Cited by 166Child and Animal Learning DevelopmentBayesian Modeling and Causal InferenceLogic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

Pretense, Counterfactuals, and Bayesian Causal Models: Why What Is Not Real Really Matters

Weisberg, Deena S., Gopnik, Alison·2013·Cognitive Science

Abstract

Young children spend a large portion of their time pretending about non-real situations. Why? We answer this question by using the framework of Bayesian causal models to argue that pretending and counterfactual reasoning engage the same component cognitive abilities: disengaging with current reality, making inferences about an alternative representation of reality, and keeping this representation separate from reality. In turn, according to causal models accounts, counterfactual reasoning is a crucial tool that children need to plan for the future and learn about the world. Both planning with causal models and learning about them require the ability to create false premises and generate conclusions from these premises. We argue that pretending allows children to practice these important cognitive skills. We also consider the prevalence of unrealistic scenarios in children's play and explain how they can be useful in learning, despite appearances to the contrary.

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Crossref · 10.1111/cogs.12069

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  • Pretend play (PP) and counterfactual reasoning (CFR) both involve thinking about alternatives to reality: disengaging from current reality, making inferences about alternate events, and keeping alternative possibilities separate from reality.

    “A notable observation is the similarities in the cognitive processes of pretend play (PP) and counterfactual reasoning (CFR) as both involve thinking about alternatives to reality.”
  • Weisberg and Gopnik posited that because an imaginary representation of the world contrary to reality is evoked in both PP and CFR, the two likely engage the same component cognitive abilities.

    “Weisberg and Gopnik (2013) posited that since an imaginary representation of the world that is contrary to reality is evoked in both contexts, PP and CFR likely engage the same component cognitive abilities.”
  • The findings from this study support Weisberg and Gopnik's (2013) unifying framework of imaginative processes.

    “The findings from this study support Weisberg and Gopnik's (2013) unifying framework of imaginative processes.”

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Authors
Weisberg, D. S., & Gopnik, A.
Affiliations
  • University of Pennsylvania (US)
  • Department of Psychology University of California at Berkeley
Corresponding author
Weisberg, Deena S.
Venue
Cognitive Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2013-08-05
Volume
37
Issue
7
Pages
1368-1381
ISSN
  • 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
  • 1551-6709
OpenAlex
W2121368041
Cited by
166
References
6
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 34 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 2 · 2012: 1
FWCI
9.65
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Cognitive Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
Keywords
pretend play, counterfactual reasoning, child cognitive development, false premises, planning, causal learning
MeSH terms
Bayes Theorem, Child, Child Development, Cognition, Concept Formation, Humans, Imagination, Thinking

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