The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Monitoring Managers: Does It Matter?
Abstract
We study how well‐incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private equity–backed firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability. “Soft” information plays a much larger role than hard data, such as the performance metrics that prior literature focuses on, and helps avoid firing a CEO for bad luck or in response to adverse external shocks. We show that governance reforms increase the effectiveness of board monitoring and establish a causal link between forced CEO turnover and performance improvements.
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Cites
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355304772839588 · Cited by 10,641
Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments
Staiger, D., & Stock, J. H. (1997) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171753 · Cited by 7,081
Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments
Staiger, D., & Stock, J. (1994) · doi:10.3386/t0151 · Cited by 5,302
Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/376950 · Cited by 3,777
Angrist, J. D., & Krueger, A. B. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.4.69 · Cited by 2,355
Cited by
Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors
McCAHERY, J. A., SAUTNER, Z., & STARKS, L. T. (2016) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12393 · Cited by 1,494
What do private equity firms say they do?
Gompers, P., Kaplan, S. N., & Mukharlyamov, V. (2016) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.06.003 · Cited by 377
Metadata
- Authors
- CORNELLI, F., KOMINEK, Z., & LJUNGQVIST, A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2013-03-07
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 431-481
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3121249284
- Cited by
- 230
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 48.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
