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Personal Costs of Executive Turnovers

MEISNER NIELSEN, KASPER·2026·The Journal of Finance
DOI 10.1111/jofi.70064
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Abstract

This study examines the income loss following forced CEO turnovers using income data from the official records at the Danish Tax Authority. We find that dismissed CEOs’ personal income is 40% lower in the five years following forced turnovers. The decline is driven by labor market outcomes: labor and entrepreneurial incomes decline, while other sources of income increase. We find larger declines in income for executives with poor performance during their tenures, consistent with the executive labor market being the main channel for the lower income. Overall, the findings suggest that executives face significant personal costs from forced turnovers.

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Metadata

Authors
MEISNER NIELSEN, K.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2026-08-08
Volume
81
Issue
5
Pages
2649-2686
ISSN
  • 0022-1082
  • 1540-6261
DOI
10.1111/jofi.70064
Cited by
0
References
1
Language
en
Licence

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Personal Costs of Executive Turnovers. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/jofi.70064
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MEISNER NIELSEN, K. (2026). Personal Costs of Executive Turnovers. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70064

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.