Pretense, Counterfactuals, and Bayesian Causal Models: Why What Is Not Real Really Matters
Abstract
Young children spend a large portion of their time pretending about non-real situations. Why? We answer this question by using the framework of Bayesian causal models to argue that pretending and counterfactual reasoning engage the same component cognitive abilities: disengaging with current reality, making inferences about an alternative representation of reality, and keeping this representation separate from reality. In turn, according to causal models accounts, counterfactual reasoning is a crucial tool that children need to plan for the future and learn about the world. Both planning with causal models and learning about them require the ability to create false premises and generate conclusions from these premises. We argue that pretending allows children to practice these important cognitive skills. We also consider the prevalence of unrealistic scenarios in children's play and explain how they can be useful in learning, despite appearances to the contrary.
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Pretend play (PP) and counterfactual reasoning (CFR) both involve thinking about alternatives to reality: disengaging from current reality, making inferences about alternate events, and keeping alternative possibilities separate from reality.
“A notable observation is the similarities in the cognitive processes of pretend play (PP) and counterfactual reasoning (CFR) as both involve thinking about alternatives to reality.”
From A plausible role of imagination in pretend play, counterfactual reasoning, and executive functions (2023) · cites this paper as Weisberg and Gopnik (2013)
Weisberg and Gopnik posited that because an imaginary representation of the world contrary to reality is evoked in both PP and CFR, the two likely engage the same component cognitive abilities.
“Weisberg and Gopnik (2013) posited that since an imaginary representation of the world that is contrary to reality is evoked in both contexts, PP and CFR likely engage the same component cognitive abilities.”
From A plausible role of imagination in pretend play, counterfactual reasoning, and executive functions (2023) · cites this paper as Weisberg and Gopnik (2013)
The findings from this study support Weisberg and Gopnik's (2013) unifying framework of imaginative processes.
“The findings from this study support Weisberg and Gopnik's (2013) unifying framework of imaginative processes.”
From A plausible role of imagination in pretend play, counterfactual reasoning, and executive functions (2023) · cites this paper as Weisberg and Gopnik's (2013)
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Buchsbaum, D., Bridgers, S., Skolnick Weisberg, D., & Gopnik, A. (2012) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0122 · Cited by 200 · see citing works
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Explaining machine learning classifiers through diverse counterfactual explanations
Mothilal, R. K., Sharma, A., & Tan, C. (2020) · Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3351095.3372850 · Cited by 1,233 · see citing works
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The power of possibility: causal learning, counterfactual reasoning, and pretend play
Buchsbaum, D., Bridgers, S., Skolnick Weisberg, D., & Gopnik, A. (2012) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0122 · Cited by 200 · see citing works
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Play, Curiosity, and Cognition
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A plausible role of imagination in pretend play, counterfactual reasoning, and executive functions
Francis, G. A., & Gibson, J. L. (2023) · British Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1111/bjop.12650 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
“Weisberg and Gopnik (2013) posited that since an imaginary representation of the world that is contrary to reality is evoked in both contexts, PP and CFR likely engage the same component cognitive abilities.”
BackgroundInfluential
- Authors
- Weisberg, D. S., & Gopnik, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Pennsylvania (US)
- Department of Psychology University of California at Berkeley
- Corresponding author
- Weisberg, Deena S.
- ORCID
- Weisberg, Deena S.
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2013-08-05
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 1368-1381
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- 1551-6709
- OpenAlex
- W2121368041
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 6
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 34 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 2 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 9.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cognitive Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Keywords
- pretend play, counterfactual reasoning, child cognitive development, false premises, planning, causal learning
- MeSH terms
- Bayes Theorem, Child, Child Development, Cognition, Concept Formation, Humans, Imagination, Thinking
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