Methodological Encounters with the Phenomenal Kind
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Block's well-known distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness has generated a large philosophical literature about putative conceptual connections between the two. The scientific literature about whether they come apart in any actual cases is rather smaller. Empirical evidence gathered to date has not settled the issue. Some put this down to a fundamental methodological obstacle to the empirical study of the relation between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Block (2007) has drawn attention to the methodological puzzle and attempted to answer it. While the evidence Block points to is relevant and important, this paper puts forward a more systematic framework for addressing the puzzle. To give it a label, the approach is to study phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind. The approach allows consciousness studies to move beyond initial means of identifying instances of the kind like verbal report, and to find its underlying nature. It is well-recognised that facts about an underlying kind may allow identification of instances of the kind that do not match the initial means of identification (cp. non-liquid samples of water). This paper shows that the same method can be deployed to investigate phenomenal consciousness independently of access consciousness.
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Cites
Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference
Pearl, J. (2009) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511803161 · Cited by 11,653
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Papineau, D. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001 · Cited by 884
Rhesus monkeys know when they remember
Hampton, R. R. (2001) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.071600998 · Cited by 493 · cited 4×
“Only those in group (a) seem to be directly dependent on Ap:- Putative tests — Ti (a) Connected to global availability of information: Report of one amongst many features, cued after the stimulus has been masked, of a complex visual stimulus, Sperling (1960), Landman et al. (2003) Meta-memory, Hampton (2001) Insensiti…”
BackgroundInfluentialIntrospective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness
Jack, A. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00128-1 · Cited by 198 · cited 3×
“The functional signature of Pp can be probed in a large variety of ingenious ways (Jack and Shallice 2001 defend a similar method and give examples).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe vegetative state and the science of consciousness
Shea, N., & Bayne, T. (2010) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axp046 · Cited by 143
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Are there levels of consciousness?
Bayne, T., Hohwy, J., & Owen, A. M. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.03.009 · Cited by 438
The search for invertebrate consciousness
Birch, J. (2022) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12351 · Cited by 254
“A study by Travers, Frith, and Shea (2018), involving visual cues, suggested that “subjects were only able to adapt [rapidly, within up to 100 trials] to reversals of the cue-target contingencies .”
The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
Are there islands of awareness?
Bayne, T., Seth, A. K., & Massimini, M. (2020) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2019.11.003 · Cited by 145
On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated information theory of consciousness
Bayne, T. (2018) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niy007 · Cited by 132
Metadata
- Authors
- SHEA, N.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-02-17
- Volume
- 84
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 307-344
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W1494557012
- Cited by
- 100
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 1.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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