The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects of Collateral Damage
Abstract
Can civilians caught in civil wars reward and punish armed actors for their behavior? If so, do armed actors reap strategic benefits from treating civilians well and pay for treating them poorly? Using precise geo‐coded data on violence in Iraq from 2004 through 2009, we show that both sides are punished for the collateral damage they inflict. Coalition killings of civilians predict higher levels of insurgent violence and insurgent killings predict less violence in subsequent periods. This symmetric reaction is tempered by preexisting political preferences; the anti‐insurgent reaction is not present in Sunni areas, where the insurgency was most popular, and the anti‐Coalition reaction is not present in mixed areas. Our findings have strong policy implications, provide support for the argument that information civilians share with government forces and their allies is a key constraint on insurgent violence, and suggest theories of intrastate violence must account for civilian agency.
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Cites
(2001) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 27,577
The Logic of Violence in Civil War
Kalyvas, S. N. (2006) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511818462 · Cited by 3,314
The Logic of Violence in Civil War
(2006) · The Logic of Violence in Civil War · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511818462.001 · Cited by 2,402
Inside rebellion: the politics of insurgent violence
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-5891 · Cited by 1,708
Blattman, C., & Miguel, E. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.1.3 · Cited by 1,617
Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia
Dube, O., & Vargas, J. F. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt009 · Cited by 1,187
Walzer, M. (1977) · Cited by 828
The accidental guerrilla: fighting small wars in the midst of a big one
(2010) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.47-3441 · Cited by 714
Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq
Berman, E., Shapiro, J. N., & Felter, J. H. (2011) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/661983 · Cited by 694
Self-citation“Draining the Sea”: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare
Valentino, B., Huth, P., & Balch-Lindsay, D. (2004) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818304582061 · Cited by 676
Cited by
Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan
LYALL, J., BLAIR, G., & IMAI, K. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055413000403 · Cited by 527
A Closer Look at Reporting Bias in Conflict Event Data
Weidmann, N. B. (2016) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12196 · Cited by 294
Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?
Biddle, S., Friedman, J. A., & Shapiro, J. N. (2012) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec_a_00087 · Cited by 276
Self-citationWhy We Kill: The Political Science of Political Violence against Civilians
Valentino, B. A. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-082112-141937 · Cited by 200
Governance and Civil War Onset
Fearon, J. D. (2011) · doi:10.1596/9123 · Cited by 84
Metadata
- Authors
- Condra, L. N., & Shapiro, J. N.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-09-14
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 167-187
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W1919102951
- Cited by
- 297
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 38.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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