicos (Druckman et al, 2013).”

    From ¿Es válido atribuir la polarización política a la comunicación digital? Sobre burbujas, plataformas y polarización afectiva (2020) · cites this paper as Druckman et al, 2013

    The Results report that, on a given issue, citizens' opinions move toward the position endorsed by their party under high elite polarization. The Conclusion cautions that broader public polarization may occur issue by issue and depends partly on citizens' information-search patterns. The paper does not establish media exposure and public discourse as the channels causing that polarization. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Processes such as self-categorization, in-group favouritism and out-group derogation contribute to political polarization by encouraging partisans to engage in various forms of motivated reasoning on behalf of their political party or ideological group.

    “Processes such as self-categorization, in-group favouritism and out-group derogation contribute to political polarization by encouraging partisans to engage in various forms of motivated reasoning — including selective information exposure or avoidance and confirmation or disconfirmation biases — on behalf of their political party or ideological group3,39,91,94,141–144.”

    From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [39]

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  • Several experiments have demonstrated that representing political elites as highly polarized leads participants to express higher levels of issue-based and affective polarization.

    “several experiments have demonstrated that representing political elites as highly polarized (either in terms of ideological abstractions or specific issue positions) leads participants to express higher levels of issue-based and affective polarization39,83.”

    From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [39]

    The Partisan Cues and Polarization section (page unavailable) describes an experiment contrasting moderate and polarized party elites. The Results report that, under high elite polarization, participants’ issue opinions followed their party’s endorsement, and the Conclusion suggests citizens may polarize issue by issue. Our copy does not report that the experiments measured or increased affective polarization, so that part of the claim is unsupported. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Partisan-motivated reasoning decreases the relative weight of substantive arguments vis-à-vis partisan cues in citizens' political opinion formation.

    “Partisanmotivated reasoning undermines decisionmaking as it decreases the relative weight of substantive arguments visávis partisan cues in citizens' political opinion formation (Bolsen et al., 2014;Druckman et al., 2013)”

    From Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review (2024) · cites this paper as Druckman et al., 2013

  • Ideological polarization can enhance the role of partisan bias in public opinion formation.

    “enhance the role of partisan bias in public opinion formation”

    From Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review (2024) · cites this paper as Druckman et al., 2013

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Research works printed but not linked: 47

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Authors
DRUCKMAN, J. N., PETERSON, E., & SLOTHUUS, R.
Affiliations
  • Northwestern University (US)
  • Aarhus University (DK)
Corresponding author
  • DRUCKMAN, JAMES N.
  • PETERSON, ERIK
  • SLOTHUUS, RUNE
Venue
American Political Science Review
Published
2013-01-25
Volume
107
Issue
1
Pages
57-79
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
OpenAlex
W2114986694
Cited by
1,569
References
5
Citations by year
2026: 163 · 2025: 174 · 2024: 104 · 2023: 122 · 2022: 179 · 2021: 156 · 2020: 199 · 2019: 140 · 2018: 93 · 2017: 86 · 2016: 46 · 2015: 59 · 2014: 28 · 2013: 17 · 2012: 2
FWCI
295.53
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Northwestern University
  • Aarhus Universitet
  • Samfund og Erhverv, Det Frie Forskningsråd
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
Keywords
public opinion formation, party endorsement, ideological polarization, democratic competition, oil well drilling, immigration, survey experiment

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