Multiverses and physical cosmology
Open accessAbstract
The idea of a multiverse — an ensemble of universes — has received increasing attention in cosmology, both as the outcome of the originating process that generated our own Universe, and as an explanation for why our Universe appears to be fine-tuned for life and consciousness. Here we carefully consider how multiverses should be defined, stressing the distinction between the collection of all possible universes, and ensembles of really existing universes that are essential for an anthropic argument. We show that such realized multiverses are by no means unique. A proper measure on the space of all really existing universes or universe domains is needed, so that probabilities can be calculated, and major problems arise in terms of realized infinities. As an illustration we examine these issues in the case of the set of Friedmann–Lemaître–Robertson–Walker universes. Then we briefly summarize scenarios such as chaotic inflation, which suggest how ensembles of universe domains may be generated, and we point out that the regularities which must underlie any systematic description of truly disjoint multiverses must imply some kind of common generating mechanism. Finally, we discuss the issue of testability, which underlies the question of whether multiverse proposals are really scientific propositions.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
The paper argues that multiverse proposals must distinguish merely possible universes from actually realized ensembles, and that realized ensembles require both a distribution function and a measure over the space of possibilities. It concludes that such ensembles are not unique, face severe infinity and testability problems, and that any regularities across disconnected universes imply a common generating mechanism.
Key findings
- A realized ensemble is represented by a possibility space \(M\), a measure \(\pi\), and a distribution function \(f(m)\); many different distribution functions can realize all possibilities, so the claim that every possibility is realized does not single out a unique multiverse.
- In the FLRW illustration, different parameterizations yield different minimum-information measures, such as a constants-of-motion measure proportional to \(d\Lambda\,d\chi/\sqrt{\chi}\) versus an observational measure proportional to \(d\Omega_{m0}/\sqrt{\Omega_{m0}}\,d\Omega_{\Lambda0}\); these measures are often non-normalizable, so probabilities may be undefined.
- Realized infinities are treated as deeply problematic: if all possibilities occur, uncountably many FLRW models arise, and even a countable infinity would leave almost all possible models unrealized. The paper cites an anthropic bound on the vacuum energy density of order \(10^{-28}\,\mathrm{g\,cm^{-3}}\) and, for \(\Lambda\) in \(\mathbb{R}^+\cup\{0\}\), an expectation value of \(\frac{1}{3}\rho_{\max}\).
- Regularities across supposedly disconnected universes imply a common causal or generating mechanism; direct testing is impossible, though some multidomain scenarios can be disproved by observations of a small universe.
Methods
- Conceptual and formal analysis with no new observational data. The paper defines a space of possible universes \(M\), a state space \(S\), and parameter categories \(p_j(i)\) for physics, cosmology, complexity, and biology, distinguishing class parameters from member parameters.
- It formalizes a realized ensemble as \(E=\{M,\pi,f(m)\}\) and uses distribution and measure integrals to define numbers, averages, and probabilities; Jaynes’ principle is applied to construct minimum-information measures.
- It illustrates the framework in the FLRW sector using Friedmann and Raychaudhuri equations, density parameters, constants of motion, and discusses chaotic inflation and cosmological-constant probability distributions.
Limitations
- Stated: multiverse existence and properties are not directly or indirectly testable; only some multidomain scenarios can be falsified. There is no evidence for the required inflaton potential or underlying physics, and the arguments become philosophical or metaphysical.
- Stated: one cannot fully specify all possibilities or an independent parameter set; measures are often non-normalizable; realized infinities create unresolved conceptual problems.
- Evident: the analysis is theoretical and programmatic, with no empirical tests or data, and its conclusions depend on assumptions about measures, parameter spaces, and extrapolated physics.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
11 of 41 cited sources checked · 5 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Ehlers & Rindler (1989) developed a parametrization in terms of observable density parameters and the Hubble parameter.
“Ehlers & Rindler (1989) developed a parametrization in terms of the observable density parameters (they also include a radiation component) and the Hubble parameter.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Ehlers & Rindler 1989 source
The Introduction (pp. 2–3) parametrizes expanding states using dust and radiation density parameters and the Hubble parameter. But the authors generally also use λ, representing the cosmological constant, and explicitly say its present value is not observable in principle; the claim therefore overstates the parametrization as being in terms of observable parameters. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Anthropic restrictions demand ρ ≲ 10^-28 g cm^-3.
“It has been shown that anthropic restrictions demand ρ 10 -28 g cm -3 (Kallosh & Linde 2002;Garriga & Vilenkin 2002).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites Kallosh & Linde 2002 source
The Introduction (p. 2) discusses anthropic limits on the cosmological constant, including an argument that life of our type is impossible when Λ is much greater than 10^-29 g/cm³. It does not establish a firm upper bound of 10^-28 g/cm³: its galaxy-formation examples give thresholds of about 10^-27 and 10^-25 g/cm³, depending on the regions considered. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Garriga & Vilenkin 2002 source
The discussion of anthropic selection (section ⑴; page unavailable) says that a large positive dark-energy density can prevent galaxies from forming. But the paper does not state a required bound of 10^-28 g cm^-3; its reported constraints on Ω_D depend on assumptions about galaxy mass and the fluctuation spectrum (section ⑵; page unavailable). (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Weinberg and Garriga & Vilenkin derive a probability distribution for the cosmological constant in an ensemble of regions generated in the same inflationary sequence via a given inflaton potential, where the cosmological constant is the potential energy of a scalar field.
“Weinberg (2000a,b) and Garriga & Vilenkin (2000) derive a probability distribution for the cosmological constant in the context of an ensemble of regions generated in the same inflationary sequence via the action of a given inflaton potential, where the cosmological constant is given by the potential energy of a scalar field.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Weinberg 2000a,b
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Garriga & Vilenkin 2000 source
- Premisecitation
Usually models in the doomsday argument literature either assume an ensemble exists or deal with potentially existing ensembles rather than actually existing ones.
“However, usually these models either in effect assume an ensemble exists, or else are content to deal with potentially existing ensembles rather than actually existing ones (see, for example, Olum 2002).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Olum 2002 source
- Premisecitation
For power-law potentials V(φ) = φ^n with n > 1, there is an integrable divergence at ρ = 0.
“Nevertheless, as has been shown in Garriga & Vilenkin (2002), this is not always the case; in particular, for power-law potentials V(φ) = φ n with n > 1 we find an integrable divergence at ρ = 0.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Garriga & Vilenkin 2002 source
Section II, “The Prior Distribution” (Eq. 9; page not available) gives a prior density proportional to 1/|V′|, and the paper states that its singularity where V′=0 is integrable. It does not state the result for all power-law potentials with n>1 or locate the divergence specifically at ρ=0; its quadratic example instead describes an approximately flat prior near zero density. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
During inflation the scalar field undergoes randomization by quantum fluctuations, so later its values in different regions are distributed according to 'the length' in field space.
“During inflation the scalar field undergoes randomization by quantum fluctuations, such that later on its values in different regions are distributed according to 'the length' in field space (Garriga & Vilenkin 2002).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Garriga & Vilenkin 2002 source
- Premisecitation
Stochastic inflation can derive probability distributions from inflaton potentials along with the Friedmann and Klein-Gordon equations and the slow-roll approximation.
“Linde and others have applied a stochastic approach to inflation (Starobinsky 1986;Linde, Linde & Mezhlumian 1994;Vilenkin 1995;Garriga & Vilenkin 2001;Linde 2003), through which probability distributions can be derived from inflaton potentials along with the usual cosmological equations (the Friedmann equation and the Klein-Gordon equation for the inflaton) and the slow-roll approximation for the”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 3 sources checked- cites Starobinsky 1986
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Linde, Linde & Mezhlumian 1994 source
- cites Vilenkin 1995 source
In “Predictions from Quantum Cosmology” (page not available), the paper describes eternal inflation as a stochastic process whose inflaton distribution satisfies a diffusion equation with boundaries set by the potential. It also gives an expansion-rate equation involving the potential and discusses slow-roll conditions. Our copy does not show the Klein–Gordon equation or derive the distribution from the stated combination of equations and approximation. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Interpretationreasoning
Major problems arise in terms of realized infinities.
“major problems arise in terms of realized infinities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Realized multiverses are by no means unique.
“We show that such realized multiverses are by no means unique.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
These combinations span a very small subset of the whole parameter space.
“they will span a very small subset of the whole parameter space (Davies 2003;Tegmark 2003).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Davies 2003
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Tegmark 2003 source
- Interpretationreasoning
The concept of a measure on M is not unique because a natural measure in one coordinate system is not natural in another.
“First, what may seem a 'natural' measure for M in one set of coordinates will not be natural in another set of coordinates.Hence, the concept of a measure is not unique”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
An achieved infinity in any physical parameter is almost certainly not a possible outcome of any physical process.
“An achieved infinity in any physical parameter (temperature, density, spatial curvature) is almost certainly not a possible outcome of any physical process”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Infinity as mathematically conceived is not the sort of property that can be physically realized.
“Infinity as it is mathematically conceived and used is not the sort of property that can be physically realized, like a definite number can.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Many universes in the ensemble may themselves have infinite spatial extent and contain an infinite amount of matter.
“Secondly, many universes in the ensemble may themselves have infinite spatial extent and contain an infinite amount of matter, with the paradoxical conclusions that entails (Ellis & Brundrit 1979).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ellis & Brundrit 1979
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationnone given
Spatial infinities in the physical universe can be avoided by compact spatial sections.
“In the physical universe, spatial infinities can be avoided by compact spatial sections, either resultant from positive spatial curvature or from choice of compact topologies in universes that have zero or negative spatial curvature”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Allowing the cosmological parameters to vary simultaneously can change the predictions enormously.
“allowing the cosmological parameters to vary simultaneously can change the predictions enormously (Aguirre 2001).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Aguirre 2001 source
- Interpretationreasoning
Actually existing infinities are very problematic.
“Actually existing infinities are very problematic.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
A multiverse consisting of completely causally disconnected universes is a problematic concept.
“Hence, a multiverse consisting of completely causally disconnected universes is a problematic concept.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
The FLRW model is completely determined by k and the scalefactor a(t).
“The FLRW model is completely determined by k and the scalefactor a(t), which incorporates the time evolution and is obtained from the Einstein field equations together with the matter description.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Gravity is described by the Einstein field equations.
- Interpretationreasoning
The theoretically possible infinite space sections of many cosmologies at a given time are unattainable in practice.
“We argue that the theoretically possible infinite space sections of many cosmologies at a given time are simply unattainable in practice -they are a theoretical idea that cannot be realized.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Assigning weights in the measure is aggravated by the parameter space containing completely different types of quantities.
“This is aggravated by the fact that the parameter space will often contain completely different types of quantities (density parameters and the values of the gravitational constant and the cosmological constant, for example), and assigning the weights entails somehow assigning a relative weighting between these quite different kinds of quantities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Certain observations would be able to disprove the existence of some multidomain ensembles.
“certain observations would be able to disprove the existence of some multidomain ensembles.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
For distribution functions that realize all possibilities, the associated integrals often diverge, preventing calculation of probabilities.
“One of the problems is that this often means that the integrals associated with such distribution functions would diverge, preventing the calculation of probabilities from such models”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
A realized past infinity in time is not possible because it involves an infinite set of completed events or moments.
“This is why, for example, a realized past infinity in time is not considered possible from this standpoint -because it involves an infinite set of completed events or moments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Only in highly symmetric cases, such as FLRW solutions, do these data reduce to a finite number of parameters.
“Only in highly symmetric cases, such as the FLRW solutions, do these data reduce to a finite number of parameters.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Anthropic arguments for existence based on ensembles of universes with specific properties require an actually existing ensemble with all the required properties.
“anthropic arguments for existence based on ensembles of universes with specific properties require an actually existing ensemble with all the required properties.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given
None of the multiverse ideas has been developed to the point of actually describing such ensembles of universes in detail.
“So far, none of these ideas has been developed to the point of actually describing such ensembles of universes in detail”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The idea of multiverses is a testable proposition only in the sense that certain observations could disprove some multidomain ensembles.
“It is only in that sense that the idea is a testable proposition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Euclidean space is an abstraction that is probably not realized in physical practice.
“Thus, Euclidean space is an abstraction that is probably not realized in physical practice.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Some of the parameters discussed are dependent on other ones, so the set will in general not be an independent set.
“some of the parameters discussed above are dependent on other ones, so that while we can write down a more or less complete set at varying levels of detail it will in general not be an independent set.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The prescription 'all that can exist does exist' allows a vast variety of different realizations with differing properties.
“This vague prescription actually allows a vast variety of different realizations with differing properties”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Lewis 2000
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Gardner 2003
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
A statistical description does not suffice to adequately describe an ensemble where 'all that can happen, happens' because there is no guarantee that all possible models will obey any known statistical description.
“We suggest not, for the simple reason that there is no guarantee that all possible models will obey any known statistical description.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Whenever infinities emerge in physics, such as in singularities, there has been a breakdown in our models.
“Whenever infinities emerge in physics, such as in the case of singularities, we can be reasonably sure, as is usually recognized, that there has been a breakdown in our models.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If all the universes in an ensemble show regularities of structure, then that implies some common generating mechanism.
“if all the universes in an ensemble show regularities of structure, then that implies some common generating mechanism.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
There is a tension between including all possibilities in what we consider, and giving an explanation for fine-tuning.
“Hence there is a tension between including all possibilities in what we consider, and giving an explanation for fine-tuning.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Specifying the geometry of a generic universe requires an infinite amount of information.
“First, specifying the geometry of a generic universe requires an infinite amount of information because the quantities in P geometry are fields on space-time, in general requiring specification at each point”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The problem with infinity is primarily a conceptual or philosophical problem with the idea of 'realized infinity', not primarily physical.
“We emphasize that the problem with infinity is not primarily physical, in the usual sense -it is primarily a conceptual or philosophical problem with the idea of 'realized infinity'.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Deriving numbers and probabilities from f(m) requires a unique measure π on the ensemble.
“It is clear that f (m) will enable us to derive numbers and probabilities relative to the realization it defines only if we also have determined a unique measure π on the ensemble”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The vast variety of realizations leads to major problems in the definition of the ensembles and in averaging, due to the lack of a well-defined measure and the infinite character of the ensemble itself.
“leading to major problems in the definition of the ensembles and in averaging, due to the lack of a well-defined measure and the infinite character of the ensemble itself.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
There cannot really be an infinite set of really existing universes.
“We suggest that, on the basis of well-known philosophical arguments, the answer is no.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Hilbert 1964
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Spitzer 2000 source
- cites Stoeger 2003
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
The real spatial geometry of the universe is almost certainly not Euclidean.
“the real spatial geometry of the universe is almost certainly not Euclidean.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given
There is no way we can test any mechanism proposed to impose such regularities; they will of necessity always remain speculative.
“there is no way we can test any mechanism proposed to impose such regularities; they will of necessity always remain speculative.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Galaxy formation is only possible for a narrow range around ρ = 0.
“Let us first note that galaxy formation is only possible for a narrow range around ρ = 0 (Weinberg 2000a,b).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Weinberg 2000a,b
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
Because it seems questionable whether additional information about the ensemble will ever be available, certain questions will have no well-defined probabilities.
“Because it seems questionable whether there will ever be additional information about the ensemble of universes available, we have to accept that certain questions will have no well-defined probabilities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If an ensemble did not have regularities of properties across its universes, we could not describe it, calculate any properties, or characterize a distribution function.
“If it did not have regularities of properties across the class of universes included in the ensemble, we could not even describe it, much less calculate any properties or even characterize a distribution function.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
It is the combination of measure and distribution function which is of importance.
“Hence, it is the combination of measure and distribution function which is of importance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Multiverse concepts were introduced to try to introduce some form of scientific explanation into a context where the probabilities of existence of specific universe models preferred by observation are known to be very small.
“That is why multiverse concepts were introduced in the first place -to try to introduce some form of scientific explanation into a context where the probabilities of existence of specific universe models preferred by observation are known to be very small.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If there are regularities in the properties of universes in an ensemble, this suggests a mechanism creating that family of universes and a causal link to a higher domain.
“If there are such regularities and specific resulting properties, this suggests a mechanism creating that family of universes, and hence a causal link to a higher domain which is the seat of processes leading to these regularities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Chaotic inflation proposals employ inflaton potentials that as yet have no connection to the particle physics known at lower energies.
“They also employ inflaton potentials which as yet have no connection to the particle physics we know at lower energies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Any multiverse with regular properties that we can characterize systematically is necessarily of the kind produced by a common causal mechanism.
“The point then is that, as emphasized when we considered how we can describe ensembles, any multiverse with regular properties that we can characterize systematically is necessarily of this kind.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
If the domain is all positive real numbers, the minimum-information measure gives a non-normalizable a priori probability distribution proportional to 1/ρ.
“If, on the other hand, the domain is given by all positive real numbers then the minimum-information measure gives an (non-normalizable) a priori probability distribution proportional to 1/ρ (Kirchner & Ellis 2003).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kirchner & Ellis 2003 source
- Interpretationreasoning
Some common generating mechanism is needed if all universes in an ensemble have the same class of properties, such as being governed by the same physical laws or meta-laws.
“A common generating mechanism is clearly a causal connection, even if not situated in a single connected space-time -and some such mechanism is needed if all the universes in an ensemble have the same class of properties, e.g.being governed by the same physical laws or meta-laws.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Jaynes' principle is 'relatively invariant' under simple parametrization changes.
“Surprisingly Jaynes' principle is 'relatively invariant' under simple parametrization changes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
There are some specific cases where the existence of a chaotic inflation (multidomain) type scenario can be disproved.
“Despite the gloomy prognosis given above, there are some specific cases where the existence of a chaotic inflation (multidomain) type scenario can be disproved.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
There are an infinite number of possible spatial topologies in the negative curvature case.
“First, there are an infinite number of possible spatial topologies in the negative curvature case (see, for example, Lachieze-Rey & Luminet 1995)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lachieze-Rey & Luminet 1995 source
- Premisereasoning
The probability distribution of vacuum-energy density ρ in these regions is given by P(ρ) dρ ∝ dρ / |V'(φ)|, where V(φ) is the inflaton potential.
“P(ρ ) dρ ∝ dρ | V (φ) | , where V(φ) is the inflaton potential, and the prime signifies differentiation with respect to the inflaton φ.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The anthropic selection factor N(ρ) is sharply peaked and vanishes for |ρ| > ρ_max for some ρ_max of the same order of magnitude as the observed cosmological constant.
“Consequently, the anthropic selection factor N(ρ ) is sharply peaked and vanishes for |ρ | > ρ max for some ρ max , which is of the same order of magnitude as the observed cosmological constant.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Chaotic inflation proposals rely on extrapolations of presently known physics to realms far beyond where its reliability is assured.
“However, these proposals rely on extrapolations of presently known physics to realms far beyond where its reliability is assured.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Totally disjoint universes must in some sense be causally connected together, albeit in a pre-physics or meta-physical domain that determines their common properties.
“What are claimed to be totally disjoint universes must in some sense indeed be causally connected together, albeit in some pre-physics or meta-physical domain that is causally effective in determining the common properties of the universes in the multiverse.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Even within the restricted set of FLRW models, if all that is possible in this subset happens, we have multiple infinities of realized universes in the ensemble.
“Even within the restricted set of FLRW models, one of the most profound issues is the problem of realized infinities; if all that is possible in this restricted subset happens, we have multiple infinities of realized universes in the ensemble.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
In multidomain universes where spatial variations in a scalar field cause different regions to inflate at different rates, the cosmological constant would be distributed according to some probability distribution P(ρ).
“In multidomain universes, where spatial variations in a scalar field cause different regions to inflate at different rates, the cosmological constant would be distributed according to some probability distribution P(ρ ).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Reducing the uncountably infinite to countably infinite does not in the end resolve the problem of infinities in these ensembles.
“Reducing the uncountably infinite to countably infinite does not in the end resolve the problem of infinities in these ensembles.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Belief in the validity of the claimed physics that could lead to a multiverse is based on unproved extrapolation of established physics to vastly beyond where it has been tested.
“Thus, belief in the validity of the claimed physics that could lead to such consequences is just that, a belief -it is based on unproved extrapolation of established physics to vastly beyond where it has been tested.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Quantum field theory remains valid far beyond the domain where it has been tested.
- Interpretationnone given
Biophilic universes are clearly highly improbable within the set of all possible universes.
“Indeed, the whole reason for the anthropic literature is precisely the fact that biophilic universes are clearly highly improbable within the set of all possible universes (see, for example, the use of anthropic arguments as regards the value of discussed in Section 5.2).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
For the 1/√ρ distribution, the expectation value of the cosmological constant is (1/3) ρ_max.
“The expectation value becomes ρ = ρ max 0 ρ (1/ √ ρ ) dρ ρ max 0 (1/ √ ρ ) dρ = 1 3 ρ max .”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If the cosmological constant takes values in R+ ∪ {0}, the minimum information measure is proportional to 1/√ρ.
“An interesting alternative is given by allowing the cosmological constant to take values in the domain R + ∪ {0} (e.g. if the cosmological constant prediction is given by a quadratic term).The minimum information-measure is then proportional to 1/ √ ρ .”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Depending on the domain of allowed cosmological constant values, different possible minimum information measures result from Jaynes' principle.
“Depending on this domain we find different possible minimum information measures, which result from Jaynes' principle.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The cosmological constant is a remnant of some underlying unknown theory and might be restricted to some domain of values.
- Interpretationreasoning
The fraction of anthropic FLRW universes that are actually life-bearing depends on many other conditions, represented by the factor F = f_l * f_i, which vary across a generic ensemble.
“The fraction of these that will actually be life-bearing depends on the fulfilment of a large number of other conditions represented by the factor F = f l * f i , which will also vary across a generic ensemble, and the above assumes this factor is non-zero.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The factor F = f_l * f_i, representing other conditions for life, is non-zero.
- Interpretationnone given
The uncountable continuum of numbers plays a devastating role locally in FLRW models.
“Secondly, even though the geometry is so simple, the uncountable continuum of numbers plays a devastating role locally.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If the domain of the cosmological constant is all real numbers, the minimum-information measure is constant and non-normalizable.
“If the domain is given by all real numbers then the (non-normalizable) measure will be constant.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Chaotic inflation proposals remain theoretically based proposals rather than established fact.
“Thus they remain theoretically based proposals rather than established fact.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The idea of a completely disconnected multiverse with regular properties but without a common causal mechanism is not viable.
“Thus, in the end the idea of a completely disconnected multiverse with regular properties but without a common causal mechanism of some kind is not viable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
There must necessarily be some prerealization causal mechanism at work determining the properties of the universes in the ensemble.
“There must necessarily be some prerealization causal mechanism at work determining the properties of the universes in the ensemble.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisereasoning
The probability distributions determined by stochastic inflation generally are functions of the inflaton potential.
“The probability distributions determined in this way generally are functions of the inflaton potential.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The price of creating anthropically favourable universe regions by considering all inflaton potentials is the multiplication of realized infinities, most of which will be uncountable.
“The price of this process for creating anthropically favourable universe regions is the multiplication of realized infinities, most of which will be uncountable (for example, the parameters in any particular form of inflaton potential will take all possible values in an interval of real numbers).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The statistical arguments used in the doomsday argument literature do not clearly lead to a useful conclusion in the singular case of interest for this paper.
“It is not clear to us that the statistical arguments used in those papers lead to a useful conclusion in this singular case, which is the case of interest for the argument in this paper.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given
We have no evidence for a specific inflaton potential generating one particular kind of ensemble.
“We have no such evidence.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
There is a clear distinction between an ensemble of possible universes M and an ensemble of really existing universes, which is envisioned as generated by a primordial process or overarching cosmic principle.
“We have pointed out a clear distinction between an ensemble of possible universes M, and an ensemble of really existing universes, which is envisioned as generated by the given primordial process or action of an overarching cosmic principle.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Among universes in which necessary cosmic conditions for life have been fulfilled is the subset of almost-FLRW universes which are good models of our own observable Universe, given current observational precision.
“Among those universes in which the necessary cosmic conditions for life have been fulfilled is the subset of almost-FLRW universes which are good models of our own observable Universe, given the precision of the observational data we have at present.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Arguments for the existence of one particular kind of multiverse would be scientifically acceptable only if evidence emerged for a specific inflaton potential generating one particular kind of ensemble of expanding universe domains, as in chaotic inflation.
“The only way in which arguments for the existence of one particular kind of multiverse would be scientifically acceptable is if, for instance, there would emerge evidence (either direct or indirect) for the existence of a specific inflaton potential which would generate one particular kind of ensemble of expanding universe domains, as in chaotic inflation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Anthropic universes lie in a small subset of M, whose characteristics we understand to some extent.
“Anthropic universes lie in a small subset of M, whose characteristics we understand to some extent.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Inflation does not account for the rest of the coincidences enabling life, involving particle masses and the values of the fundamental constants.
“However, this does not account for the rest of the coincidences enabling life, involving particle masses and the values of the fundamental constants.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
It is the really existing ensemble of universes, not the ensemble of all possible universes, which provides the basis for anthropic arguments.
“It is this really existing ensemble of universes, not the ensemble of all possible universes, which provides the basis for anthropic arguments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The introduction of the multiverse or ensemble idea is a fundamental change in the nature of cosmology because it challenges the uniqueness of the Universe.
“The introduction of the multiverse or ensemble idea is a fundamental change in the nature of cosmology, because it aims to challenge one of the most basic aspects of standard cosmology, namely the uniqueness of the Universe (see Ellis 1991, 1999, andreferences therein).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Ellis 1991
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Ellis 1999
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
There is a definite causal connection, or 'law of laws', relating all the universes in these multiverses.
“Thus, there is a definite causal connection, or 'law of laws', relating all the universes in these multiverses.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 63
- May combine two claims. 51
- Borderline: one of the tests for a substantial claim is unclear. 1
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe probability distribution for the existence of galaxies as a function of the cosmological constant can be approximated by P_gal = N(ρ)P(ρ), where N(ρ) is the fraction of baryons that form galaxies.
“It has been suggested (Vilenkin 1995;Weinberg 1997) that the way the probability distribution for the existence of galaxies depends on the cosmological constant can be approximated by P gal = N (ρ )P(ρ ) (24 ) where N(ρ ) is the fraction of baryons that form galaxies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Vilenkin 1995 source
In “Predictions from Quantum Cosmology” (page unavailable), Vilenkin describes a probability distribution weighted by N(α) and discusses how the cosmological constant can affect galaxy formation. But N(α) is defined as the average number of civilizations in a universe, not the fraction of baryons that form galaxies; our copy does not give the claimed P_gal = N(ρ)P(ρ) approximation. (LLM, conf=0.87)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Weinberg 1997
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe 'small universe' situation is observationally testable, and the cosmic background radiation power spectrum might already be giving evidence for it because of its lack of power on the largest angular scales.
“This 'small universe' situation is observationally testable, and indeed it has been suggested that the cosmic background radiation power spectrum might already be giving us evidence that this is indeed so, because of its lack of power on the largest angular scales (Luminet et al. 2003).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Luminet et al. 2003 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenA proper measure on the space of all really existing universes or universe domains is needed so that probabilities can be calculated.
“A proper measure on the space of all really existing universes or universe domains is needed, so that probabilities can be calculated”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe astrophysical issues expressed in the product are the easier ones to investigate.
“The astrophysical issues expressed in the product are the easier ones to investigate.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone givenIt has not been demonstrated that a generic well-defined ensemble will admit life.
“nor has it been demonstrated that a generic well-defined ensemble will admit life.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThe full space M must be large enough to represent all possibilities, along with many others we cannot even conceive of, but which can nevertheless in principle also be described by such parameters.
“The full space M must be large enough to represent all of these possibilities, along with many others we cannot even conceive of, but which can nevertheless in principle also be described by such parameters.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningInfinity cannot be arrived at or realized.
“However, if that is the case, then 'infinity' cannot be arrived at, or realized.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningFor providing an explanation of existence, simply having a conceptually possible ensemble is not adequate; a link to objects or things that actually exist, or to mechanisms that make them exist, is needed.
“For the purposes of providing an explanation of existence, simply having a conceptually possible ensemble is not adequate -we need a link to objects or things that actually exist, or to mechanisms that make them exist.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenUniverses in a multiverse should be able to differ in at least some properties from each other.
“It is clear that universes in a multiverse should be able to differ in at least some properties from each other.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationnone givenIt is not at all clear that we shall ever be able to accurately delineate the class of all possible universes.
“Furthermore, it is not at all clear that we shall ever be able to accurately delineate the class of all possible universes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningWe can, in principle, make a cut between those consistent with the eventual emergence of life and those incompatible with it.
“We can, in principle, make a cut between those consistent with the eventual emergence of life and those incompatible with it”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe relevant integrals may diverge, making assignment of mean values or averages for physical quantities in an ensemble problematic.
“Finally, the relevant integrals may diverge.In that case, assigning mean values or averages for physical quantities in an ensemble of universes is problematic”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kirchner & Ellis 2003 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningIn an ensemble in which all that is possible happens, all parameters will be member parameters.
“In an ensemble in which all that is possible happens, all parameters will be member parameters”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe existence of the actually infinite inevitably leads to unresolvable contradictions in set theory and in definitions and deductive foundations of mathematics.
“As he points out, following many others, the existence of the actually infinite inevitably leads to well-recognized unresolvable contradictions in set theory, and thus in definitions and deductive foundations of mathematics itself”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hilbert 1964
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenNo proof has been given that the physics that maximizes black hole production also favours life.
“no proof has been given of the last step, that the physics that maximizes black hole production also favours life.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Smolin's (1999)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenIf the set of realized models is finite or countably infinite, then almost all possible models are not realized and the ensemble represents a set of measure zero in the set of possible universes.
“However, on the other hand, if the set of realized models is either finite or countably infinite, then almost all possible models are not realized -the ensemble represents a set of measure zero in the set of possible universes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThere are infinitely many distribution functions that realize all possible universes, so a really existing 'ensemble of all possible universes' is not unique.
“However, there are an infinite number of distribution functions which would fulfil this condition, and so a really existing 'ensemble of all possible universes' is not unique.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenThere is still considerable uncertainty as to the nature of an ensemble even within the restricted FLRW context.
“There is still considerable uncertainty as to the nature of an ensemble even within this restricted context.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenProblems arise when it is claimed that there is an actually existing ensemble containing an infinite number of universes or of expanding universe regimes.
“the problems arising when it is claimed that there is an actually existing ensemble containing an infinite number of universes or of expanding universe regimes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenThe structures defined so far are uniform across the class of models in the possibility space, characterized by laws of physics and a restricted class of geometries.
“The structures defined so far are the uniform structures across the class of models in this possibility space, characterized both by laws of physics (in particular, general relativity) and by a restricted class of geometries.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe assumption that the product N_S * f_S * f_p * n_e * f_l * f_i > 0 might be acceptable in our physically realized Universe but there is no reason to believe it holds generally in an ensemble.
“This assumption might be acceptable in our physically realized Universe, but there is no reason to believe it would hold generally in an ensemble because these parameters will depend on other ensemble parameters, which will vary.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningBecause the parameters P determine the dynamics, the set of paths in S characterizing individual universes m are determined by this prescription.
“Because the parameters P determine the dynamics, the set of paths in S characterizing individual universes m are determined by this prescription.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe existence of multiverses or ensembles is in principle untestable by any direct observations, and the same applies to any hypothesized properties we may suppose for them.
“the existence of multiverses or ensembles is in principle untestable by any direct observations, and the same applies to any hypothesized properties we may suppose for them.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Leslie 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Gardner 2003
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThere is no conceptual problem with an infinite set of possible or conceivable universes.
“There is no conceptual problem with an infinite set -countable or uncountable -of possible or conceivable universes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe arguments against an infinite past time are strong; it is not constructible in terms of events or instants of time.
“The arguments against an infinite past time are strong -it is simply not constructible in terms of events or instants of time, besides being conceptually indefinite.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningRealizing probabilities for points of M implies a causal mechanism relating created members of the multiverse; otherwise there is no reason any probability law should be obeyed.
“Realizing such probabilities seems to imply a causal mechanism relating the created members of the multiverse to one another so they are not, in fact, causally disjoint.Otherwise, there is no reason why any probability law (Gaussian normal, for example) should be obeyed.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe regularities which must underlie any systematic description of truly disjoint multiverses must imply some kind of common generating mechanism.
“the regularities which must underlie any systematic description of truly disjoint multiverses must imply some kind of common generating mechanism.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenSpecifying the set of possible parameters determines a uniform high-level structure that is obeyed by all universes in M.
“specifying the set of possible parameters determines a uniform high-level structure that is obeyed by all universes in M.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningSome such structuring is necessary if we are to be able to describe a multiverse with specified properties; a coherent description is only possible through the existence of such regularities.
“Some such structuring is necessary if we are to be able to describe a multiverse with specified properties -a coherent description is only possible through the existence of such regularities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningM anthropic does not intersect M FLRW, because realistic models of a life-bearing universe like ours cannot be exactly FLRW, for then there is no structure.
“but does not intersect M FLRW (realistic models of a life-bearing universe like ours cannot be exactly FLRW, for then there is no structure).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningIt is often convenient to use a set of parameters which are comoving in state space, i.e. constants of motion.
“For these reasons it is often convenient to use a set of parameters which are comoving in the state space, i.e. parameters which are constants of motion.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenThere is vagueness about the proposed nature of multiverses.
“There is, however, a vagueness about the proposed nature of multiverses.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenThe same universe may occur several times over in the space of possible universes; the equivalence problem determines when such multiple representations occur.
“Note that the same universe may occur several times over in this space; the equivalence problem determines when such multiple representations occur.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone givenFor a complete probabilistic description of an ensemble we need both a distribution function P and a measure π.
“For a complete probabilistic description of an ensemble we need not only a distribution function P, but also a measure π = µ(x) dx for each parameter space with parameter x”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenIn order to define a FLRW ensemble, we need a set of independent parameters which uniquely identify all possible FLRW models.
“In order to define a FLRW ensemble, we need a set of independent parameters which uniquely identify all possible FLRW models.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenIn any given ensemble, not all possible universes may be realized, and some may be realized many times.
“However, in any given ensemble, they may not all be realized, and some may be realized many times.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningIt will be impossible at any stage to characterize that set of the multiverse in which all the conditions necessary for the emergence of self-conscious life and its maintenance have been met, because we do not know what those conditions are.
“It will be impossible at any stage to characterize that set of the multiverse in which all the conditions necessary for the emergence of self-conscious life and its maintenance have been met, for we do not know what those conditions are”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationRealized infinite sets are not constructible; there is no procedure to complete such a set.
“Others (see Spitzer 2000;Stoeger 2003, and references therein) have further pointed out that realized infinite sets are not constructible -there is no procedure we can in principle implement to complete such a set -they are simply incompletable.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Spitzer 2000 source
- cites Stoeger 2003
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningM Observational is a subset of M anthropic because we need observers to make observations.
“Precisely because we need observers to make observations, this is a subset of M anthropic .”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationcitationLife demands unique combinations of many different parameter values that must be realized simultaneously.
“life demands unique combinations of many different parameter values that must be realized simultaneously.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Davies 2003
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Tegmark 2003 source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningWe can provide necessary sets of parameter values but cannot guarantee completeness or independence.
“This means we can provide necessary sets of parameter values but cannot guarantee completeness or independence.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningThe detailed characterization of the space M and its relationship to S depends on the matter description used and its behaviour.
“The detailed characterization of this space, and its relationship to S, will depend on the matter description used and its behaviour.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningFuture infinite time is never realized; whatever time we reach, there is always more time available.
“Future infinite time also is never realized; rather, the situation is that whatever time we reach, there is always more time available.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningGenuine existence of an uncountable infinitude of models is highly problematic.
“Because of the real number continuum, this is an uncountably infinite set of models -and genuine existence of such an uncountable infinitude is highly problematic.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationA really existing infinite set is not possible.
“However, as stressed by Hilbert (1964), it can be argued that a really existing infinite set is not possible.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hilbert 1964
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenMany inflaton potentials may yield ensembles uninteresting for life, but some will be bio-friendly.
“Many of these potentials may yield ensembles which are uninteresting as far as the emergence of life is concerned, but some will be bio-friendly.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenChaotic inflation proposals are not directly observationally testable, and there is no astronomical evidence that the supposed other FLRW-like regions exist.
“Also, these proposals are not directly observationally testable -we have no astronomical evidence the supposed other FLRW-like regions exist.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningOverarching physics, or a 'law of laws' represented by the inflaton field and its potential, can lead to a really existing ensemble of many very different FLRW-like regions of a larger universe.
“This type of scenario suggests how overarching physics, or a 'law of laws' (represented by the inflaton field and its potential), can lead to a really existing ensemble of many very different FLRW-like regions of a larger universe.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenIf a multiverse contains a finite or infinite countable number of universes, the distribution function contains Dirac δ-functions.
“A multiverse might contain a finite or infinite countable number of universes.In these cases, the distribution function contains Dirac δ-functions”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThere is no evidence that the postulated physics is true in this universe, much less in some pre-existing metaspace that might generate a multiverse.
“There is no evidence that the postulated physics is true in this universe, much less in some pre-existing metaspace that might generate a multiverse.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningWe seem to face an infinite regress when following the logic of explaining meta-laws, and it is not clear how to end it except by arbitrarily calling a stop.
“We seem to face an infinite regress as we follow this logic to its conclusion, and it is not clear how to end it except by arbitrarily calling a stop to this process.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Some relevant meta-laws pre-exist.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIf a multiverse is 'tested' by its prediction that our universe is a likely member, then an ensemble with many copies should be the most satisfying one, but one copy (just our universe) might be just as well.
“If a multiverse is 'tested' by its prediction that our universe is a likely member, then such an ensemble should be the most satisfying one -but then we might just as well be happy with one copy, i.e. just our universe.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningDifferent distribution functions are needed for different possibility spaces.
“While distribution functions can be parametrized by any set of coordinates over the possibility space, we need different distribution functions for different possibility spaces.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationIf we live in a 'small universe' where we have already seen right round the universe, then the universe closes up on itself in a single FLRW-like domain and no further causally connected such domains can exist.
“These are when we live in a 'small universe' where we have already seen right round the universe (Ellis & Schrieber 1986;Lachieze-Rey & Luminet 1995) for then the universe closes up on itself in a single FLRW-like domain and so no further such domains that are causally connected to us in a single connected space-time can exist.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThese transformations are not unique, and hence it is possible to find many different measures.
“These transformations are not unique, and hence it is possible to find many different measures.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningPhilosophical argumentation is unavoidable if one is to seriously argue the claim for existence of a multiverse.
“Thus, philosophical argumentation is unavoidable if one is to seriously argue the claim for existence of a multiverse.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenThe measure is in general non-normalizable and hence there is no normalizable maximum-entropy distribution; without additional information we cannot calculate definite probabilities.
“Secondly, the measure is in general non-normalizable and hence there is no normalizable maximum-entropy distribution.Without additional information we are not able to calculate definite probabilities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenA particular distribution function can be expressed in any set of coordinates.
“It is clear that a particular distribution function can be expressed in any set of coordinates.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationnone givenIn order to establish distributions in a non-arbitrary way, we need a theory of how this particular ensemble is selected for from all other possible ones.
“However, in order to establish these in a non-arbitrary way, we need a theory of how this particular ensemble is selected for from all the other possible ones.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThere is a vast set of possible distribution functions.
“Obviously there is a vast set of possible distribution functions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe individual universes making up an ensemble with regularities are not actually independent of each other; they are products of a single process.
“This in turn means that the individual universes making up the ensemble are not actually independent of each other.They are, instead, products of a single process, as in the case of chaotic inflation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningFor the 1/ρ distribution, the divergence is inside the anthropically allowed region and is non-integrable.
“In this case the divergence is located inside the anthropically allowed region and is non-integrable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimBorderline on S4 (based): unclear from the text.
Interpretationnone givenEnsembles resulting from a single causal process and ensembles consisting of discrete entities are ultimately not distinguishable from each other.
“We discuss these two cases in turn, and then show that they are ultimately not distinguishable from each other.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIf space-time is quantized at the Planck level, then all physical quantities are quantized and uncountable infinities become finite numbers in any finite interval.
“The problem would be allayed if space-time is quantized at the Planck level, as suggested for example by loop quantum gravity.In that case we can argue that all physical quantities also are quantized, and the uncountable infinities of the real line become transmuted into finite numbers in any finite interval”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe proposed underlying physics for chaotic inflation has not been tested and may be untestable.
“However, the problem is that the proposed underlying physics has not been tested, and indeed may be untestable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningFor the 1/ρ distribution, the expectation value of the cosmological constant vanishes, so we fail to explain the observed non-zero value.
“For this case, the expectation value vanishes, i.e. ρ = ρ max 0 ρ (1/ρ ) dρ ρ max 0 (1/ρ ) dρ = 0 and we fail to explain the observed non-zero value of the cosmological constant.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenObservational probabilities are never conclusive.
“In any case, in the end those papers all deal just with observational probabilities, which are never conclusive.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn scalar-field models P(ρ) is directly related to the a priori distribution of scalar-field fluctuations, and for a wide class of potentials the variations of P(ρ) over the anthropically allowed range should be negligible.
“In scalar-field models P(ρ ) is in direct relation to the a priori distribution of the scalar-field fluctuations and it has been argued (Weinberg 2000a,b) that for a wide class of potentials the variations of P(ρ ) over the anthropically allowed range (where N(ρ ) = 0) should be negligible.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Weinberg 2000a,b
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningWe cannot link the distribution of the cosmological constant to that of the scalar field in a unique way, and there is a vast choice for possible a priori probability distributions for the cosmological constant.
“Hence, we cannot link the distribution of the cosmological constant to that of the scalar field in a unique way, and there is a vast choice for possible a priori probability distributions for the cosmological constant.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenIn the ensemble of all possible universes, all possible inflaton potentials and all solutions to those potentials should exist, including stationary and non-stationary chaotic inflationary models.
“Finally, from the point of view of the ensemble of all possible universes often invoked in discussions of multiverses, all possible inflaton potentials should be considered, as well as all solutions to all those potentials.They should all exist in such a multiverse, which will include chaotic inflationary models which are stationary as well as those which are non-stationary.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningFor the 1/√ρ distribution, there is a divergence in the anthropically allowed region, but it is integrable.
“Again, there is a divergence in the anthropically allowed region, but this time it is integrable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThere is a philosophical problem surrounding a realized infinite set of any kind.
“As we have pointed out above, there is a philosophical problem surrounding a realized infinite set of any kind.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe infinities of really existent FLRW-like domains derive from the assumed initial infinite flat or open space sections, and there are problems in assuming such space sections are actually realized.
“In this case, the infinities of really existent FLRW-like domains derive from the assumed initial infinite flat (or open) space sections -and we have pointed out above the problems in assuming such space sections are actually realized.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The initial space sections are infinite flat or open.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenThe only known method for constructing such a measure is Jaynes' principle.
“The only known method for constructing such a measure is Jaynes' principle.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningIf you cannot show which particular multiverse exists, it is doubtful you have shown any one exists.
“Indeed, if you cannot show which particular one exists, it is doubtful you have shown any one exists.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisereasoningAnthropic FLRW universes are those in which the necessary cosmological conditions for life are fulfilled, allowing galaxies, stars and planets if the universe is perturbed, so allowing a non-zero factor N_g * N_S.
“We can identify those FLRW universes in which the emergence and sustenance of life is possible at a broad levelfoot_8 -the necessary cosmological conditions have been fulfilled allowing the existence of galaxies, stars and planets if the universe is perturbed, so allowing a non-zero factor N g * N S * as discussed above.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenIn the state of minimum information we do not know the natural parametrization, and different measures correspond to different guesses.
“Nevertheless, in the state of minimum information we do not know what the natural parametrization is for the possibility space and different measures correspond to different guesses.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenA similar relation to equation (24) should hold for multiverses in the wider sense.
“It is clear that a similar relation to equation ( 24) should hold for multiverses in the wider sense.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenIn a true multiverse, there is no possibility of any indirect causal connection of any kind; the universes are completely disjoint.
“In the case of a true multiverse, there is not even any possibility of any indirect causal connection of any kind -the universes are then completely disjoint and nothing that happens in any one of them is causally linked to what happens in any other one.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThere is no direct evidence of existence of the claimed other universe regions in an ensemble, nor can there be any, because they lie beyond the visual horizon and most beyond the particle horizon.
“There is no direct evidence of existence of the claimed other universe regions in an ensemble, nor can there be any, for they lie beyond the visual horizon; most will even be beyond the particle horizon, so there is no causal connection with them.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe one way we might make a reasonable claim for the existence of a multiverse would be if we could show its existence was a more or less inevitable consequence of well-established physical laws and processes.
“The one way we might make a reasonable claim for the existence of a multiverse would be if we could show its existence was a more or less inevitable consequence of well-established physical laws and processes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenWithout knowledge of the creation mechanism, it is impossible to determine the measure with certainty.
“Without knowledge of the creation mechanism, it is impossible to determine this measure with certainty.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe measure is derived from the chosen set of parameters; generally a different choice of parameters yields a different minimum-information measure, predicting another maximum-entropy distribution function.
“First, the measure is derived from the chosen set of parameters.Generally a different choice of parameters yields a different minimum-information measure, predicting another maximum-entropy distribution function.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIf the existence of a multiverse is a scientific proposition, we need to be able to show which specific multiverse exists, but there is no observational way to do this.
“The point is that there is not just an issue of showing a multiverse exists -if this is a scientific proposition we need to be able to show which specific multiverse exists; but there is no observational way to do this.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenThe requirement of structure formation as a prerequisite for life places strong anthropic constraints on the domains in which observers could exist, and these constraints must be satisfied in the really existing universe.
“The requirement of structure formation as a prerequisite for life places strong anthropic constraints on the domains in which observers could exist; these constraints must be satisfied in the really existing universe.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenReally existing multiverses that can be defined as candidates for the one to which our Universe belongs are not unique, and neither their properties nor their existence are directly testable.
“It is, however, abundantly clear that 'really existing multiverses' which can be defined as candidates for the one to which our Universe belongs are not unique, and neither their properties nor their existence are directly testable.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningIf all that can exist exists, then there are universe models occupying the biophilic subspace.
“The issue of fine-tuning is the statement that the biophilic set of universes is a very small subset of the set of possible universes; but if all that can exist exists then there are universe models occupying this biophilic subspace.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningA small universe would disprove the usual chaotic inflationary scenario, but not a true multiverse proposal, for that cannot be shown false by any observation, nor shown true.
“This would disprove the usual chaotic inflationary scenario, but not a true multiverse proposal, for that cannot be shown to be false by any observation.Neither can it be shown to be true.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenPerturbations of exact FLRW models can allow life, but exact FLRW models themselves cannot.
“More accurately, perturbations of these models can allow life -the exact FLRW models themselves cannot do so.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenEven if inflation works just once, that is sufficient to give a model close enough to standard FLRW cosmological models to be friendly to life.
“The counter response is that this does not matter; however small the chances are, if it works just once then that is sufficient to give a model close enough to the standard FLRW cosmological models to be friendly to life.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe multiverse idea has problems: realized infinities; inability to describe such ensembles because we do not know all possibilities; and it is not testable or provable in the usual scientific sense, remaining a matter of faith rather than proof.
“However, there are the following problems: (i) the issue of realized infinities discussed above; (ii) the problem of our inability to describe such ensembles because we do not know what all the possibilities are, so our solution is in terms of a category we cannot fully describe; (iii) the multiverse idea is not testable or provable in the usual scientific sense -existence of the hypothesized”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningA really existing ensemble or multiverse is not a priori unique, nor uniquely defined; it must somehow be selected for.
“Our fundamental starting point is the recognition that there is an important distinction to be made between possible universes and realized universes, and our main conclusion is that a really existing ensemble or multiverse is not a priori unique, nor uniquely defined.It must somehow be selected for.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenIt is very likely that the simultaneous realization of all the conditions for life will pick out only a very small sector of the parameter space of all possibilities; anthropic universes are fine-tuned.
“It is very likely that the simultaneous realization of all the conditions for life will pick out only a very small sector of the parameter space of all possibilities; anthropic universes are fine-tuned.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenPrevious discussions have not made clear what is required in order to define a multiverse, although some specific physical calculations have been given based on restricted low-dimensional multiverses.
“However, previous discussions have not made clear what is required in order to define a multiverse, although some specific physical calculations have been given based on restricted low-dimensional multiverses.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe ultimate questions about why this multiverse and its order cannot be answered scientifically because of the lack of any possibility of verification of any proposed underlying theory, and must be argued in philosophical terms.
“In our view these questions -Issues 1 and 2 discussed in this paper -cannot be answered scientifically because of the lack of any possibility of verification of any proposed underlying theory.They will of necessity have to be argued in philosophical terms.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe existence of life is quite unlike anything else in the physical world and requires explanation beyond chance.
“The counter response is that the existence of life is quite unlike anything else in the physical world -its coming into being is not just like choosing one out of numerous essentially identical hands of cards.It is like being transformed into an entirely different higher level game, and so does indeed require explanation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe claim that inflation explains the current state of the universe is only partially successful, because very anisotropic or inhomogeneous models may never inflate.
“However, this move is only partially successful, because very anisotropic or inhomogeneous models may never inflate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenAt present, uniqueness eludes us.
“At present, uniqueness eludes us.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe evolution of life should only be possible in sufficiently flat models, at not too early and not too late times.
“The evolution of life should only be possible in sufficiently flat models -otherwise the universes either recollapse too early or are too empty -at not too early and not too late times.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe primordial process or overarching cosmic principle effectively selects a really existing multiverse from the possibilities in M and defines a distribution function over M.
“These effectively select a really existing multiverse from the possibilities in M, and, as such, effectively define a distribution function over M.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe multiverse idea in the end represents a regress of causation.
“Furthermore, in the end it simply represents a regress of causation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAlmost-FLRW universes that are good models of our observable Universe are a small subset of all possible universes, and it is conceivable they are part of a multiverse or ensemble.
“They are a small subset of all possible universes, and it is conceivable they are part of a multiverse or ensemble of universes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The authors state this as an assumption.
The description of the space M of possible universes assumes a set of laws of behaviour (laws of physics or meta-laws) that all universes have in common.
“The very description of this space M of possibilities is based on an assumed set of laws of behaviour, either laws of physics or meta-laws that determine the laws of physics, which all universes m have in common; without this, we have no basis for setting up its description.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The expected number of planets with intelligent life in a universe is given by an adaptation of the Drake equation.
“An adaptation of the Drake equation (Bennett et al. 2002) gives for the expected number of planets with intelligent life in any particular universe m in an ensemble”
The authors state this as an assumption.
There is a function on the set of possible universes that describes the probability that life may evolve.
“we need a function on the set of possible universes that describes the probability that life may evolve.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The quantities {N_g, N_S, f_S, f_p, n_e, f_l, f_i} are functions of the physical and cosmological parameters.
“The quantities {N g , N S , f S , f p , n e , f l , f i } are functions of the physical and cosmological parameters characterized above”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The family of FLRW models considered is filled with matter components characterized by a γ-law equation of state.
“We assume the family considered is filled with matter components characterized by a γ -law equation of state”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Gravity is described by the Einstein field equations.
“Assuming gravity is described by the Einstein field equations, the evolution of FLRW models is described by the Friedmann equation”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The discussion is restricted to models with only a cosmological constant and one comoving matter component obeying a γ-law equation of state.
“We restrict our discussion to models with only a cosmological constant and one comoving matter component which obeys a γ -law equation of state”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Only the gravitational constant G and the cosmological constant Λ are variables, with ranges G ∈ [0, ∞) and Λ ∈ (-∞, ∞).
“For this simplified discussion let us just assume that only the gravitational constant G and the cosmological constant (which also qualifies as a model parameter) are variables, with the rangesfoot_4 G ∈ [0, ∞) and ∈ (-∞, ∞).”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Space-time is quantized at the Planck level (or physical quantities are quantized) to soften the infinity problem.
“We believe that this is a physically reasonable assumption to make, thus softening a major problem for many ensemble proposals.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The factor F = f_l * f_i, representing other conditions for life, is non-zero.
“the above assumes this factor is non-zero.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The cosmological constant is a remnant of some underlying unknown theory and might be restricted to some domain of values.
“Let us assume that the cosmological constant is a remnant of some underlying (unknown) theory and as such might be restricted to some domain of values.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Some relevant meta-laws pre-exist.
“As emphasized above, we have to assume that some relevant meta-laws pre-exist.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Quantum field theory remains valid far beyond the domain where it has been tested.
“It is also that, for example, we are assuming quantum field theory remains valid far beyond the domain where it has been tested, and we have faith in that extreme extrapolation despite all the unsolved problems at the foundation of quantum theory, the divergences of quantum field theory, and the failure of that theory to provide a satisfactory resolution of the cosmological constant problem.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The initial space sections are infinite flat or open.
“In this case, the infinities of really existent FLRW-like domains derive from the assumed initial infinite flat (or open) space sections -and we have pointed out above the problems in assuming such space sections are actually realized.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
As Ellis et al. (2004) point out, any multiverse proposal will have to deal with the problems of what determines {M; f(m); p}, actualized infinities, non-renormalisability, parameter dependence and non-uniqueness of p, and how one could possibly observationally confirm any of these quantities.
“As Ellis et al. (2004) point out, any such proposal will have to deal with the problems of what determines {M; f ðmÞ; p}, actualized infinities (in M, f(m) and the spatial extent of universes) and non-renormalisability, the parameter dependence and non-uniqueness of p, and how one could possibly observationally confirm any of these quantities.”
From The Fine-Tuning of the Universe for Intelligent Life (2012) · cites this paper as Ellis et al. (2004)
Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Cites
Linde, A. D. (1983) · Physics Letters B · doi:10.1016/0370-2693(83)90837-7 · Cited by 3,299 · see citing works
A class of homogeneous cosmological models
Ellis, G., & MacCallum, M. A. H. (1969) · Communications in Mathematical Physics · doi:10.1007/bf01645908 · Cited by 861 · cited 3× · see citing works
“6The way the tetrad description given above relates to FLRW universes is described in detail in Ellis & MacCallum (1969).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationFrom the big bang theory to the theory of a stationary universe
Linde, A., Linde, D., & Mezhlumian, A. (1994) · Physical Review D · doi:10.1103/physrevd.49.1783 · Cited by 542 · cited 1× · see citing works
“A detailed example of this approach, in which specific probability distributions are derived from a Langevin-type equation describing the stochastic behaviour of the inflaton over horizon-sized regions before inflation begins, is given in Linde & Mezhlumian (1993) and in Linde et al. (1994).”
MethodCovariant and gauge-invariant approach to cosmological density fluctuations
Ellis, G. F. R., & Bruni, M. (1989) · Physical Review D · doi:10.1103/physrevd.40.1804 · Cited by 535 · cited 1× · see citing works
“These need to be characterized in a gauge-invariant way (see, for example, Ellis & Bruni 1989) so that we can clearly identify those universes that are almost-FLRW and those that are not.”
BackgroundSelf-citationPARTICLE PHYSICS AND INFLATIONARY COSMOLOGY
Linde, A. D. (1990) · Inflation and Quantum Cosmology · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-450145-4.50004-9 · Cited by 534 · see citing works
Lachièze-Rey, M., & Luminet, J.-P. (1995) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/0370-1573(94)00085-h · Cited by 437 · see citing works
Luminet, J.-P., Weeks, J. R., Riazuelo, A., Lehoucq, R., & Uzan, J.-P. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature01944 · Cited by 424 · see citing works
Dynamics of Pressure-Free Matter in General Relativity
Ellis, G. F. R. (1967) · Journal of Mathematical Physics · doi:10.1063/1.1705331 · Cited by 411 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Except in the special cases of isotropic space–times and locally rotationally symmetric space–times (see Ellis 1967; van Elst & Ellis 1996), the basis tetrad can be chosen in an invariant way so that three of these quantities vanish and all the rest are scalar invariants.”
BackgroundSelf-citationPredictions from Quantum Cosmology
Vilenkin, A. (1995) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.74.846 · Cited by 368 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Linde and others have applied a stochastic approach to inflation (Starobinsky 1986; Linde, Linde & Mezhlumian 1994; Vilenkin 1995; Garriga & Vilenkin 2001; Linde 2003), through which probability distributions can be derived from inflaton potentials along with the usual cosmological equations (the…”
BackgroundIs “the Theory of Everything” Merely the Ultimate Ensemble Theory?
Tegmark, M. (1998) · Annals of Physics · doi:10.1006/aphy.1998.5855 · Cited by 250 · cited 1× · see citing works
“They might be associated with the multi-universe Everett–Wheeler-type interpretation of quantum mechanics (Deutsch 1998), or perhaps multiverses can be truly disjoint collections of universes (see Sciama 1993; Lewis 2000; Rees 2001a,b,c; Tegmark 1998, 2003).”
BackgroundThe fabric of reality: the science of parallel universes--and its implications
(1998) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.35-3931 · Cited by 201 · see citing works
The Cosmological Constant Problems
Weinberg, S. (2001) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-04587-9_2 · Cited by 181 · see citing works
The covariant approach to LRS perfect fluid spacetime geometries
van Elst, H., & Ellis, G. F. R. (1996) · Classical and Quantum Gravity · doi:10.1088/0264-9381/13/5/023 · Cited by 143 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Except in the special cases of isotropic space–times and locally rotationally symmetric space–times (see Ellis 1967; van Elst & Ellis 1996), the basis tetrad can be chosen in an invariant way so that three of these quantities vanish and all the rest are scalar invariants.”
BackgroundSelf-citationTegmark, M. (2003) · Scientific American · doi:10.1038/scientificamerican0503-40 · Cited by 143
Linde, A. D., & Mezhlumian, A. (1993) · Physics Letters B · doi:10.1016/0370-2693(93)90187-m · Cited by 141 · cited 1× · see citing works
“A detailed example of this approach, in which specific probability distributions are derived from a Langevin-type equation describing the stochastic behaviour of the inflaton over horizon-sized regions before inflation begins, is given in Linde & Mezhlumian (1993) and in Linde et al. (1994).”
MethodOn likely values of the cosmological constant
Garriga, J., & Vilenkin, A. (2000) · Physical Review D · doi:10.1103/physrevd.61.083502 · Cited by 133 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Weinberg (2000a,b) and Garriga & Vilenkin (2000) derive a probability distribution for the cosmological constant in the context of an ensemble of regions generated in the same inflationary sequence via the action of a given inflaton potential, where the cosmological constant is given by the…”
Background<i>Just Six Numbers: The Deep Forces that Shape the Universe</i>
Rees, M., & Kolb, E. W. (2000) · Physics Today · doi:10.1063/1.1341923 · Cited by 130 · see citing works
A prioriprobability distribution of the cosmological constant
Weinberg, S. (2000) · Physical review. D. Particles, fields, gravitation, and cosmology/Physical review. D. Particles and fields · doi:10.1103/physrevd.61.103505 · Cited by 99 · cited 2× · see citing works
“In scalar-field models P(ρ ) is in direct relation to the a priori distribution of the scalar-field fluctuations and it has been argued (Weinberg 2000a,b) that for a wide class of potentials the variations of P(ρ ) over the anthropically allowed range (where N(ρ ) = 0) should be negligible.”
BackgroundCosmological models (Cargèse lectures 1998)Preprint
Ellis, G., & van Elst, H. (1998) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.gr-qc/9812046 · Cited by 84 · see citing works
Self-citationTestable anthropic predictions for dark energy
Garriga, J., & Vilenkin, A. (2002) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.astro-ph/0210358 · Cited by 81
M-theory, Cosmological Constant and Anthropic Principle
Kallosh, R., & Linde, A. (2002) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.hep-th/0208157 · Cited by 79
Observational and dynamical properties of small universes
Ellis, G. F. R., & Schreiber, G. (1986) · Physics Letters A · doi:10.1016/0375-9601(86)90032-0 · Cited by 72 · see citing works
Self-citationRees, M. (2001) · doi:10.1515/9781400841073 · Cited by 65
Cold big-bang cosmology as a counterexample to several anthropic arguments
Aguirre, A. (2001) · Physical Review D · doi:10.1103/physrevd.64.083508 · Cited by 64 · cited 1× · see citing works
“We are a long way from understanding all these issues; allowing the cosmological parameters to vary simultaneously can change the predictions enormously (Aguirre 2001).”
BackgroundAsymptotic dynamics of the exceptional Bianchi cosmologies
Hewitt, C. G., Horwood, J. T., & Wainwright, J. (2003) · Classical and Quantum Gravity · doi:10.1088/0264-9381/20/9/311 · Cited by 51 · see citing works
The Doomsday Argument and the Number of Possible Observers
Olum, K. D. (2002) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00260 · Cited by 50 · cited 2× · see citing works
“However, usually these models either in effect assume an ensemble exists, or else are content to deal with potentially existing ensembles rather than actually existing ones (see, for example, Olum 2002).”
BackgroundGarriga, J., & Vilenkin, A. (2001) · Physical Review D · doi:10.1103/physrevd.64.043511 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
Ehlers, J., & Rindler, W. (1989) · Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society · doi:10.1093/mnras/238.2.503 · Cited by 43 · cited 4× · see citing works
“Ehlers & Rindler (1989) developed a parametrization in terms of the observable density parameters (they also include a radiation component) and the Hubble parameter.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialLate-time asymptotic dynamics of Bianchi VIII cosmologies
Horwood, J. T., HANCOCK, M. J., The, D., & Wainwright, J. (2003) · Classical and Quantum Gravity · doi:10.1088/0264-9381/20/9/312 · Cited by 34 · see citing works
A probability measure for FLRW models
Kirchner, U., & Ellis, G. F. R. (2003) · Classical and Quantum Gravity · doi:10.1088/0264-9381/20/6/311 · Cited by 15 · cited 4× · see citing works
“This life-allowing region is indicated schematically. equation of state has been discussed in Kirchner & Ellis (2003).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationDefinitions of Real Time and Ultimate Reality
Spitzer, R. J. (2000) · Ultimate Reality and Meaning · doi:10.3138/uram.23.3.260 · Cited by 4 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Others (see Spitzer 2000; Stoeger 2003, and references therein) have further pointed out that realized infinite sets are not constructible – there is no procedure we can in principle implement to complete such a set – they are simply incompletable.”
BackgroundThe doomsday argument and the number of possible observersPreprint
Olum, K. D. (2000) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.gr-qc/0009081 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Concluding PerspectivePreprint
Rees, M. J. (2001) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.astro-ph/0101268
On likely values of the cosmological constant
Garriga, J., & Vilenkin, A. (1999) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.astro-ph/9908115
Asymptotic dynamics of the exceptional Bianchi cosmologies
Hewitt, C. G., Horwood, J. T., & Wainwright, J. (2002) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.gr-qc/0211071
Late-time asymptotic dynamics of Bianchi VIII cosmologies
Horwood, J. T., Hancock, M. J., The, D., et al. (2002) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.gr-qc/0210031
Asymptotic isotropization in inhomogeneous cosmology
Lim, W. C., van Elst, H., Uggla, C., et al. (2003) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.gr-qc/0306118
Linde, A., & Mezhlumian, A. (1993) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.gr-qc/9304015
Is "the theory of everything'' merely the ultimate ensemble theory?
Tegmark, M. (1997) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.gr-qc/9704009
The past attractor in inhomogeneous cosmology
Uggla, C., van Elst, H., Wainwright, J., et al. (2003) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.gr-qc/0304002
A Priori Probability Distribution of the Cosmological Constant
Weinberg, S. (2000) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.astro-ph/0002387
The Cold Big-Bang Cosmology as a Counter-example to Several Anthropic Arguments
Aguirre, A. (2001) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.astro-ph/0106143
Lachieze-Rey, M., & Luminet, J. P. (1996) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.gr-qc/9605010
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 6
- 1991, MEM ITAL ASTRON SOC, 62, 553
- 1999, TOWARD A NEW MILLENIUM IN GALAXY MORPHOLOGY, Vol. 269 279, 693
- 1979, QJRAS, 20, 37
- 1999, THEORETICAL AND OBSERVATIONAL COSMOLOGY, 541, 1
- 2002, PHYS REV D, 67, 043503
- 2002, PHYS REV D, 67, 023510
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Varying Constants, Gravitation and Cosmology
Uzan, J. (2010) · Living Reviews in Relativity · doi:10.12942/lrr-2011-2 · Cited by 708 · see citing works
“Such an approach is indeed not widely accepted and has been criticized in many ways [7, 182, 480, 402, 479, 511, 475].”
BackgroundTegmark, M. (2007) · Foundations of Physics · doi:10.1007/s10701-007-9186-9 · Cited by 489 · see citing works
Varying Constants, Gravitation and Cosmology
Uzan, J. (2011) · DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) · Cited by 392 · see citing works
The Fine-Tuning of the Universe for Intelligent Life
Barnes, L. A. (2012) · Publications of the Astronomical Society of Australia · doi:10.1071/as12015 · Cited by 150 · see citing works
“As Ellis et al. (2004) point out, any such proposal will have to deal with the problems of what determines {M; f ðmÞ; p}, actualized infinities (in M, f(m) and the spatial extent of universes) and non-renormalisability, the parameter dependence and non-uniqueness of p, and how one could possibly…”
BackgroundCarr, B. J., & Ellis, G. (2008) · Astronomy & Geophysics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-4004.2008.49229.x · Cited by 135 · see citing works
“For criticisms, see Gardner (2003), Ellis et al. (2004) and Smolin (2007).”
BackgroundSelf-citationISSUES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF COSMOLOGY
Ellis, G. (2007) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-044451560-5/50014-2 · Cited by 128 · see citing works
“These three elements (the possibility space, the measure, and the distribution function) must all be clearly defined in order to give a proper specification of a multiverse [69].”
BackgroundSelf-citationVidal, C. (2014) · The frontiers collection · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-05062-1 · Cited by 67 · see citing works
Multiple universes, cosmic coincidences, and other dark matters
Aguirre, A., & Tegmark, M. (2004) · Journal of Cosmology and Astroparticle Physics · doi:10.1088/1475-7516/2005/01/003 · Cited by 73 · see citing works
Multiple universes, cosmic coincidences, and other dark mattersPreprint
Aguirre, A. N., & Tegmark, M. (2004) · Cited by 55 · see citing works
The degree of fine-tuning in our universe — and others
Adams, F. C. (2019) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2019.02.001 · Cited by 62 · see citing works
“Current cosmological theories argue that our universe may be only one component of a vast collection of universes that make up a much larger region of spacetime, often called the “multiverse” or the “megaverse” [119, 165, 172, 186, 196, 227, 261, 357, 445].”
BackgroundScreams for explanation: finetuning and naturalness in the foundations of physics
Hossenfelder, S. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02377-5 · Cited by 85 · see citing works
“The reader interested in learning more details about this particular type of finetuning is referred to Barnes (2012), Ellis et al. (2004).”
BackgroundThe Born rule fails in cosmology
Page, D. (2009) · Journal of Cosmology and Astroparticle Physics · doi:10.1088/1475-7516/2009/07/008 · Cited by 47 · see citing works
Onset of inflation in loop quantum cosmology
Germani, C., Nelson, W., & Sakellariadou, M. (2007) · Physical review. D. Particles, fields, gravitation, and cosmology/Physical review. D. Particles and fields · doi:10.1103/physrevd.76.043529 · Cited by 37 · see citing works
Cosmological measures without volume weighting
Page, D. (2008) · Journal of Cosmology and Astroparticle Physics · doi:10.1088/1475-7516/2008/10/025 · Cited by 39 · see citing works
Fundamental constants: from measurement to the universe, a window on gravitation and cosmology
Uzan, J.-P. (2025) · Living Reviews in Relativity · doi:10.1007/s41114-025-00059-y · Cited by 36 · see citing works
Testability and epistemic shifts in modern cosmology
Kragh, H. (2013) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics · doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2012.12.001 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
“It seems to be generally accepted that the latter kind of multiverse, advocated by a few physicists, cannot be subject to scientific analysis and must be characterized as an interesting philosophical speculation (Ellis et al., 2004).”
BackgroundPredictability crisis in early universe cosmology
Smeenk, C. (2014) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics · doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2013.11.003 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
“13See Ellis et al. (2004) for a general, systematic discussion of multiverse ensembles and the measure problem.”
BackgroundDRAKE EQUATION FOR THE MULTIVERSE: FROM THE STRING LANDSCAPE TO COMPLEX LIFE
Gleiser, M. (2010) · International Journal of Modern Physics D · doi:10.1142/s0218271810017949 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
0 DRAKE EQUATION FOR THE MULTIVERSE: FROM THE STRING LANDSCAPE TO COMPLEX LIFEPreprint
Gleiser, M. (2016) · Cited by 25 · see citing works
Infinity and the Nostalgia of the Stars
Bersanelli, M. (2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511976889.011 · Cited by 24 · see citing works
An f ( R , T ) gravity based FLRW model and observational constraints
Pradhan, A., Goswami, G., Rani, R., et al. (2023) · Astronomy and Computing · doi:10.1016/j.ascom.2023.100737 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Science and Ideology: The Case of Cosmology in the Soviet Union, 1947–1963
Kragh, H. (2013) · Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum · doi:10.11590/abhps.2013.1.02 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
Dark energy, gravitation and the Copernican principle
Uzan, J. (2010) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139193627.002 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
Relativistic models and the expanding universe
Realdi, M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198817666.013.3 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
The Oxford Handbook of the History of Modern Cosmology
Kragh, H., & Longair, M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198817666.001.0001 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
Dark Energy, Dark Matter, and the Multiverse
Irani, A. (2021) · Journal of High Energy Physics Gravitation and Cosmology · doi:10.4236/jhepgc.2021.71009 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
“The idea of a Multiverse-an ensemble of Universes-has received increasing attention in Cosmology as the outcome of the originating process that generated our own Universe [14].”
BackgroundSensitivity of carbon and oxygen yields to the triple-alpha resonance in massive stars
Huang, L., Adams, F., & Grohs, E. (2018) · Astroparticle physics · doi:10.1016/j.astropartphys.2018.09.005 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
“, our local region could represent one member of a vast collection of other universes [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7].”
BackgroundCosmological zoo—accelerating models with dark energy
Szydłowski, M. (2007) · Journal of Cosmology and Astroparticle Physics · doi:10.1088/1475-7516/2007/09/007 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
The implementation, interpretation, and justification of likelihoods in cosmology
McCoy, C. D. (2017) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics · doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2017.05.002 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
“The interested reader should refer to the critiques in (Smeenk, 2014) and (Ellis et al., 2004) as a starting point.”
BackgroundThe Philosophy of Astronomy, Cosmology, and Astrobiology: A Preliminary Reconnaissance
Dick, S. J. (2020) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-41614-0_37 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Agnesi weighting for the measure problem of cosmology
Page, D. (2010) · Journal of Cosmology and Astroparticle Physics · doi:10.1088/1475-7516/2011/03/031 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
“Most of the work on the measure problem in cosmology has focused on regularizing these infinite numbers of observations [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 1, 55,…”
BackgroundAre anthropic arguments, involving multiverses and beyond, legitimate?
Stoeger, W. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107050990.027 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
“The presupposition here is that there exist universes or domains representing the full range of possibilities [7].”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationElucidation of ‘Cosmic Coincidence’
Shimon, M. (2023) · New Astronomy · doi:10.1016/j.newast.2023.102126 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
The Big Bang, quantum cosmology and creatio ex nihilo
William, R., & Stoeger, S. J. (2010) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511778063.012 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Artificial Cosmogenesis: A New Kind of Cosmology
Vidal, C. (2012) · Emergence, complexity and computation · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35482-3_13 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“To define it, we build on Drake’s [19] equation in the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI) and on the thoughtful discussion of possible universes by Ellis, Kirchner and Stoeger [23].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialNuclear processes in other universes: Varying the strength of the weak force
Howe, A., Grohs, E., & Adams, F. (2018) · Physical Review D · doi:10.1103/physrevd.98.063014 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Effects of bound diprotons and enhanced nuclear reaction rates on stellar evolution
Adams, F., Howe, A., Grohs, E., & Fuller, G. (2021) · Astroparticle physics · doi:10.1016/j.astropartphys.2021.102584 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“An ongoing debate in cosmology considers whether our local universe is one out of many [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] and whether or not the laws of physics could be different in other (causally disconnected) regions.”
BackgroundMcMullin, E. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511536557.007 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Life, the Multiverse, and Fine-Tuning
Helbig, P. (2023) · Foundations of Physics · doi:10.1007/s10701-023-00732-8 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“That is one of the conclusions of [84], who provide an interesting survey of the topic of Multiverses in physical cosmology.”
BackgroundThe cosmic microwave background: from discovery to precision cosmology
Partridge, R. B. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198817666.013.8 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Anthropic Selection of Physical Constants, Quantum Entanglement, and the Multiverse Falsifiability
Da̧browski, M. (2019) · Universe · doi:10.3390/universe5070172 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“There is an issue of how large the sets are (or ensembles [55]) of universes and whether these sets are finite or infinite and if the latter is the case, then whether they are at least countable perhaps in the sense of cardinal numbers or uncountable [84]? The question is also what would be the measure of the set of u…”
BackgroundInfluentialCOSMOLOGICAL MEASURES WITH VOLUME AVERAGING
Page, D. (2011) · International Journal of Modern Physics Conference Series · doi:10.1142/s2010194511000110 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Multiverses, Science, and Ultimate Causation
Ellis, G. (2012) · Astrophysics and space science library · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-32254-9_11 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Self-citationLemaître’s Prescience: The Beginning and End of the Cosmos
Carr, B. J. (2012) · Astrophysics and space science library · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-32254-9_12 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Alternative cosmological theories
Kragh, H. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198817666.013.4 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Serna, F. J. A. (2024) · European Public & Social Innovation Review · doi:10.31637/epsir-2024-627 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
A New Hilbert's Hotel Argument Against Past‐Eternalism
Loke, A. T. E., & Haitov, E. (2025) · Analytic Philosophy · doi:10.1111/phib.12371 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Re-examining the law of energy conservation-A Euclidean geometric proof
Kimuya, A. M. (2025) · Eurasian Journal of Science Engineering and Technology · doi:10.55696/ejset.1559047 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Paths of Friedmann–Robertson–Walker brane models
Szydłowski, M., & Hrycyna, O. (2008) · Journal of Mathematical Physics · doi:10.1063/1.2957845 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
World enough and form: why cosmology needs hylomorphism
Brungardt, J. G. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02112-0 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
The Essence of Gravity Is the Expansion Tendency of the Universe after the Big Bang
Qian, W. (2024) · Journal of Modern Physics · doi:10.4236/jmp.2024.156036 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Relativistic astrophysics and cosmology
Longair, M. S. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198817666.013.7 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
CONCEPT OF THE MULTIVERSE IN FANTASY LITERATURE: FROM M. MOORCOCK TO A. SAPKOWSKI
Naumchik, O. S., & Smirnov, V. N. (2020) · Proceedings of Petrozavodsk State University · doi:10.15393/uchz.art.2020.463 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
The universal theory of structure: a fundamental ontology for ontic structural realism
Hamlin, C. E. (2026) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-025-05425-5 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
A Mathematical Exploration of the Correlation between the Speeds of Light in Adjacent Universes
Osaka, M. (2026) · Applied Mathematics · doi:10.4236/am.2026.173010 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Steady-State theory and the cosmological controversy
Kragh, H. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198817666.013.5 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Observational and astrophysical cosmology: 1940–1980
Longair, M. S. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198817666.013.6 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Inflation, dark matter, and dark energy
Longair, M. S., & Smeenk, C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198817666.013.11 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Philosophical aspects of cosmology
Smeenk, C. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198817666.013.13 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Smith, R. W. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198817666.013.2 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
THE SPACE OF COSMOLOGICAL SPACE–TIMES
Ellis, G. (2005) · Journal of Hyperbolic Differential Equations · doi:10.1142/s0219891605000476 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Self-citationIs it a Janus‐Faced World After All? Physics is Not Reductionist
Ahmad, B., & Gordon, R. (2024) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781119865667.ch3 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Koperski, J. (2014) · doi:10.1002/9781118933800.ch2
Is the Number of Prior Causes and Durations Infinite? An Assessment of the Current Literature
Loke, A. T. E. (2017) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-57547-6_2
Observational and astrophysical cosmology: 1980–2018
Longair, M. S. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198817666.013.10
Cosmological theories before and without einstein
Kragh, H. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198817666.013.1
Is There Paradox with Infinite Space?
Coule, D. H. (2004) · General Relativity and Gravitation · doi:10.1023/b:gerg.0000038474.55903.3f
Stranger things: multiverse, string cosmology, physical eschatology
Ćirković, M. M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198817666.013.12
Bianchi, S. D. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198817666.013.9
Membaca Konsep Multiverse dengan Paradigma Wahyu (Al-Qur’an)Preprint
Fansuri, F., & Saadah, S. (2022) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/at2mv
Loke, A. T. E. (2022) · Palgrave frontiers in philosophy of religion · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-94403-2_5
Introducing the Quest for an Explanation
Loke, A. T. E. (2022) · Palgrave frontiers in philosophy of religion · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-94403-2_1
Fine-Tuning and Order of our Universe
Loke, A. T. E. (2022) · Palgrave frontiers in philosophy of religion · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-94403-2_4
(2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198817666.002.0004
(2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198817666.002.0002
(2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198817666.002.0005
Perkembangan dan Kontroversi Mengenai Eksistensi Multiverse
Romli, S., Muslim, M., & Suhandi, A. (2023) · PSEJ (Pancasakti Science Education Journal) · doi:10.24905/psej.v8i1.161
Holder, R. (2024) · Zygon® · doi:10.16995/zygon.16294
Quarenta bilhões de universos de grãos de sal
Daniel‐Ribeiro, C. T., & Martins, Y. C. (2017) · Editora FIOCRUZ eBooks · doi:10.7476/9786557082294.0013
Towards the New Scientific Realism
Voosholz, J. (2025) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-98886-8_8
Shirvani, E. (2025) · The Open Psychology Journal · doi:10.2174/0118743501418015251029064317
Finite-Trial Constraints on Abiogenesis: Quantitative Bounds on Replicator EmergencePreprint
Reardon, D. C. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.6843594
- Authors
- Ellis, G. F. R., Kirchner, U., & Stoeger, W. R.
- Affiliations
- University of Cape Town (ZA)
- Venue
- Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-01-21
- Volume
- 347
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 921-936
- ISSN
- 0035-8711 (ISSN-L)
- 1365-2966
- OpenAlex
- W2124540618
- Semantic Scholar
- ca6024ada27e9f9b87430e54545a928419c823b4
- Cited by
- 82
- References
- 21
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 21 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 1 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 1.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Astronomy and Astrophysics › Cosmology and Gravitation Theories
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Astronomy and Astrophysics › Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life
- Social Sciences › Law › Multidisciplinary Warburg-centric Studies
- Keywords
- multiverse, anthropic principle, fine-tuning, measure problem, FRW universe, chaotic inflation, testability
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-11.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-11.
Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review