Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, But Not Others?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper develops a bargaining model that explains why political power-sharing agreements lead to peaceful resolution of civil wars between governments and insurgents in some cases, but not others. The model predicts that if the civil war ends in a military stalemate, the government uses its offer of a political power-sharing agreement to the insurgents as a tool to misrepresent private information about its military capacity and defeat the insurgency. This exacerbates commitment problems, increases the degree of support that insurgent leaders receive from their civilian supporters and consequently increases the likelihood of recurrence of civil war. Conversely, the model shows that when the war ends in a decisive military victory for the government or the insurgents, the offer of a political power-sharing agreement reduces the degree of support that insurgent leaders get from their civilian supporters and increases the costs of fighting for the insurgents. Hence, after a decisive military victory insurgents have incentives to accept the political power-sharing agreement and not revert to fighting. Results from Cox Proportional Hazard models estimated on a data set of 111 civil wars (1944–1999) provide robust statistical support for the model's predictions.
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Citations
Cites
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
FEARON, J. D., & LAITIN, D. D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000534 · Cited by 7,366
Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?
Fearon, J. D. (2004) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343304043770 · Cited by 1,306
Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post‐Civil War Conflict Management
Hartzell, C., & Hoddie, M. (2003) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/1540-5907.00022 · Cited by 709
Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War
Walter, B. F. (2004) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343304043775 · Cited by 690
Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War
Fortna, V. P. (2004) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00301.x · Cited by 673
Cited by
Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace
Krause, J., Krause, W., & Bränfors, P. (2018) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2018.1492386 · Cited by 344
When Civil Wars Recur: Conditions for Durable Peace after Civil Wars
David Mason, T., Gurses, M., Brandt, P. T., & Michael Quinn, J. (2011) · International Studies Perspectives · doi:10.1111/j.1528-3585.2011.00426.x · Cited by 210
On malaria and the duration of civil war
Bagozzi, B. E. (2016) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002714550202 · Cited by 38
Roper, S. D., & Barria, L. A. (2009) · Human Rights Review · doi:10.1007/s12142-009-0122-6 · Cited by 20
The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in Post-Conflict Economic Recovery and Peace-Building
Bak, D., Lee, H., & Biglaiser, G. (2024) · Foreign Policy Analysis · doi:10.1093/fpa/orae032 · Cited by 8
Metadata
- Authors
- MUKHERJEE, B.
- Venue
- International Studies Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2006-06
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 479-504
- ISSN
- 0020-8833 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2478
- OpenAlex
- W2012038534
- Cited by
- 127
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 11.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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