The DOI matches its Crossref record; 93 of the 93 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Analyzing collective action
Open accessAbstract
Collective‐action problems pervade all societies as well as ecological systems used by humans. Substantial evidence has accrued during the last several decades that human actors are able to solve some (but definitely not all) collective‐action problems on their own without external rules and enforcement imposed from the outside. In this article, I review some of the structural variables that have been found to affect the likelihood of collective action. Then, I address the need to base future work on collective action on a more general theory of human behavior than has been used to model collective action over the last five decades. In the last section, I discuss how structural variables affect the core relationships of reputation, trust, and reciprocity as these affect levels of cooperation.
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Cites
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Self-citation
Cited by
Cost-effective mitigation of nitrogen pollution from global croplands
Gu, B., Zhang, X., Lam, S. K., Yu, Y., van Grinsven, H. J. M., Zhang, S., Wang, X., Bodirsky, B. L., Wang, S., Duan, J., et al. (2023) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-022-05481-8 · Cited by 722
Data governance as a collective action problem
Benfeldt, O., Persson, J. S., & Madsen, S. (2020) · Information Systems Frontiers · doi:10.1007/s10796-019-09923-z · Cited by 137
Glynn, P. D., Voinov, A. A., Shapiro, C. D., & White, P. A. (2017) · Earth's Future · doi:10.1002/2016ef000487 · Cited by 98
“…a Nobel Prize for understanding the need for “bottom-up” community planning and the importance of cultural norms that could help avert the “Tragedy of the Commons” described by Hardin [Dietz et al., 2003; Ostrom, 2010a, 2010b; Vollan and Ostrom, 2010; Ostrom et al., 2012; Kinzig et al., 2013].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Ostrom, E.
- Venue
- Agricultural Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-11
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- s1
- Pages
- 155-166
- ISSN
- 0169-5150 (ISSN-L)
- 1574-0862
- OpenAlex
- W2140493897
- Cited by
- 488
- References
- 93
- FWCI
- 29.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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