The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Two Conceptions of the Physical
Abstract
The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: (1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; (2) a priori physicalism is false; (3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; (4) epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory‐based conception, it is plausible that (2) is true and (3) is false; on the object‐based conception, it is plausible that (3) is true and (2) is false. the paper also defends and explores the version of physicalism that results from this strategy.
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Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Kripke, S. A. (1972) · Semantics of Natural Language · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9 · Cited by 7,028
Jackson, F. (1982) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2960077 · Cited by 2,477
Chalmers, D. J. (1996) · Cited by 1,998
A MATERIALIST THEORY OF THE MIND
KINGDOM, E. (1968) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1968.tb01392.x · Cited by 1,742
Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays
Kim, J. (1993) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625220 · Cited by 1,532
From metaphysics to ethics: a defence of conceptual analysis
(1999) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.36-3262 · Cited by 1,469
Jackson, F. (1986) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2026143 · Cited by 1,422
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
Harman, G. (1990) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214186 · Cited by 1,409
How to Define Theoretical Terms
Lewis, D. (1970) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2023861 · Cited by 1,400
Cited by
Consciousness and its Place in Nature
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind · doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch5 · Cited by 574
Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism
Chalmers, D. J. (2016) · Panpsychism · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.003.0002 · Cited by 432
The Combination Problem for Panpsychism
Chalmers, D. J. (2016) · Panpsychism · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.003.0008 · Cited by 231
Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness
Stoljar, D. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195306589.001.0001 · Cited by 191
Self-citationWhy panpsychism doesn’t help us explain consciousness
Goff, P. (2009) · dialectica · doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01196.x · Cited by 163
Metadata
- Authors
- STOLJAR, D.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2001-03
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 253-281
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W2117445582
- Cited by
- 315
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 3.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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