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Cited by 315

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Two Conceptions of the Physical

STOLJAR, DANIEL·2001·Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Abstract

The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: (1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; (2) a priori physicalism is false; (3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; (4) epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory‐based conception, it is plausible that (2) is true and (3) is false; on the object‐based conception, it is plausible that (3) is true and (2) is false. the paper also defends and explores the version of physicalism that results from this strategy.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00056.x

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Metadata

Authors
STOLJAR, D.
Venue
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2001-03
Volume
62
Issue
2
Pages
253-281
ISSN
  • 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
  • 1933-1592
OpenAlex
W2117445582
Cited by
315
References
41
FWCI
3.91
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Two Conceptions of the Physical. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00056.x
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STOLJAR, D. (2001). Two Conceptions of the Physical. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00056.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.