The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 43 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why panpsychism doesn’t help us explain consciousness
Abstract
This paper starts from the assumption that panpsychism is counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding. A number of philosophers, whilst not denying these negative aspects of the view, think that panpsychism has in its favour that it offers a good explanation of consciousness. In opposition to this, the paper argues that panpsychism cannot help us to explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre-theoretical reason to believe in.
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In the citing paper
“I submit that what Penrose and Hameroff meant by the “binding problem” is referring to what has become known as the “combination problem of panpsychism” by philosophers (Seager 1995, Goff 2009).”
From A quantum microtubule substrate of consciousness is experimentally supported and solves the binding and epiphenomenalism problems (2025) · cites this paper as Goff 2009
In the citing paper
“Critics of PP argue that the problem of explaining how microphenomenal properties, states, or processes might merge to form macro-phenomenal properties, states, or processes is just as daunting as POC itself (e.g., Goff 2009).”
From Priority Cosmopsychism and the Advaita Vedānta (2019) · cites this paper as Goff 2009
In the citing paper
“By Goff's argument we cannot see how the combination of micro--subjects could provide for the existence of a macro--subject.”
From The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence (2014) · cites this paper as Goff 2009
Citations
Cites
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The Two‐Dimensional Argument Against Materialism
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Goff, P. (2011) · Durham Research Online (Durham University) · Cited by 27
Self-citationStrawson, G. (1999) · Cited by 11
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Chalmers, 1996, The Conscious Mind: Towards a Fundamental Theory
- Lewis, 1988, Proceedings of the Russellian Society
- Rey, 1995, Conscious Experience
- Strawson, 2002, Towards a Science of Consciousness III
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence
Coleman, S. (2014) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9431-x · Cited by 206
“Cosmopsychism: A Holistic Approach to the Metaphysics of Experience
Shani, I. (2015) · Philosophical Papers · doi:10.1080/05568641.2015.1106709 · Cited by 165
(2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198843702.001.0001 · Cited by 138
The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory
Cerullo, M. A. (2015) · PLOS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004286 · Cited by 114
Why? The Purpose of the Universe
Goff, P. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198883760.001.0001 · Cited by 112
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Goff, P.
- Affiliations
- University of Birmingham (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Goff, Philip
- ORCID
- Goff, Philip
- Venue
- dialectica
- Publisher
- Verein philosophie.ch
- Published
- 2009
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 289-311
- ISSN
- 0012-2017 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2109455157
- Cited by
- 163
- References
- 43
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 41 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 31 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 0.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- dialectica (publishedVersion)
- University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- panpsychism, consciousness, metaphysics of mind
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