Delusional Inference
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Does the formation of delusions involve abnormal reasoning? According to the prominent ‘two-factor’ theory of delusions (e.g. Coltheart, 2007), the answer is yes. The second factor in this theory is supposed to affect a deluded individual's ability to evaluate candidates for belief. However, most published accounts of the two-factor theory have not said much about the nature of this second factor. In an effort to remedy this shortcoming, Coltheart, Menzies and Sutton (2010) recently put forward a Bayesian account of inference in delusions. I outline some criticisms of this important account, and sketch an alternative account of delusional inference that, I argue, avoids these criticisms. Specifically, I argue that the second factor in delusion formation involves a systematic deviation from Bayesian updating, a deviation that may be characterized as a bias towards ‘explanatory adequacy’. I present a numerical model of this idea and show that my alternative account is broadly consistent with prominent prediction error models of delusion formation (e.g. Corlett, Murray et al., 2007).
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Cites
Kapur, S. (2003) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.160.1.13 · Cited by 2,813
Error management theory: A new perspective on biases in cross-sex mind reading
Haselton, M. G., & Buss, D. M. (2000) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.78.1.81 · Cited by 1,180
Probabilistic judgements in deluded and non-deluded subjects
Huq, S. F., Garety, P. A., & Hemsley, D. R. (1988) · The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A · doi:10.1080/14640748808402300 · Cited by 596
McKay, R. T., & Dennett, D. C. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09990975 · Cited by 474
Self-citationThe 33rd Sir Frederick Bartlett Lecture Cognitive neuropsychiatry and delusional belief
Coltheart, M. (2007) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1080/17470210701338071 · Cited by 280
Abductive inference and delusional belief.
Coltheart, M., Menzies, P., & Sutton, J. (2010) · Cognitive Neuropsychiatry · doi:10.1080/13546800903439120 · Cited by 177
Corlett, P. R. (2009) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/neuro.09.012.2009 · Cited by 146
“Far from the heart far from the eye”: evidence from the Capgras delusion.
Brighetti, G., Bonifacci, P., Borlimi, R., & Ottaviani, C. (2007) · Cognitive Neuropsychiatry · doi:10.1080/13546800600892183 · Cited by 96
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Griffin, J. D., & Fletcher, P. C. (2017) · Annual Review of Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-032816-045145 · Cited by 133
Chambon, V., Farrer, C., Pacherie, E., Jacquet, P. O., Leboyer, M., & Zalla, T. (2017) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2016.12.005 · Cited by 95
The Generative Adversarial Brain
Gershman, S. J. (2019) · Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.3389/frai.2019.00018 · Cited by 89
Bell, V., Raihani, N., & Wilkinson, S. (2021) · Clinical Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/2167702620951553 · Cited by 78
The doxastic shear pin: Delusions as errors of learning and memory
Fineberg, S. K., & Corlett, P. R. (2016) · Cognitive Neuropsychiatry · doi:10.1080/13546805.2015.1136206 · Cited by 48
Metadata
- Authors
- MCKAY, R.
- Venue
- Mind & Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2012-06
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 330-355
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0017
- OpenAlex
- W4240629346
- Cited by
- 70
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 40.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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