Virtue Signaling and Moral Progress
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Abstract
Virtue signaling' is the practice of using moral talk in order to enhance one's moral reputation.Many find this kind of behavior irritating.However, some philosophers have gone further, arguing that virtue signaling actively undermines the proper functioning of public moral discourse and impedes moral progress.Against this view, I argue that widespread virtue signaling is not a social ill, and that it can actually serve as an invaluable instrument for moral change, especially in cases where moral argument alone does not suffice.Specifically, virtue signaling can change the broader public's social expectations, which can in turn motivate the adoption of new, positive social norms.I also argue that the reputation-seeking motives underlying virtue signaling impose important constraints on virtue signalers' behavior, which serve to keep the worst excesses of virtue signaling in check.One engages in virtue signaling in the hopes of seeing one's moral reputation improve in the eyes of one's peers (or potential customers); the desire to make a constructive, sincere contribution to public moral discourse is at best a secondary motivation. 2It is easy to see why 'virtue signaling' is a pejorative term, and why many find it annoying.But for some, the prospect of widespread virtue signaling represents something much darker.Recently, philosophers Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke have argued that virtue signaling (or, as they call it, moral grandstanding 3 ) is not just irritating, but actively harmful to the proper functioning of public moral discourse itself, such that it impairs our collective ability to improve our moral beliefs and promote positive moral changes in the world.4 When contributions to public debate are driven by status-seeking goals, these authors argue, this leads to a series of increasingly inflated moral claims, exaggerated expressions of outrage, and aggressive piling on and public shaming.This causes onlookers to disengage from moral discourse, either because of increased cynicism about their would-be interlocutors' motives, increased political polarization, or sheer exhaustion.In short, when the sphere of public moral discourse ceases to be a forum for
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Cites
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Metadata
- Authors
- Westra, E.
- Venue
- Philosophy & Public Affairs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2021-02-23
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 156-178
- ISSN
- 0048-3915 (ISSN-L)
- 1088-4963
- OpenAlex
- W3130818118
- Cited by
- 69
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 67.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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