Representing intentions in self and other: studies of autism and typical development
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Two experiments were conducted to explore the extent to which individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), as well as young typically developing (TD) children, are explicitly aware of their own and others’ intentions. In Experiment 1, participants with ASD were significantly less likely than age‐ and ability‐matched comparison participants to correctly recognize their own knee‐jerk reflex movements as unintentional. Performance on this knee‐jerk task was associated with performance on measures of false belief understanding, independent of age and verbal ability, in both participants with ASD and TD children. In Experiment 2, participants with ASD were significantly less able than comparison participants to correctly recognize their own or another person’s mistaken actions as unintended, in a ‘Transparent Intentions’ task (Russell & Hill, 2001; Russell, Hill & Franco, 2001). Performance on aspects of the Transparent Intentions task was associated with performance on measures of false belief understanding, independent of age and verbal ability, in both participants with ASD and TD children. This study suggests that individuals with ASD have a diminished awareness of their own and others’ intentions and that this diminution is associated with other impairments in theory of mind.
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Citations
Cites
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
Searle, J. R. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173452 · Cited by 4,575
Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The Truth about False Belief
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00304 · Cited by 4,476
The Role of Age and Verbal Ability in the Theory of Mind Task Performance of Subjects with Autism
Happe, F. G. E. (1995) · Child Development · doi:10.2307/1131954 · Cited by 1,227
Self-citationExploration of the autistic child’s theory of mind: Knowledge, belief, and communication
Perner, J., Frith, U., Leslie, A. M., & Leekam, S. R. (1989) · Child Development · doi:10.2307/1130734 · Cited by 757
How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition
Carruthers, P. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09000545 · Cited by 610
Cited by
Atypical neural self-representation in autism
Lombardo, M. V., Chakrabarti, B., Bullmore, E. T., Sadek, S. A., Pasco, G., Wheelwright, S. J., Suckling, J., MRC AIMS Consortium, & Baron-Cohen, S. (2010) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awp306 · Cited by 376
Annual Research Review: Towards a developmental neuroscience of atypical social cognition
Happé, F., & Frith, U. (2014) · Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry · doi:10.1111/jcpp.12162 · Cited by 293
Self-citationIs schizophrenia on the autism spectrum?
King, B. H., & Lord, C. (2011) · Brain Research · doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2010.11.031 · Cited by 255
Weiss, J. A. (2014) · Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice · doi:10.1111/cpsp.12084 · Cited by 73
Mitsea, E., Drigas, A., & Skianis, C. (2023) · Education Sciences · doi:10.3390/educsci13070639 · Cited by 49
Metadata
- Authors
- Williams, D., & Happé, F.
- Venue
- Developmental Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-02-02
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 307-319
- ISSN
- 1363-755X (ISSN-L)
- 1467-7687
- OpenAlex
- W2151678266
- Cited by
- 110
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 11.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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