How Predictive Appeals Affect Policy Opinions
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
When political actors debate the merits of a public policy, they often focus on the consequences of a bill or legislative proposal, with supporters and opponents making stark but contradictory predictions about the future. Building upon the framing literature, I examine how rhetoric about a policy's consequences influences public opinion. I show that predictive appeals work largely by altering people's beliefs about the impact of a policy. Following in the tradition of recent framing research, this article also examines how opinions are influenced when people are exposed to opposing predictions. The analysis focuses on two strategies that are common in real‐world debates—the direct rebuttal (in which an initial appeal is challenged by a statement making the opposite prediction) and the alternate frame (which counters an initial appeal by shifting the focus to some other consequence). There are important differences in the effectiveness of these two strategies—a finding that has implications for the study of competitive framing and the policymaking process more generally.
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Citations
Cites
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Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
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Automatic vigilance: The attention-grabbing power of negative social information.
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“Therefore, people should give greater weight to negative information relative to equally extreme positive information (e.g., Cobb and Kuklinski 1997; Pratto and John 1991; Soroka 2006).”
BackgroundWhat Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat
Brader, T., Valentino, N. A., & Suhay, E. (2008) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00353.x · Cited by 1,313
Misinformation and the Currency of Democratic Citizenship
Kuklinski, J. H., Quirk, P. J., Jerit, J., Schwieder, D., & Rich, R. F. (2000) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1111/0022-3816.00033 · Cited by 1,167 · cited 1×
“In addition, beliefs often are buttressed by a person’s policy preferences (e.g., Kuklinski et al. 2000).”
BackgroundSelf-citationA Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation in Competitive Elite Environments
Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007) · Journal of Communication · doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00331.x · Cited by 1,159
Good News and Bad News: Asymmetric Responses to Economic Information
Soroka, S. N. (2006) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00413.x · Cited by 850
Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens' Conversations Limit Elite Influence
Druckman, J. N., & Nelson, K. R. (2003) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/1540-5907.00051 · Cited by 841
The Logic of the Survey Experiment Reexamined
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Cited by
How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation
DRUCKMAN, J. N., PETERSON, E., & SLOTHUUS, R. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000500 · Cited by 1,569
“(chapter 5: 6; also see Jerit 2009).”
BackgroundThe Influence of Partisan Motivated Reasoning on Public Opinion
Bolsen, T., Druckman, J. N., & Cook, F. L. (2014) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-013-9238-0 · Cited by 891
“When individuals engage in motivated reasoning they may miss out on relevant information that might otherwise be helpful (Druckman and Bolsen 2011; Fazio and Olson 2003, p. 149; Jerit 2009; Lavine et al. 2012).”
BackgroundPolitical Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and Issue Framing Effects
Slothuus, R., & de Vreese, C. H. (2010) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s002238161000006x · Cited by 734
Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and Public Opinion Formation
Leeper, T. J., & Slothuus, R. (2014) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12164 · Cited by 722
“Similarly, parties may have incentives to influence reasoning through the strategic provision of ambiguous information, for example about economic conditions, their policy positions (Tomz & van Houweling, 2009), or the impact of proposed policy (Jerit, 2009).”
BackgroundAre Survey Experiments Externally Valid?
BARABAS, J., & JERIT, J. (2010) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000092 · Cited by 481
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Jerit, J.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-03-27
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 411-426
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W2033502228
- Cited by
- 103
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 78.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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