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Cited by 376Epistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceScientific Research and Philosophical Inquiry

Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data?

Open access
FLORIDI, LUCIANO·2005·Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00531.x
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Abstract

There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information. This paper contributes to the current debate by criticising and revising the Standard Definition of semantic Information (SDI) as meaningful data, in favour of the Dretske-Grice approach: meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful. After a brief introduction, SDI is criticised for providing necessary but insufficient conditions for the definition of semantic information. SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on semantic information, and misinformation (that is, false semantic information) is not a type of semantic information, but pseudo-information, that is not semantic information at all. This is shown by arguing that none of the reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information is convincing, whilst there are compelling reasons to treat it as pseudo-information. As a consequence, SDI is revised to include a necessary truth-condition. The last section summarises the main results of the paper and indicates some interesting areas of application of the revised definition.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Floridi argues that the Standard Definition of Information (SDI) as well-formed, meaningful data gives only necessary but insufficient conditions for semantic information, because truth-values do not supervene on information and misinformation is pseudo-information rather than a type of information. He revises SDI into RSDI by adding a fourth, necessary truth-condition, aligning with the Dretske–Grice approach.

Key findings

  • SDI is formulated as: σ is DOS (declarative, objective, semantic) information iff (1) σ consists of n data (d), n ≥ 1; (2) the data are well-formed; (3) the well-formed data are meaningful. Floridi holds these are necessary but not sufficient.
  • The paper rejects alethic neutrality (AN) — the claim that meaningful, well-formed data qualify as information regardless of truth-value — and with it the consequences that false information (FI) is a genuine type of information, that tautologies qualify as information (TA), and that "it is true that σ" is non-redundant (TI).
  • Nine proposed reasons for treating false information as a type of semantic information (FI.1–FI.9) are each argued to be unconvincing; two positive arguments are given that misinformation is pseudo-information: (a) "false" in "false information" is attributive and negative, so the compound fails the splitting test (unlike "digital information"), and (b) if false information counted as information, semantic erosion by operators like "not" would be inexplicable.
  • The revised definition (RSDI) adds a fourth condition: the meaningful, well-formed data are truthful. Five areas of application are listed, including critique of deflationary theories of truth, mathematical/analytic propositions, empty names, the standard definition of knowledge, and a quantitative theory of semantic information based on truth-values and degrees of discrepancy rather than probability distributions.

Methods

  • Conceptual/philosophical analysis, not empirical: the paper works within situation logic (Israel and Perry; Devlin), using the symbol σ and the term "infon" for discrete items of information irrespective of semiotic code or physical implementation.
  • The argument proceeds by (i) formalising SDI and its four endorsed neutralities (typological, taxonomic, ontological, genetic), (ii) rejecting the fifth, alethic neutrality, (iii) rebutting nine reasons for counting false information as information, and (iv) supplying two constructive arguments that it is pseudo-information.
  • Illustrative examples are used throughout (e.g. a dinner-guests scenario, a "false constable," the EREP CD-ROM database, Poe's raven as a unary device, hieroglyphics before the Rosetta Stone).

Limitations

  • Stated by the paper: the rejection of TA (tautologies as information) is not pursued because it is "crucially connected to the interpretation of mathematical and analytic truths" and is left to another paper; arguments against AN based on deflationary theories of truth and a criticism of TI are also deferred as beyond the paper's scope.
  • Stated by the paper: the analysis is deliberately restricted to declarative, objective and semantic (DOS) information; non-declarative uses of "information" (stipulations, invitations, orders, instructions, game moves, music files, digital paintings) and the mathematical/pragmatic senses tied to uncertainty, probability and decision utility are explicitly excluded.
  • Evident from the text: the argument is conceptual and illustrative rather than empirical, resting on linguistic intuitions (e.g. the attributive/predicative test, the "false constable" analogy) and on the plausibility of the semantic-erosion argument, with no data or formal proof offered for the central claim.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00531.x

Cites

44 of 44 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

1 of 13 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured

  • Interpretationnone given
    § It follows that · p. 10

    None of the consequences of AN (FI, TA, TI) seems ultimately defensible.

    “None of these consequences seems ultimately defensible”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Interpretationnone given
    § Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data? · p. 1

    Truth-values do not supervene on semantic information.

    “SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on semantic information”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Objective semantic information is taken to have a declarative or factual value, i.e., it is supposed to be correctly qualifiable alethically.
  • Interpretationreasoning
    § It follows that · p. 10

    The rejection of the consequences of AN forces a revision of AN and hence of SDI.

    “their rejection forces a revision of AN and hence of SDI.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Interpretationnone given
    § Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data? · p. 1

    None of the reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information is convincing.

    “none of the reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information is convincing”
    • Also stated in: § It follows that · p. 10 · hedged
      “none of the main reasons that could be adduced for interpreting false information as a type of information is convincing”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The reasons considered in the paper are the main reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information.
  • Interpretationnone given
    § Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data? · p. 1

    There are compelling reasons to treat false and tautological information as pseudo-information.

    “there are compelling reasons to treat it as pseudo-information”
    • Also stated in: § It follows that · p. 10 · boosted
      “there are compelling reasons to treat false and tautological information as pseudo-information”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 26
  • May combine two claims. 8

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data? · p. 1

    There is no consensus on a single, unified definition of semantic information.

    “There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information.”
    • Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · p. 1 · plain
      “recent surveys have shown no consensus on a single, unified definition of semantic information.¹”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Floridi [2002], [2004a], [2005] source

      Section 5 (p. 137) says there is no consensus on a single, unified definition of information. It mentions a proposed revision to the definition of semantic information, but does not specifically say there is no consensus on that narrower definition. (LLM, conf=0.85)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 2.1. An Analysis of the Standard Definition of Information · p. 7

    No information without data representation.

    “ON) no information without data representation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § 3. Alethic neutrality · p. 9

    According to SDI, alethic values are not embedded in, but supervene on semantic information.

    “According to SDI, alethic values are not embedded in, but supervene on semantic information:”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data? · p. 1

    Meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful.

    “meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Objective semantic information is taken to have a declarative or factual value, i.e., it is supposed to be correctly qualifiable alethically.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.1. An Analysis of the Standard Definition of Information · p. 7

    A datum is a relational entity.

    “TaxN) a datum is a relational entity.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 2.1. An Analysis of the Standard Definition of Information · p. 8

    δ can have a semantics independently of any informee.

    “GN) δ can have a semantics independently of any informee.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 2. The Standard Definition of Information · p. 3

    The bipartite account is not rigorous enough to be applied in the context of an information-theoretical epistemology.

    “The question is whether it is rigorous enough to be applied in the context of an informationtheoretical epistemology. We shall see that this is not the case”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § FI.3) FI can still be genuinely informative, if only indirectly. · p. 11

    FI can be genuinely informative indirectly only because it is coupled to true metainformation M; what counts as information is M, not FI.

    “FI may be coupled to some true, metainformation M that the source of FI is not fully reliable. What now counts as information is the true M, not the false FI.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § 2. The Standard Definition of Information · p. 3

    Over the last three decades, most analyses have supported a definition of DOS information in terms of data + meaning.

    “Over the last three decades, most analyses have supported a definition of DOS information in terms of data + meaning.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Davis and Olson (1985)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Silver and Silver (1989)
    • cites Checkland and Scholes (1990)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 7. Conclusion: summary of results and future developments · p. 17

    The standard definition of DOS information (SDI) provides necessary but insufficient conditions for the qualification of data as information.

    “The standard definition of DOS information (SDI) provides necessary but insufficient conditions for the qualification of data as information.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 5. Two good reasons to believe that false information is pseudo-information · p. 15

    'False information' does not pass the splitting test; it is not the case that p constitutes information about x and is also a falsehood.

    “it is not the case, and hence it would be a mistake or an act of misinformation to assert, that p constitutes information about the number of natural satellites orbiting around the earth and is also a falsehood.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. The standard definition of information revised · p. 16

    False information is not a type of information; it is pseudo-information or misinformation.

    “misinformation (false information) has turned out to be not a type of information but rather pseudo-information.”
    • Also stated in: § 6. The standard definition of information revised · p. 16 · plain
      “False information is not an inferior kind of information; it just is not information.”
    • Also stated in: § 6. The standard definition of information revised · p. 16 · plain
      “[...] false information and mis-information are not kinds of information——any more than decoy ducks and rubber ducks are kinds of ducks.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Dretske (1981), 45

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Grice (1989), 371

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § 6. The standard definition of information revised · p. 16

    'False information' is like 'false evidence': it is not an oxymoron, but a way of specifying that the contents in question do not conform to the situation they purport to map.

    “it is not an oxymoron, but a way of specifying that the contents in question do not conform to the situation they purport to map.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.1. An Analysis of the Standard Definition of Information · p. 9

    SDI endorses four types of neutrality: TN, TaxN, ON and GN.

    “it also endorses four types of neutrality: TN, TaxN, ON and GN.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 5. Two good reasons to believe that false information is pseudo-information · p. 14

    The confusion about the nature of false information is generated by a misleading analogy.

    “The confusion about the nature of false information seems to be generated by a misleading analogy.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 5. Two good reasons to believe that false information is pseudo-information · p. 14

    The attributive use of an adjective can be either positive or negative.

    “the attributive use can be either positive or negative.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 2.1. An Analysis of the Standard Definition of Information · p. 8

    S.4 is one of the earliest and most popular formulations of SDI.

    “S.4 is one of the earliest and most popular formulations of SDI”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Bateson (1973)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 5. Two good reasons to believe that false information is pseudo-information · p. 15

    If false information were a genuine type of information, it should pass the splitting test; it does not, so it is not.

    “If false information were a genuine type of information it should pass the splitting test. It does not, so it is not.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationcitation
    § 6. The standard definition of information revised · p. 16

    To exchange false DOS information about x is to exchange no DOS information at all about x, only meaningful and well-formed data, that is semantic content.

    “to exchange (receive, sell, buy, etc.) false DOS information about x, e.g. the number of moons orbiting around the earth, is to exchange (receive, sell, buy, etc.) no DOS information at all about x, only meaningful and well-formed data, that is semantic content.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 7. Conclusion: summary of results and future developments · p. 17

    We ordinarily speak of false information when what we mean is misinformation, i.e. no information at all.

    “we ordinarily speak of false information when what we mean is misinformation, i.e. no information at all.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationcitation
    § 6. The standard definition of information revised · p. 16

    If data are not truthful, they can only constitute misinformation.

    “if they are not truthful, they can only constitute misinformation”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § FI.1) FI can include genuine information. · p. 11

    FI can include genuine information only in the sense that FI is a compound in which only the true component B qualifies as information.

    “this merely shows that FI is a compound in which only the true component B qualifies as information.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § 2. The Standard Definition of Information · p. 3

    The bipartite account has begun to influence the philosophy of computing and information.

    “More recently, the bipartite account has begun to influence the philosophy of computing and information as well”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Chalmers [1996]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Floridi [1999]
    • cites Franklin [1995]

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § FI.4) FI can support decision-making processes. · p. 14

    There seem to be no good reasons to treat false information as a type of information.

    “In conclusion, there seem to be no good reason to treat false information as a type of information.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Ordinary uses of technical words may be too generic and idiosyncratic, if not incorrect, to provide conceptual guidelines.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. The standard definition of information revised · p. 16

    SDI needs to be modified to include a fourth condition about the positive alethic nature of the data in question.

    “it follows that SDI needs to be modified, to include a fourth condition about the positive alethic nature of the data in question”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § FI.4) FI can support decision-making processes. · p. 12

    If a mathematical theorem p is false, then Q is misinformed (not informed) that p and does not have any information about the theorem.

    “if the mathematical theorem is not correct (if p is false), it must be concluded that Q is misinformed (i.e. not informed) that p (Q does not have any information about the theorem).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § 2.1. An Analysis of the Standard Definition of Information · p. 8

    SDI.3 only requires the δ to be provided with a semantics already.

    “SDI.3 only requires the δ to be provided with a semantics already.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 5. Two good reasons to believe that false information is pseudo-information · p. 14

    A false constable (attributive use) is not a specific type of constable, but not a constable at all.

    “a false constable (attributive use) is clearly not a specific type of constable, but not a constable at all (negative use)”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 7. Conclusion: summary of results and future developments · p. 17

    DTT may be satisfactory as theories of truth-ascriptions while being inadequate as theories of truthfulness.

    “DTT may be satisfactory as theories of truth-ascriptions while being inadequate as theories of truthfulness”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
29 of 29

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Objective semantic information is taken to have a declarative or factual value, i.e., it is supposed to be correctly qualifiable alethically.

    “where objective semantic information is taken to have a declarative or factual value, i.e., it is suppose to be correctly qualifiable alethically.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The reasons considered in the paper are the main reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information.

    “none of the main reasons that could be adduced for interpreting false information as a type of information is convincing”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The rejection of FI alone is sufficient to force a revision of AN and hence of SDI.

    “For the sake of simplicity, in the rest of this article only the rejection of FI will be pursued”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Sources of information are usually supposed to be truth-oriented or truth-tracking by default.

    “sources of information are usually supposed to be truth-oriented or truth-tracking by default”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The cloth of semantic information can be, and indeed is, often undone by equally semantic means.

    “We know that the cloth of semantic information can be, and indeed is, often undone by equally semantic means.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Ordinary uses of technical words may be too generic and idiosyncratic, if not incorrect, to provide conceptual guidelines.

    “ordinary uses of technical words may be too generic and idiosyncratic, if not incorrect, to provide conceptual guidelines.”
6 of 6

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • The most articulate defense of VTNN has been offered by Floridi (2005, 2007).

    “The most articulate defense of VTNN has been offered by Floridi (2005, 2007), who gives two main arguments in support of the thesis that false ''nonnatural information'' is not really information: the argument from splitting and the argument from semantic loss .”

    From INFORMATION WITHOUT TRUTH (2010) · cites this paper as Floridi 2005

  • Floridi gives two main arguments in support of the thesis that false nonnatural information is not really information: the argument from splitting and the argument from semantic loss.

    “The most articulate defense of VTNN has been offered by Floridi (2005, 2007), who gives two main arguments in support of the thesis that false ''nonnatural information'' is not really information: the argument from splitting and the argument from semantic loss .”

    From INFORMATION WITHOUT TRUTH (2010) · cites this paper as Floridi 2005

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Chalmers citation year disagrees with reference list

    Minor

    The text cites Chalmers as a 1996 source, while the reference list gives the Chalmers entry as 1997.

1 of 1

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. T. R. Colburn, 2000 , "Information, Thought, and Knowledge",Proceedings of the World Multiconference on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics(Orlando FL, July 23-26, 2000), vol. X, 467 -471 .
  2. Shannon C. E., 1993, Collected Papers

Cited by

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Related

Authors
FLORIDI, L.
Affiliations
University of Oxford (GB)
Corresponding author
FLORIDI, LUCIANO
ORCID
FLORIDI, LUCIANO
Venue
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2005-03
Volume
70
Issue
2
Pages
351-370
ISSN
  • 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
  • 1933-1592
DOI
10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00531.x
OpenAlex
W2059974307
Semantic Scholar
2af4a76b5eac94619fac8f2a44d008de8f94d58a
Cited by
375
References
40
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 17 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 23 · 2015: 27 · 2014: 20 · 2013: 20 · 2012: 17
FWCI
97.33
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1 (tdm, 3836 d)
Locations
  • Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • University of Hertfordshire Research Archive (University of Hertfordshire) (submittedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Scientific Research and Philosophical Inquiry
Keywords
semantic information, misinformation, truth conditions, definition of information

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