Attention, Visual Consciousness and Indeterminacy
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
I propose a new argument showing that conscious vision sometimes depends constitutively on conscious attention. I criticise traditional arguments for this constitutive connection, on the basis that they fail adequately to dissociate evidence about visual consciousness from evidence about attention. On the same basis, I criticise Ned Block's recent counterargument that conscious vision is independent of one sort of attention (‘cognitive access'). Block appears to achieve the dissociation only because he underestimates the indeterminacy of visual consciousness. I then appeal to empirical work on the interaction between visual indeterminacy and attention, to argue for the constitutive connection.
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The information available in brief visual presentations
Sperling, G. (1960) · Psychological Monographs: General and Applied · doi:10.1037/h0093759 · Cited by 4,042 · cited 1×
“As evidence for his claims about ‗overflow‘, Block cites experiments by George Sperling, 1960.”
BackgroundGorillas in our midst: sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events
Simons, D. J., & Chabris, C. F. (1999) · Perception · doi:10.1068/p281059 · Cited by 3,181
A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
O'Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x01000115 · Cited by 3,126 · cited 1×
“And others suggest a way of explaining how we might come to think of ourselves as visually aware of every part of an array in front of us, even though we're visually aware of only the portions of the array to which we attend (O'Regan and Noë, 2001).”
BackgroundSelective Attention Gates Visual Processing in the Extrastriate Cortex
Moran, J., & Desimone, R. (1985) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.4023713 · Cited by 2,433 · cited 1×
“It's well-established that attention produces heightened selective responses in V4 (Moran and Desimone, 1985; Luck et al., 1997).”
BackgroundConscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy
Dehaene, S., Changeux, J.-P., Naccache, L., Sackur, J., & Sergent, C. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.03.007 · Cited by 2,067
Neural mechanisms of spatial selective attention in areas V1, V2, and V4 of macaque visual cortex
Luck, S. J., Chelazzi, L., Hillyard, S. A., & Desimone, R. (1997) · Journal of Neurophysiology · doi:10.1152/jn.1997.77.1.24 · Cited by 1,615
Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Block, N. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002786 · Cited by 1,146
Attention and consciousness: two distinct brain processes
Koch, C., & Tsuchiya, N. (2007) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.10.012 · Cited by 1,046
Two neural correlates of consciousness
Block, N. (2005) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.12.006 · Cited by 713 · cited 3×
“Changes in these processes are implicated in changes in the course of conscious visual experience (Lamme, 2005), which suggests that they form part of a minimal sufficient condition on that experience (Block, 2005).”
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Cited by
A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness
LeDoux, J. E., & Brown, R. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1619316114 · Cited by 690
Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access
Block, N. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.001 · Cited by 679
If perception is probabilistic, why does it not seem probabilistic?
Block, N. (2018) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0341 · Cited by 91
Unconscious perceptual justification*
Berger, J., Nanay, B., & Quilty-Dunn, J. (2018) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2018.1432413 · Cited by 53
Metadata
- Authors
- STAZICKER, J.
- Venue
- Mind & Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-03-15
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 156-184
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2032790016
- Cited by
- 151
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 7.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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