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Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria
Open accessAbstract
Elections are now common in low-income societies. However, they are frequently flawed. We investigate a Nigerian election marred by violence. We designed and conducted a nationwide field experiment based on anti-violence campaigning. The campaign appealed to collective action through electoral participation, and worked through town meetings, popular theatres and door-to-door distribution of materials. We find that the campaign decreased violence perceptions and increased empowerment to counteract violence. We observe a rise in voter turnout and infer that the intimidation was dissociated from incumbents. These effects are accompanied by a reduction in the intensity of actual violence, as measured by journalists.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Collier, P., & Vicente, P. C.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2014-02-01
- Volume
- 124
- Issue
- 574
- Pages
- F327-F355
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0297
- OpenAlex
- W2135115883
- Cited by
- 334
- References
- 50
- FWCI
- 129.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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