The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player
Open accessAbstract
Finite population noncooperative games with linear-quadratic utilities, where each player decides how much action she exerts, can be interpreted as a network game with local payoff complementarities, together with a globally uniform payoff substitutability component and an own-concavity effect. For these games, the Nash equilibrium action of each player is proportional to her Bonacich centrality in the network of local complementarities, thus establishing a bridge with the sociology literature on social networks. This Bonacich–Nash linkage implies that aggregate equilibrium increases with network size and density. We then analyze a policy that consists of targeting the key player, that is, the player who, once removed, leads to the optimal change in aggregate activity. We provide a geometric characterization of the key player identified with an intercentrality measure, which takes into account both a player's centrality and her contribution to the centrality of the others.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications
Wasserman, S. S., & Faust, K. (1994) · Cited by 17,993
Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications
Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. (1994) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511815478 · Cited by 17,557
Error and attack tolerance of complex networks
Albert, R., Jeong, H., & Barabási, A.-L. (2000) · Nature · doi:10.1038/35019019 · Cited by 7,534
Error and attack tolerance of complex networks
Albert, R., Jeong, H., & Barabási, A.-Ĺ. (2000) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 6,469
(2017) · The SAGE Encyclopedia of Communication Research Methods · doi:10.4135/9781483381411.n575 · Cited by 6,008
Power and Centrality: A Family of Measures
Bonacich, P. (1987) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/228631 · Cited by 5,165
A New Status Index Derived from Sociometric Analysis
Katz, L. (1953) · Psychometrika · doi:10.1007/bf02289026 · Cited by 3,866
A measure of betweenness centrality based on random walks
Newman, M. E. J. (2005) · Social Networks · doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2004.11.009 · Cited by 2,461
Peer Pressure and Partnerships
Kandel, E., & Lazear, E. P. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261840 · Cited by 1,756
A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence
Akerlof, G. A. (1980) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885667 · Cited by 1,648
Social Distance and Social Decisions
Akerlof, G. A. (1997) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171877 · Cited by 1,443
Bernheim, B. D. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261957 · Cited by 1,304
Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives
Iannaccone, L. R. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261818 · Cited by 1,251
The Effects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality
Calvó-Armengol, A., & Jackson, M. O. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828041464542 · Cited by 1,051
Self-citationOptimal Network Topologies for Local Search with Congestion
Guimerà, R., Díaz-Guilera, A., Vega-Redondo, F., Cabrales, A., & Arenas, A. (2002) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.89.248701 · Cited by 605
Cvetkovic, D., Rowlinson, P., & Simic, S. (1997) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139086547 · Cited by 531
Networks of Collaboration in OligopolyPreprint
Joshi, S. (n.d.) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 386
A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency
Jackson, M. O. (2003) · CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) · doi:10.7907/c4y9t-bg336 · Cited by 374
Goyal, S., & Moraga-Gonzalez, J. L. (2001) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696388 · Cited by 360
Debreu, G., & Herstein, I. N. (1953) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907925 · Cited by 314
Calvó‐Armengol, A., & Zenou, Y. (2004) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/j.0020-6598.2004.00292.x · Cited by 285
Self-citationRobustness and Vulnerability of Scale-Free Random Graphs
Bollobás, B., & Riordan, O. (2004) · Internet Mathematics · doi:10.1080/15427951.2004.10129080 · Cited by 273
The Key Player ProblemPreprint
Borgatti, S. P. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1149843 · Cited by 147
Cited by
An Introduction to Spatial Econometrics
LeSage, J. P. (2008) · Revue d'économie industrielle · doi:10.4000/rei.3887 · Cited by 2,998
The Network Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations
(2012) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta9623 · Cited by 2,198
Banerjee, A., Chandrasekhar, A. G., Duflo, E., & Jackson, M. O. (2013) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1236498 · Cited by 1,248
The Effects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality
Calvó-Armengol, A., & Jackson, M. O. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828041464542 · Cited by 1,051
Self-citationNaïve Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds
Golub, B., & Jackson, M. O. (2010) · American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.2.1.112 · Cited by 979
Metadata
- Authors
- Ballester, C., Calvó-Armengol, A., & Zenou, Y.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2006-09
- Volume
- 74
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1403-1417
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W2166193992
- Cited by
- 1,291
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 44.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.