The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Promises and Partnership
Abstract
We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with people striving to live up to others' expectations so as to avoid guilt, as can be modeled using psychological game theory. When players exhibit such guilt aversion, communication may influence motivation and behavior by influencing beliefs about beliefs. Promises may enhance trustworthy behavior, which is what we observe. We argue that guilt aversion may be relevant for understanding strategic interaction in a variety of settings, and that it may shed light on the role of language, discussions, agreements, and social norms in these contexts.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,165
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences.
Whitfield, J. W., & Siegel, S. (1957) · Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (General) · doi:10.2307/2342828 · Cited by 7,947
Nash, J. F. (1950) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907266 · Cited by 7,840
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1027 · Cited by 5,548
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.166 · Cited by 5,378
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
RABIN, M. (2011) · Advances in Behavioral Economics · doi:10.2307/j.ctvcm4j8j.15 · Cited by 4,705
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302760193904 · Cited by 3,970
Self-citationThe Handbook of experimental economics
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-1645 · Cited by 3,679
Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.159 · Cited by 3,239
The “false consensus effect”: An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes
Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/0022-1031(77)90049-x · Cited by 3,139
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9 · Cited by 2,780
Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences
(1977) · doi:10.1016/c2013-0-10517-x · Cited by 2,457
Glaeser, E. L., Laibson, D. I., Scheinkman, J. A., & Soutter, C. L. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554926 · Cited by 2,105
Social Norms and Economic Theory
Elster, J. (1989) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.3.4.99 · Cited by 2,071
Guilt: An interpersonal approach
Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. F. (1994) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.115.2.243 · Cited by 1,884
A theory of sequential reciprocity
Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.003 · Cited by 1,867
Self-citationDeception: The Role of Consequences
Gneezy, U. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828053828662 · Cited by 1,729
Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments
Levine, D. K. (1998) · Review of Economic Dynamics · doi:10.1006/redy.1998.0023 · Cited by 1,408
Bernheim, B. D. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261957 · Cited by 1,304
Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing “Conditional Cooperation” in a Field Experiment
Frey, B. S., & Meier, S. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828043052187 · Cited by 1,184
Dawes, R. M., McTavish, J., & Shaklee, H. (1977) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-3514.35.1.1 · Cited by 1,044
Psychological games and sequential rationality
Geanakoplos, J., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. (1989) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/0899-8256(89)90005-5 · Cited by 1,017
Farrell, J., & Rabin, M. (1996) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.10.3.103 · Cited by 1,012
Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity
Sobel, J. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/0022051054661530 · Cited by 899
A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk
Crawford, V. (1998) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2359 · Cited by 551
Battigalli, P., & Dufwenberg, M. (2009) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.004 · Cited by 535
Self-citationMeasuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game
Dufwenberg, M., & Gneezy, U. (2000) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1999.0715 · Cited by 453
Self-citationRoth, A. E. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-006 · Cited by 430
Promises, Threats and Fairness
Ellingsen, T., & Johannesson, M. (2004) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00214.x · Cited by 426
Recent Advances in the Empirical Study of Shame and Guilt
TANGNEY, J. P. (1995) · American Behavioral Scientist · doi:10.1177/0002764295038008008 · Cited by 419
Communication, commitment, and cooperation in social dilemma.
Kerr, N. L., & Kaufman-Gilliland, C. M. (1994) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-3514.66.3.513 · Cited by 358
Personal Narratives About Guilt: Role in Action Control and Interpersonal Relationships
Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. F. (1995) · Basic and Applied Social Psychology · doi:10.1080/01973533.1995.9646138 · Cited by 353
Hannan, R. L., Kagel, J. H., & Moser, D. V. (2002) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/342894 · Cited by 235
Marital investments, time consistency and emotions
Dufwenberg, M. A. (2002) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00225-6 · Cited by 126
Self-citationExpressed preferences and behavior in experimental games
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2004) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.010 · Cited by 121
Self-citationBeiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung
Sauermann, H. (2025) · Mohr Siebeck eBooks · doi:10.1628/978-3-16-165378-0 · Cited by 113
Essentials of statistical analysis for the behavioral sciences
Glasnapp, D. R., & Poggio, J. P. (1985) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 112
More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures
Huang, P. H., & Wu, H.-M. (1994) · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036856 · Cited by 112
Dufwenberg, M. A., & Lundholm, M. (2001) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00648 · Cited by 56
Self-citationThe Framing of Games and the Psychology of Strategic ChoicePreprint
Dufwenberg, M. A., Gächter, S., & Hennig‐Schmidt, H. (2006) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 39
Self-citationThe Canonical Type Space for Interdependent PreferencesPreprint
Gül, F., & Pesendorfer, W. (2005) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 33
Cited by
Deception: The Role of Consequences
Gneezy, U. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828053828662 · Cited by 1,729
Mas, A., & Moretti, E. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.112 · Cited by 1,280
LIES IN DISGUISE-AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON CHEATING
Fischbacher, U., & Föllmi-Heusi, F. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12014 · Cited by 1,243
Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing “Conditional Cooperation” in a Field Experiment
Frey, B. S., & Meier, S. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828043052187 · Cited by 1,184
Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity
Sobel, J. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/0022051054661530 · Cited by 899
Metadata
- Authors
- Charness, G., & Dufwenberg, M.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2006-11
- Volume
- 74
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1579-1601
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W3123273141
- Cited by
- 1,491
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 132.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.