The (Multiple) Realization of Psychological and other Properties in the Sciences
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
There has recently been controversy over the existence of ‘multiple realization’ in addition to some confusion between different conceptions of its nature. To resolve these problems, we focus on concrete examples from the sciences to provide precise accounts of the scientific concepts of ‘realization’ and ‘multiple realization’ that have played key roles in recent debates in the philosophy of science and philosophy of psychology. We illustrate the advantages of our view over a prominent rival account (Shapiro, 2000 and 2004) and use our work to rebut recent objections to the long-standing claim that psychological properties are multiply realized. For we use scientific evidence, in combination with our more precise theoretical framework, to show that we have strong reason to believe that psychological properties are indeed multiply realized both at the biochemical and neuronal levels.
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Citations
Cites
Long-term in vivo imaging of experience-dependent synaptic plasticity in adult cortex
Trachtenberg, J. T., Chen, B. E., Knott, G. W., Feng, G., Sanes, J. R., Welker, E., & Svoboda, K. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature01273 · Cited by 1,927
Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis)
Fodor, J. A. (1974) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/bf00485230 · Cited by 1,815
Long-term dendritic spine stability in the adult cortex
Grutzendler, J., Kasthuri, N., & Gan, W.-B. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature01276 · Cited by 1,198
Transient and persistent dendritic spines in the neocortex in vivo
Holtmaat, A. J. G. D., Trachtenberg, J. T., Wilbrecht, L., Shepherd, G. M., Zhang, X., Knott, G. W., & Svoboda, K. (2005) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2005.01.003 · Cited by 1,131
Development of long-term dendritic spine stability in diverse regions of cerebral cortex
Zuo, Y., Lin, A., Chang, P., & Gan, W.-B. (2005) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2005.04.001 · Cited by 684
Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States
Bechtel, W., & Mundale, J. (1999) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/392683 · Cited by 483
Cotrina, M. L., Lin, J. H.-C., López-Garcı́a, J. C., Naus, C. C. G., & Nedergaard, M. (2000) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.20-08-02835.2000 · Cited by 388
Cited by
Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches
Piccinini, G., & Craver, C. (2011) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9898-4 · Cited by 508
Brain disorders? Not really: Why network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research
Borsboom, D., Cramer, A. O. J., & Kalis, A. (2019) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x17002266 · Cited by 468
Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy
Gillett, C. (2016) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139871716 · Cited by 202
Self-citationThe Nature of Physical Computation
Shagrir, O. (2022) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197552384.001.0001 · Cited by 70
Multiple realizability and the spirit of functionalism
Cao, R. (2022) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03524-1 · Cited by 58
“21 Aizawa and Gillett (2009) have argued that compensatory adjustments suffice to support multiple realizability.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- AIZAWA, K., & GILLETT, C.
- Venue
- Mind & Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-03-30
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 181-208
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0017
- OpenAlex
- W1976682694
- Cited by
- 111
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 6.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- AIZAWA, K., & GILLETT, C. (2009). The (Multiple) Realization of Psychological and other Properties in the Sciences. Mind & Language. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.01359.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.