Automatic Brains—Interpretive Minds
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The involvement of specific brain areas in carrying out specific tasks has been increasingly well documented over the past decade. Many of these processes are highly automatic and take place outside of conscious awareness. Conscious experience, however, seems unitary and must involve integration between distributed processes. This article presents the argument that this integration occurs in a constructive and interpretive manner and that increasingly complex representations emerge from the integration of modular processes. At the highest levels of consciousness, a personal narrative is constructed. This narrative makes sense of the brain's own behavior and may underlie the sense of a unitary self. The challenge for the future is to identify the relationships between patterns of brain activity and conscious awareness and to delineate the neural mechanisms whereby the underlying distributed processes interact.
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Cites
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“Dehaene and Naccache (2001) have hypothesized that there is a global neuronal work space in which unconscious modular processes can be integrated in a common network of activation if they receive amplification by an attentional gating system.”
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Self-citationCerebral mechanisms of word masking and unconscious repetition priming
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Neurological disorders and the structure of human consciousness
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“Patients’ responses in such studies are very similar to the confabulations produced by brain-damaged patients who deny that they have a serious deficit by rationalizing their bizarre behavior (Cooney & Gazzaniga, 2003).”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Cited by
The origin of mind: Evolution of brain, cognition, and general intelligence.
Geary, D. C. (2005) · doi:10.1037/10871-000 · Cited by 551
Authentic leadership and the narrative self
Sparrowe, R. T. (2005) · The Leadership Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2005.03.004 · Cited by 494
Interoception in emotional experience
Wiens, S. (2005) · Current Opinion in Neurology · doi:10.1097/01.wco.0000168079.92106.99 · Cited by 356
The Function of Phenomenal States: Supramodular Interaction Theory.
Morsella, E. (2005) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.112.4.1000 · Cited by 312
Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership
Lane, T. (2012) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-012-9252-4 · Cited by 33
Metadata
- Authors
- Roser, M., & Gazzaniga, M. S.
- Venue
- Current Directions in Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2004-04
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 56-59
- ISSN
- 0963-7214 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8721
- OpenAlex
- W2112398247
- Cited by
- 58
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 5.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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