The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
‘Unwilling’ versus ‘unable’: chimpanzees’ understanding of human intentional action
Abstract
Understanding the intentional actions of others is a fundamental part of human social cognition and behavior. An important question is therefore whether other animal species, especially our nearest relatives the chimpanzees, also understand the intentional actions of others. Here we show that chimpanzees spontaneously (without training) behave differently depending on whether a human is unwilling or unable to give them food. Chimpanzees produced more behaviors and left the testing station earlier with an unwilling compared to an unable (but willing) experimenter. These data together with other recent studies on chimpanzees’ knowledge about others’ visual perception show that chimpanzees know more about the intentional actions and perceptions of others than previously demonstrated.
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Citations
Cites
The origins of intelligence in children.
Piaget, J. (1952) · doi:10.1037/11494-000 · Cited by 10,687
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00076512 · Cited by 8,743
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
Searle, J. R. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173452 · Cited by 4,575
Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (1997) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195106237.001.0001 · Cited by 1,491
Self-citation
Cited by
Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000129 · Cited by 4,882
Self-citationDoes the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later
Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.010 · Cited by 1,592
Self-citationHuman-like social skills in dogs?
Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2005) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.07.003 · Cited by 967
Self-citationWhat Makes Human Cognition Unique? From Individual to Shared to Collective Intentionality
Tomasello, M., & Rakoczy, H. (2003) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00217 · Cited by 579
Self-citationHow infants and toddlers react to antisocial others
Hamlin, J. K., Wynn, K., Bloom, P., & Mahajan, N. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1110306108 · Cited by 507
Metadata
- Authors
- Call, J., Hare, B., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M.
- Venue
- Developmental Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004-08-16
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 488-498
- ISSN
- 1363-755X (ISSN-L)
- 1467-7687
- OpenAlex
- W2122151571
- Cited by
- 388
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 19.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Call, J., Hare, B., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2004). ‘Unwilling’ versus ‘unable’: chimpanzees’ understanding of human intentional action. Developmental Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00368.x
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