THE IMF: A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF ITS ROLE AND OPERATIONS
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 68 of the 68 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the world's premier international financial institution with 184 member countries and active programmes in a significant number of them at any one time. The Fund attracts a great deal of attention, much of it critical. But the discussion is often polemic in style. Strongly held, but frequently opposing, views are expressed. This survey attempts to examine, in an objective way, the theory and evidence relating to the Fund's operations. Many aspects of the empirical research are relatively recent and a universal consensus is yet to emerge; as a consequence there is scope for disagreement to persist. However, the research is also gradually clarifying many important issues. The format for the survey is to examine the life cycle of IMF arrangements. What makes a country turn to the Fund for assistance? Should the IMF be lending? What influences the outcome of negotiations and the design of programmes? Are IMF programmes effective? And why do some countries make prolonged use of IMF resources? For completeness there is also some discussion of the history of the IMF, the extent to which Fund policies have been influenced by advances in economic theory and the Fund's systemic role. Important organisational and governance issues are also covered briefly. Although primarily adopting an economist's perspective, the survey reflects the growing recognition that in order to understand the IMF's operations, economics has to be combined with politics. Examining the IMF is an exercise in applied political economy.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Journal of Economic Literature
(2019) · AEA Papers and Proceedings · doi:10.1257/pandp.109.633 · Cited by 7,468
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
(2022) · doi:10.52340/jds · Cited by 1,444
Emons, W. (2007) · Cited by 1,187
Globalization and Its Discontents
Pike, R. M., & Stiglitz, J. (2004) · The Canadian Journal of Sociology · doi:10.2307/3654702 · Cited by 813
IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects?
Barro, R. J., & Lee, J.-W. (2005) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.04.003 · Cited by 775
The High Politics of IMF Lending
Thacker, S. C. (1999) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887100020025 · Cited by 734
The IMF and Economic Development
Vreeland, J. R. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511615726 · Cited by 609
The effect of IMF programs on economic growth
Przeworski, A., & Vreeland, J. R. (2000) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(00)00090-0 · Cited by 601
The Political economy of policy reform
(1994) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.31-5561 · Cited by 594
The Politics of Economic Adjustment
Diebold, W., Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. R. (1992) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20045428 · Cited by 544
The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa
STONE, R. W. (2004) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305540404136x · Cited by 474 · cited 1×
“…of loans rather than their incidence, while Dreher and Jensen (2004) claim that the influence is felt on the nature of structural conditionality.5 Stone (2002, 2004) reports similar political influences over IMF lending to transition economies and African economies and argues that the behaviour…”
What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programmes?
Dollar, D., & Svensson, J. (2000) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00569 · Cited by 469
The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts and the State
(1992) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691188034 · Cited by 459
Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund, 1979-1989
Cooper, R. N., & Boughton, J. M. (2002) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20033103 · Cited by 361
International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods
Cooper, R. N., & James, H. (1996) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20047597 · Cited by 357
Dreher, A., & Jensen, N. M. (2007) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/508311 · Cited by 318
EASTERLY, W. (2005) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(04)00087-2 · Cited by 317
A public choice approach to international organization
Vaubel, R. (1986) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00141684 · Cited by 310
Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition
Stone, R. W. (2002) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400824434 · Cited by 303
IMF conditionality: theory and evidence
Dreher, A. (2009) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9486-z · Cited by 297
Lending credibility: the International Monetary Fund and the post-communist transition
(2003) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.40-2909 · Cited by 293 · cited 2×
“Still others have been undertaken by outside academics; a good example being Stone’s analysis of the IMF’s involvement in countries in transition during the 1990s (Stone, 2002).”
Why is there Multilateral Lending?
Rodrik, D. (1995) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w5160 · Cited by 278
Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World
(1990) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691228150 · Cited by 276
Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach
Drazen, A. (2002) · IMF Staff Papers · doi:10.2307/3872471 · Cited by 267
American Interests and IMF Lending
Oatley, T., & Yackee, J. (2004) · International Politics · doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800085 · Cited by 241
Economic determinants of IMF financial arrangements
Knight, M., & Santaella, J. A. (1997) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(97)00049-7 · Cited by 225 · cited 1×
“Later research, while continuing to emphasise economic determinants, used probability approaches which sought to explain whether or not countries had programmes, rather than seeking to explain the amount of lending (Joyce, 1992, Conway, 1994, Santaella, 1996, and Knight and Santaella, 1997).”
Collier, P., Guillaumont, P., Guillaumont, S., & Gunning, J. W. (1997) · World Development · doi:10.1016/s0305-750x(97)00053-3 · Cited by 225
The effects of IMF programs in the Third World: Debate and evidence from Latin America
Pastor, M. (1987) · World Development · doi:10.1016/0305-750x(87)90080-5 · Cited by 224 · cited 4×
“In early research Pastor (1987) had reported evidence that IMF programmes led to a more unequal distribution of income in Latin America. Vreeland (2001a) also claims that Fund programmes reduce the labour share of income.”
InfluentialMoney Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund Conditionality
Gould, E. R. (2003) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818303573039 · Cited by 216
Do IMF and IBRD Cause Moral Hazard and Political Business Cycles? Evidence from Panel Data
Dreher, A., & Vaubel, R. (2004) · Open Economies Review · doi:10.1023/b:open.0000009422.66952.4b · Cited by 212
The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality
(1991) · OECD Development Centre Working Papers · doi:10.1787/187765075405 · Cited by 209
The Effect of IMF Programs on Labor
Raymond Vreeland, J. (2002) · World Development · doi:10.1016/s0305-750x(01)00101-2 · Cited by 207
Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World
Eusufzai, Z., & Nelson, J. M. (1992) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1059852 · Cited by 204
What is the Economics of Climate Change
Stern, N. H. (2006) · World Economy · Cited by 195
Current-Account Sustainability
Razin, A., & Milesi‐Ferretti, G. M. (1996) · Cited by 189
The Distributional Effects of IMF Programs: A Cross-Country Analysis
Garuda, G. (2000) · World Development · doi:10.1016/s0305-750x(00)00002-4 · Cited by 187 · cited 1×
“However, Garuda (2000) finds more nuanced results suggesting that in those countries that are least likely to participate in an IMF programme (as measured by a propensity score), the poor gained more in IMF users as compared to non-users.”
Goldstein, M., & Montiel, P. J. (1986) · Staff Papers · doi:10.2307/3867072 · Cited by 180
The Causes and Consequences of IMF Conditionality
Dreher, A., & Vaubel, R. (2004) · Emerging Markets Finance and Trade · doi:10.1080/1540496x.2004.11052571 · Cited by 175 · cited 3×
“Dreher and Vaubel (2004b) undertake a panel data analysis of 206 letters of intent between 1997 and 2003 and find that the number of conditions depends negatively on international reserves and positively on world interest rates; a finding that could be viewed as consistent with this explanation.”
InfluentialThe Moral Hazard of IMF Lending
Vaubel, R. (1983) · The World Economy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.1983.tb00015.x · Cited by 160 · cited 2×
“They claim that evidence based on pooled time-series cross section regressions for 94 countries over 1975 – 97 suggests that higher amounts of outstanding IMF credits lead to more expansive fiscal policy, and that, controlling for other relevant influences, budget deficits and the rate of monetary expansion ‘significa…”
Evaluating the effect of IMF lending to low-income countries
Dicks-Mireaux, L., Mecagni, M., & Schadler, S. (2000) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(00)00066-3 · Cited by 151 · cited 1×
“They even present evidence to suggest that the effect may be positive (Dicks-Mireaux et al, 2000; IEO, 2004; Bird and Mosley, 2006).”
Many happy returns? Recidivism and the IMF
Bird, G., Hussain, M., & Joyce, J. P. (2004) · Journal of International Money and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jimonfin.2003.12.002 · Cited by 147 · cited 1×
“This may in part explain why Bird et al (2004) find no connection between openness and prolonged use, since they do not distinguish between low and middle income countries.”
Self-citationIMF lending: how is it affected by economic, political and institutional factors?
Bird, G., & Rowlands, D. (2001) · The Journal of Policy Reform · doi:10.1080/13841280108523421 · Cited by 147
Self-citationBureaucracy at the IMF and the World Bank: A Comparison of the Evidence
Vaubel, R. (1996) · World Economy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.1996.tb00672.x · Cited by 133 · cited 2×
“One adopts a public choice interpretation (Vaubel, 1986, 1991, 1996; Willett, 2001, 2002).”
Do IMF Programmes Have a Catalytic Effect on Other International Capital Flows?
Bird, G., & Rowlands, D. (2002) · Oxford Development Studies · doi:10.1080/1360081022000012671 · Cited by 129
Self-citationOn being grandmotherly: The evolution of IMF conditionality
Dell, S. (1982) · CEPAL review · doi:10.18356/5a3fc447-en · Cited by 110
Catalysing Private Capital Flows: Do IMF Programmes Work as Commitment Devices?
Mody, A., & Saravia, D. (2006) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01114.x · Cited by 100
Hutchison, M. M. (2001) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8305 · Cited by 97
IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with ConditionalityPreprint
Dreher, A. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.558401 · Cited by 96 · cited 3×
“Dreher (2005b) argues that this trend continued and suggests that over the period 1999-2001 the average number of conditions per programme was 21.”
Compliance with IMF Program Indicators and Growth in Transition Economies
Mercer-Blackman, V., & Unigovskaya, A. (2000) · Emerging Markets Finance and Trade · doi:10.1080/1540496x.2004.11052574 · Cited by 93
Globalization and the Nation State: The Impact of the IMF and the World Bank
Ranis, G., Vreeland, J. R., & Kosack, S. (2004) · Cited by 85
The IMF: Lender of Last Resort or Scapegoat?
Vreeland, J. R. (1999) · Cited by 83
3 Do IMF-Supported Programs Work? A Survey of the Cross-Country Empirical Evidence
Haque, N. U., & Khan, M. S. (2002) · International Monetary Fund eBooks · doi:10.5089/9781589060944.071.ch003 · Cited by 80
Is Policy Ownership An Operational Concept?
Boughton, J. M., & Mourmouras, A. (2002) · IMF Working Paper · doi:10.2139/ssrn.879578 · Cited by 78
Conditionality: Past, Present, Future
Guitián, M. (1995) · Staff Papers · doi:10.2307/3867599 · Cited by 78
The IMF and the Force of History: Ten Events and Ten Ideas That Have Shaped the Institution
James, P., Boughton, M., Events, I. T., The, A., & Conference, P. P. (n.d.) · Cited by 73
Hutchison, M. M., & Noy, I. (2003) · Journal of International Money and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jimonfin.2003.09.007 · Cited by 72
Signalling credibility? The IMF and catalytic finance
Edwards, M. S. (2006) · Journal of International Relations and Development · doi:10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800079 · Cited by 69 · cited 2×
“Edwards (2006) corrects more formally for selection bias in a study of portfolio flows but corroborates the finding that the catalytic effect is not significantly positive.”
Doroodian, K. (1993) · Economic Development and Cultural Change · doi:10.1086/452051 · Cited by 65 · cited 2×
“With-without tests of one form or another have tended to show stronger results for the current account (Gylfason, 1987; Khan, 1990; Doroodian, 1993). Killick (1995) uses a combination of before-and-after tests and case study evidence.”
The Revolving Door: Duration and Recidivism in IMF Programs
Conway, P. (2007) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.89.2.205 · Cited by 57
The IMF in a world of private capital markets
Eichengreen, B. J., Kletzer, K., & Mody, A. (2005) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.07.002 · Cited by 57
Bird, G. (2004) · Journal of International Development · doi:10.1002/jid.1111 · Cited by 54
Self-citationCan Public Discussion Enhance Program "Ownership"?
Allan Drazen, Y., & Isard, P. (2004) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/7762.003.0019 · Cited by 37
IMF Conditionality: Ineffectual, Inefficient, Mistargeted
Spraos, J. (1986) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 35
Goldsbrough, D., y Lago, I. M., Kaufman, M., Sembene, D., Tsikata, T., Mugerwa, S., Segura-Ubiergo, A., & Chelsky, J. (2004) · International Monetary Fund eBooks · doi:10.5089/9781589063679.017 · Cited by 31
Conducting Macroeconomic Policy in Developing Countries: Piece of Cake or Mission Impossible?
Bird, G. (2004) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230599840_1 · Cited by 14
Self-citationWhat Happened to the Washington Consensus?
Bird, G. (2004) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230599840_5 · Cited by 9
Self-citationConducting macroeconomic policy in developing countries: Piece of cake or mission impossible?
Bird, G. (2001) · Third World Quarterly · doi:10.1080/713701139 · Cited by 8 · cited 3×
“Bird (2001a) suggested that there might be a conditionality Laffer curve, implying that a reduction in conditionality could improve the effectiveness of IMF programmes.”
Self-citationShould the IMF discontinue its long-term lending role in developing countries?
Bird, G., & Mosley, P. (2004) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203323441-22 · Cited by 6
Self-citation
Cited by
A Thousand Cuts: Social Protection in the Age of Austerity
Kentikelenis, A., & Stubbs, T. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190637736.001.0001 · Cited by 94
Metadata
- Authors
- Bird, G.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Surveys
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-07-11
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 683-745
- ISSN
- 0950-0804 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-6419
- OpenAlex
- W2064810414
- Cited by
- 162
- References
- 68
- FWCI
- 12.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.