The DOI matches its Crossref record; 68 of the 70 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Patterns of Moral Judgment Derive From Nonmoral Psychological Representations
Open accessAbstract
Ordinary people often make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical principles and legal distinctions. For example, they judge killing as worse than letting die, and harm caused as a necessary means to a greater good as worse than harm caused as a side-effect (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). Are these patterns of judgment produced by mechanisms specific to the moral domain, or do they derive from other psychological domains? We show that the action/omission and means/side-effect distinctions affect nonmoral representations and provide evidence that their role in moral judgment is mediated by these nonmoral psychological representations. Specifically, the action/omission distinction affects moral judgment primarily via causal attribution, while the means/side-effect distinction affects moral judgment via intentional attribution. We suggest that many of the specific patterns evident in our moral judgments in fact derive from nonmoral psychological mechanisms, and especially from the processes of causal and intentional attribution.
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“Harmful actions are judged more harshly than harmful inactions 179,180 ,”
From Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response (2020) · cites this paper as [179]
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Background
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Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response
Bavel, J. J. V., Baicker, K., Boggio, P. S., Capraro, V., Cichocka, A., Cikara, M., Crockett, M. J., Crum, A. J., Douglas, K. M., Druckman, J. N., et al. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-0884-z · Cited by 4,964
Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality
Gray, K., Young, L., & Waytz, A. (2012) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2012.651387 · Cited by 1,008
Self-citationThe Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by Redefining Harm
Schein, C., & Gray, K. J. (2017) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868317698288 · Cited by 724
Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2014) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2014.877340 · Cited by 632
Cushman, F. A. (2013) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868313495594 · Cited by 507
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cushman, F., & Young, L.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
- Corresponding author
- Cushman, Fiery
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-01-31
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1052-1075
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2133646840
- Cited by
- 179
- References
- 70
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 7.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Cognitive Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Harvard University
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Ethics in Business and Education
- Keywords
- moral judgment, causal attribution, intentional attribution, killing versus letting die, moral intuitions
- MeSH terms
- Adolescent, Adult, Humans, Judgment, Morals, Social Perception, Intention, Theory of Mind
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