Open Problems in the Philosophy of Information
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The philosophy of information (PI) is a new area of research with its own field of investigation and methodology. This article, based on the Herbert A. Simon Lecture of Computing and Philosophy I gave at Carnegie Mellon University in 2001, analyses the eighteen principal open problems in PI. Section 1 introduces the analysis by outlining Herbert Simon's approach to PI. Section 2 discusses some methodological considerations about what counts as a good philosophical problem. The discussion centers on Hilbert's famous analysis of the central problems in mathematics. The rest of the article is devoted to the eighteen problems. These are organized into five sections: problems in the analysis of the concept of information, in semantics, in the study of intelligence, in the relation between information and nature, and in the investigation of values.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception
Bornstein, M. H., & Gibson, J. J. (1980) · The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism · doi:10.2307/429816 · Cited by 22,935
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception: Classic Edition
Gibson, J. J. (2014) · doi:10.4324/9781315740218 · Cited by 12,132
On computable numbers, with an application to the entscheidungsproblem
Turing, A. M. (1937) · Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society · doi:10.1112/plms/s2-42.1.230 · Cited by 8,283
Searle, J. R. (1980) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005756 · Cited by 6,954
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E., & Thompson, E. (1991) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6730.001.0001 · Cited by 5,765
Intelligence without representation
Brooks, R. A. (1991) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/0004-3702(91)90053-m · Cited by 4,853
Fraassen, B. C. V. (1980) · doi:10.1093/0198244274.001.0001 · Cited by 4,682
On the proper treatment of connectionism
Smolensky, P. (1988) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00052432 · Cited by 2,441
Churchland, P. S., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1992) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2010.001.0001 · Cited by 1,757
The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics
Penrose, R., & Landauer, R. (1990) · Physics Today · doi:10.1063/1.2810599 · Cited by 1,110
Cited by
The wisdom hierarchy: representations of the DIKW hierarchy
Rowley, J. (2007) · Journal of Information Science · doi:10.1177/0165551506070706 · Cited by 1,827
The ethics of information transparency
Turilli, M., & Floridi, L. (2009) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-009-9187-9 · Cited by 419
Self-citationInformation ethics: a reappraisal
Floridi, L. (2008) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-008-9176-4 · Cited by 52
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Floridi, L.
- Venue
- Metaphilosophy
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004-07
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 554-582
- ISSN
- 0026-1068 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9973
- OpenAlex
- W2130765775
- Cited by
- 196
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 26.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Open Problems in the Philosophy of Information. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2004.00336.x
- The paper
- Floridi, L. (2004). Open Problems in the Philosophy of Information. Metaphilosophy. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2004.00336.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.