The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 43 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why panpsychism doesn’t help us explain consciousness
Abstract
This paper starts from the assumption that panpsychism is counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding. A number of philosophers, whilst not denying these negative aspects of the view, think that panpsychism has in its favour that it offers a good explanation of consciousness. In opposition to this, the paper argues that panpsychism cannot help us to explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre-theoretical reason to believe in.
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“I submit that what Penrose and Hameroff meant by the “binding problem” is referring to what has become known as the “combination problem of panpsychism” by philosophers (Seager 1995, Goff 2009).”
From A quantum microtubule substrate of consciousness is experimentally supported and solves the binding and epiphenomenalism problems (2025) · cites this paper as Goff 2009
In the citing paper
“Critics of PP argue that the problem of explaining how microphenomenal properties, states, or processes might merge to form macro-phenomenal properties, states, or processes is just as daunting as POC itself (e.g., Goff 2009).”
From Priority Cosmopsychism and the Advaita Vedānta (2019) · cites this paper as Goff 2009
In the citing paper
“By Goff's argument we cannot see how the combination of micro--subjects could provide for the existence of a macro--subject.”
From The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence (2014) · cites this paper as Goff 2009
Citations
Cites
James, W. (1891) · Personality Culture Society · doi:10.1037/11059-000 · Cited by 25,876
Ryle, G. (2006) · Rowman & Littlefield Publishers eBooks · doi:10.5040/9798216413257.ch-2 · Cited by 6,804
“Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap
Levine, J. (1983) · Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1983.tb00207.x · Cited by 2,150
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Facing up to the problem of consciousness
Chalmers, D. J. (1996) · Toward a Science of Consciousness · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6860.003.0003 · Cited by 1,966
A MATERIALIST THEORY OF THE MIND
Kingdom, E. (1968) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1968.tb01392.x · Cited by 1,746
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind
Tye, M. (1995) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6712.001.0001 · Cited by 1,718
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
Harman, G. (1990) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214186 · Cited by 1,409
Morton, A., & Publishing, C. (1993) · Cogito · doi:10.5840/cogito19937236 · Cited by 1,369
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness
Chalmers, D. J. (1998) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203826430-11 · Cited by 1,334
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Chalmers, 1996, The Conscious Mind: Towards a Fundamental Theory
- Lewis, 1988, Proceedings of the Russellian Society
- Rey, 1995, Conscious Experience
- Strawson, 2002, Towards a Science of Consciousness III
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Metadata
- Authors
- Goff, P.
- Affiliations
- University of Birmingham (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Goff, Philip
- ORCID
- Goff, Philip
- Venue
- dialectica
- Publisher
- Verein philosophie.ch
- Published
- 2009
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 289-311
- ISSN
- 0012-2017 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2109455157
- Cited by
- 163
- References
- 43
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 41 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 31 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 0.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- dialectica (publishedVersion)
- University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- panpsychism, consciousness, metaphysics of mind
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