The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentives and the Efficiency of Public Sector‐outsourcing Contracts
Abstract
Outsourcing the provision of traditionally publicly provided services has become commonplace in most industrialized nations. Despite its prevalence, there still is no consensus in the academic literature on the magnitude (and determinants) of expected cost savings to the government, nor the sources of those savings. This article considers the arguments for (and against) outsourcing and then examines the empirical evidence pertaining to whether any observed savings occur and whether they persist over time. In addition, we examine the existing evidence for the ‘redistribution hypothesis’ and the ‘quality‐shading hypothesis’, which critics have used to argue that outsourcing lowers government expenditure by lowering wages and conditions and/or lower quality services. Finally, we consider the impact of contract design on outsourcing outcomes. While the power of incentives is a strong theme in economics, recent work has suggested that high‐powered incentives may be suboptimal for many public sector services, because they may crowd out intrinsic motivation, particularly in instances where agents are highly motivated. We discuss the implications of this insight for the efficiency of public sector outsourcing.
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Cites
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations
Williamson, O. E. (1979) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466942 · Cited by 10,190
Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.6.627 · Cited by 7,176 · cited 1×
“For instance, the assumption that incentives have a positive effect on both effort and performance is at odds with sociological and psychological research which suggests that extrinsic rewards can sometimes have the opposite effect (see Deci et al., 1999 ).”
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
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The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338 · cited 1×
“8. Following Posner (1997), a norm is defined as ‘. . . a rule that is neither promulgated by an official source, such as a court or a legislature, nor enforced by the threat of legal sanction, yet is regularly complied with . . .’ 9. There is an extensive body of work on incentives and contract design within firms (f…”
BackgroundIntrinsic and extrinsic motivation
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00253 · Cited by 2,913
Psychological foundations of incentives
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Cited by
Contracting or Public Delivery? The Importance of Service, Market, and Management Characteristics
Hefetz, A., & Warner, M. E. (2012) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mur006 · Cited by 424
Digitalization and the Anthropocene
Creutzig, F., Acemoglu, D., Bai, X., Edwards, P. N., Hintz, M. J., Kaack, L. H., Kilkis, S., Kunkel, S., Luers, A., Milojevic-Dupont, N., et al. (2022) · Annual Review of Environment and Resources · doi:10.1146/annurev-environ-120920-100056 · Cited by 112
Sharma, H. (2025) · Journal of Public Policy · doi:10.1017/s0143814x24000205 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Jensen, P. H., & Stonecash, R. E.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Surveys
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005-11-25
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 767-787
- ISSN
- 0950-0804 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-6419
- OpenAlex
- W2072601017
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 8.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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