Cited by 68Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsNeural and Behavioral Psychology StudiesChild and Adolescent Psychosocial and Emotional Development

Development of risky decision making: Fuzzy-trace theory and neurobiological perspectives

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Reyna, Valerie F, Wilhelms, Evan A, McCormick, Michael J, Weldon, Rebecca B·2015·Child Development Perspectives

Abstract

Developmental differences in mental representations of choices, reward sensitivity, and behavioral inhibition (self-control) explain greater susceptibility to risk taking. Ironically, relying on precise representations in reasoning promotes greater risk taking, but this reliance declines as adolescents mature. This phenomenon is known as a developmental reversal; it is called a reversal because it violates traditional developmental expectations of greater cognitive complexity with maturation. Fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) predicts reversals by proposing two types of mental representation (gist and verbatim), and that risk takers rely more on verbatim processing when making decisions. In this article, we describe the main tenets of FTT and explain how it can account for risky decision making. We also explore the neural underpinnings of development and decision making in the context of distinctions from FTT. FTT's predictions elucidate unanswered questions about risk taking, providing directions for research.

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  • Behavioral research has demonstrated for decades that by mid-adolescence, young people are comparable to adults in their ability to make deliberative decisions, including working memory, logical reasoning, weighing risks and benefits, and anticipating consequences of their actions.

    “Specifically, behavioral research has demonstrated for decades that by mid-adolescence, young people are comparable to adults in their ability to make deliberative decisions, including specific abilities in working memory, logical reasoning, weighing risks and benefits, and anticipating consequences of their actions (Icenogle et al., 2019; Reyna et al., 2015; Steinberg, 2013).”

    From The role (and limits) of developmental neuroscience in determining adolescents' autonomy rights: The case for reproductive and voting rights (2024) · cites this paper as Reyna et al., 2015

    The Abstract (page unavailable) says adolescents trade off risks and rewards and often do not underestimate risks. But it describes the view that decision-making capacities had developed by adolescence as something 'once thought,' then emphasizes cognitive differences between adolescents and adults. The cited passages do not establish adult-comparable working memory, logical reasoning, or anticipation of consequences by mid-adolescence. (LLM, conf=0.84)

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  • Adolescents have demonstrated capacity to make deliberative decisions.

    “adolescents have demonstrated capacity to make deliberative decisions (Icenogle et al., 2019; Reyna et al., 2015; Steinberg, 2013).”

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. [16]Wilhelms EA Corbin JC Reyna VF Thompson V Feeney A Gist memory in reasoning and decision making: Age, experience, and expertise Reasoning as memory 2014 93 109 Psychology Press New York, NY

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Authors
Reyna, V. F., Wilhelms, E. A., McCormick, M. J., & Weldon, R. B.
Affiliations
Cornell University (US)
Corresponding author
Reyna, Valerie F
Venue
Child Development Perspectives
Published
2015-04-28
Volume
9
Issue
2
Pages
122-127
ISSN
  • 1750-8592 (ISSN-L)
  • 1750-8606
OpenAlex
W1989900451
Cited by
68
References
42
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 1
FWCI
6.55
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Child Development Perspectives (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
Funders
  • National Institutes of Health
  • National Cancer Institute (R21CA149796)
  • National Institute of Nursing Research (RO1NR014368-01)
  • National Institute of Food and Agriculture
  • United States Department of Agriculture
  • Federal formula funds (NYC-321423, NYC-321436)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Clinical Psychology › Child and Adolescent Psychosocial and Emotional Development
Keywords
risky decision making, fuzzy-trace theory, risk-taking, adolescents, self-control, behavioral inhibition, reward sensitivity, mental representation, neural development, decision-making

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