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BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF RECIPROCITY: EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
Abstract
Laboratory experiments have generally supported the theorem that, in classical property rights environments, noncooperative behavior in markets yields efficient social outcomes. Experiments, however, regularly fail to support the game theoretic prediction of noncooperative behavior in small‐group strategic interaction and in large‐group public good environments. In these two types of experiments subjects frequently achieve more efficient social outcomes–they collect more money from the experimenter–than noncooperative game theory predicts. Many subjects in these experiments exhibit reciprocity even in single‐play games. Evolutionary psychologists hypothesize that humans have evolved mental algorithms for identifying and punishing cheaters in social exchange. (JEL A11, A12, B41, C70, C72, C92)
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WEIRD languages have misled us, too
Majid, A., & Levinson, S. C. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x1000018x · Cited by 4,076
The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms
Bicchieri, C. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511616037 · Cited by 1,991
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., et al. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000142 · Cited by 1,898
COPING WITH TRAGEDIES OF THE COMMONS
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Metadata
- Authors
- HOFFMAN, E., MCCABE, K. A., & SMITH, V. L.
- Venue
- Economic Inquiry
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1998-07
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 335-352
- ISSN
- 0043-3640 (ISSN-L)
- 0095-2583
- 1465-7295
- OpenAlex
- W2166585156
- Cited by
- 370
- References
- 50
- FWCI
- 86.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- HOFFMAN, E., MCCABE, K. A., & SMITH, V. L. (1998). BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF RECIPROCITY: EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY. Economic Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01719.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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