The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Metaphysical Rationalism
Abstract
The Principle of Sufficient Reason states that everything has an explanation. But different notions of explanation yield different versions of this principle. Here a version is formulated in terms of the notion of a “grounding” explanation. Its consequences are then explored, with particular emphasis on the fact that it implies necessitarianism, the view that every truth is necessarily true. Finally, the principle is defended from a number of objections, including objections to necessitarianism. The result is a defense of a “rationalist” metaphysics, one that constitutes an alternative to the contemporary dogmas that some aspects of the world are “metaphysically brute” and that the world could in so many ways have been different.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dasgupta, S.
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2014-11-19
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 379-418
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0068
- OpenAlex
- W2321018567
- Cited by
- 265
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 6.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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