The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Has Finance Made the World Riskier?
Abstract
Developments in the financial sector have led to an expansion in its ability to spread risks. The increase in the risk bearing capacity of economies, as well as in actual risk taking, has led to a range of financial transactions that hitherto were not possible, and has created much greater access to finance for firms and households. On net, this has made the world much better off. Concurrently, however, we have also seen the emergence of a whole range of intermediaries, whose size and appetite for risk may expand over the cycle. Not only can these intermediaries accentuate real fluctuations, they can also leave themselves exposed to certain small probability risks that their own collective behaviour makes more likely. As a result, under some conditions, economies may be more exposed to financial‐sector‐induced turmoil than in the past. The paper discusses the implications for monetary policy and prudential supervision. In particular, it suggests market‐friendly policies that would reduce the incentive of intermediary managers to take excessive risk.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261155 · Cited by 9,369
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03807.x · Cited by 5,291 · cited 1×
“Increasingly, finance academics are coming to the conclusion that prolonged deviations from fundamental value are possible because relatively few resources will be deployed to fight the herd (see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) or Lamont and Thaler (2001)).”
BackgroundThe Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems
Kaminsky, G. L., & Reinhart, C. M. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.3.473 · Cited by 4,978
Kiyotaki, N., & Moore, J. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262072 · Cited by 4,694
Domestic Saving and International Capital Flows
Feldstein, M., & Horioka, C. (1980) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2231790 · Cited by 2,765
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
Jensen (Deceased), M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1998) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.94043 · Cited by 2,749
Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives
Chevalier, J., & Ellison, G. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/516389 · Cited by 2,290
Does Distance Still Matter? The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending
Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00505 · Cited by 2,150
Self-citationLiquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking
Diamond, D. W., & Rajan, R. G. (2001) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/319552 · Cited by 2,002
Self-citationThe Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from Bank Branch Deregulation
Jayaratne, J., & Strahan, P. E. (1996) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946668 · Cited by 1,723
Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives
Chevalier, J., & Ellison, G. (1995) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w5234 · Cited by 1,582
Banks as Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit‐taking
Kashyap, A. K., Rajan, R., & Stein, J. C. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00415 · Cited by 1,442
Self-citationAsset Prices, Financial and Monetary Stability: Exploring the Nexus
Borio, C. E. V., & Lowe, P. W. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.846305 · Cited by 1,255
Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry
Morgan, D. P. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260344506 · Cited by 1,241
How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans
QIAN, J., & STRAHAN, P. E. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01293.x · Cited by 1,102
Myers, S. C., & Rajan, R. G. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355398555739 · Cited by 959
Self-citationFinancial Fragility and Economic Performance
Bernanke, B., & Gertler, M. (1990) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937820 · Cited by 926
Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises
DIAMOND, D. W., & RAJAN, R. G. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00741.x · Cited by 874
Self-citationWhat Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions
Kroszner, R. S., & Strahan, P. E. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556223 · Cited by 862
Distance Constraints: The Limits of Foreign Lending in Poor Economies
MIAN, A. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00878.x · Cited by 826
Asset prices, financial and monetary stability: exploring the nexusPreprint
Lowe, P. W., & Borio, C. E. V. (2002) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 782
Can the Market Add and Subtract? Mispricing in Tech Stock Carve‐outs
Lamont, O. A., & Thaler, R. H. (2003) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/367683 · Cited by 660
Banks' Advantage in Hedging Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market
GATEV, E., & STRAHAN, P. E. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00857.x · Cited by 610
Beauty Contests and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets
Allen, F., Morris, S., & Shin, H. S. (2006) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhj036 · Cited by 572
Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (2003) · Cited by 550
Self-citationEntry Restrictions, Industry Evolution, and Dynamic Efficiency: Evidence From Commercial Banking
Jayaratne, J., & Strahan, P. E. (1998) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467390 · Cited by 543
Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial Supervision and Regulation?
Borio, C. E. V. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.841306 · Cited by 536
Reputation and Discretion in Financial Contracting
Boot, A. W. A., Greenbaum, & Thakor, A. V. (2004) · Credit, Intermediation, and the Macroeconomy · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199242948.003.0020 · Cited by 526
Too big to fail: the hazards of bank bailouts
(2004) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-1064 · Cited by 521
Preference shocks, liquidity, and central bank policy
Bhattacharya, S., & Gale, D. (1987) · New Approaches to Monetary Economics · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511759628.005 · Cited by 510
Careers and Survival: Competition and Risk in the Hedge Fund and CTA Industry
Brown, S. J., Goetzmann, W. N., & Park, J. (2001) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00392 · Cited by 474
The new financial order: risk in the 21st century
(2003) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.41-0438 · Cited by 471
International Energy Agency (2004) · World Energy Outlook · doi:10.1787/weo-2004-en · Cited by 451
The Division of Spoils: Rent-Sharing and Discrimination in a Regulated Industry
Black, S. E., & Strahan, P. E. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.4.814 · Cited by 434
On the Empirics of Sudden Stops: The Relevance of Balance-Sheet Effects
Calvo, G. A., Izquierdo, A., & Mejía, L. F. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1818711 · Cited by 432
Economic Policy for a Free Society
Wright, D. M., & Simons, H. (1948) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1927379 · Cited by 386
Hoshi, T., Kashyap, A., & Scharfstein, D. (1993) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w4421 · Cited by 283
How Law and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans
Qian, J., & Strahan, P. (2005) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w11052 · Cited by 230
Chan, N., Getmansky, M., Haas, S., & Lo, A. (2005) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w11200 · Cited by 207
Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984
Alesina, A., & Sachs, J. (1988) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/1992667 · Cited by 205
Banks, short-term debt and financial crises: theory, policy implications and applications
Diamond, D. W., & Rajan, R. G. (2001) · Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy · doi:10.1016/s0167-2231(01)00039-2 · Cited by 199
Self-citationWhy Do Emerging Economies Borrow in Foreign Currency?
Jeanne, O., & OJeanne@imf.org (2003) · IMF Working Papers · doi:10.5089/9781451858891.001 · Cited by 183
Kroszner, R. S., & Strahan, P. E. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.170355 · Cited by 171
Flows, Performance, and Managerial Incentives in Hedge FundsPreprint
Agarwal, V., Daniel, N. D., & Naik, N. Y. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.424369 · Cited by 169
The Past and Future of Commercial Banking Viewed Through an Incomplete Contract Lens
Rajan, R. G. (1998) · Journal of money credit and banking · doi:10.2307/2601255 · Cited by 159
Self-citationInternational Energy Agency (2005) · World energy outlook · doi:10.1787/weo-2005-en · Cited by 158
The Paradox of LiquidityPreprint
Myers, S. C., & Rajan, R. G. (1995) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 149
Self-citationDumb Money: Mutual Fund Flows and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns
Frazzini, A., & Lamont, O. A. (2005) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w11526 · Cited by 128
Ferri, G. (2006) · Economic Notes · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0300.2006.00163.x · Cited by 89
Default Risk Sharing Between Banks and Markets: The Contribution of Collateralized Debt Obligations
Franke, G., & Krahnen, J. P. (2005) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w11741 · Cited by 56
Exchange Rate Volatility and the Credit Channel in Emerging Markets: A Vertical Perspective
Caballero, R. J., & Krishnamurthy, A. (2004) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10517 · Cited by 46
Banks' Advantage in Hedging Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market
Gatev, E., & Strahan, P. E. (2003) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w9956 · Cited by 34
Cited by
Econometric measures of connectedness and systemic risk in the finance and insurance sectors
Billio, M., Getmansky, M., Lo, A. W., & Pelizzon, L. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.12.010 · Cited by 2,511
(2014) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta10104 · Cited by 1,325
Risk, uncertainty and monetary policy
Bekaert, G., Hoerova, M., & Lo Duca, M. (2013) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2013.06.003 · Cited by 1,235
Neglected risks, financial innovation, and financial fragility
Gennaioli, N., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.005 · Cited by 735
Maddaloni, A., & Peydró, J.-L. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr015 · Cited by 678
Metadata
- Authors
- Rajan, R. G.
- Venue
- European Financial Management
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-08-10
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 499-533
- ISSN
- 1354-7798 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-036X
- OpenAlex
- W2034309299
- Cited by
- 913
- References
- 53
- FWCI
- 15.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.