Estimated transmissibility and impact of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7 in England
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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 63 of the 63 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 7 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
A severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variant, VOC 202012/01 (lineage B.1.1.7), emerged in southeast England in September 2020 and is rapidly spreading toward fixation. Using a variety of statistical and dynamic modeling approaches, we estimate that this variant has a 43 to 90% (range of 95% credible intervals, 38 to 130%) higher reproduction number than preexisting variants. A fitted two-strain dynamic transmission model shows that VOC 202012/01 will lead to large resurgences of COVID-19 cases. Without stringent control measures, including limited closure of educational institutions and a greatly accelerated vaccine rollout, COVID-19 hospitalizations and deaths across England in the first 6 months of 2021 were projected to exceed those in 2020. VOC 202012/01 has spread globally and exhibits a similar transmission increase (59 to 74%) in Denmark, Switzerland, and the United States.
Overview
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TL;DR
Using sequencing, mobility/contact data, and dynamic transmission models, the paper finds that SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7 (VOC 202012/01) spread substantially faster than prior lineages in England. The authors estimate it is 43 to 90% more transmissible, with no clear evidence of increased disease severity, but warn that faster spread would increase cases, hospitalizations, and the need for stronger control measures and faster vaccination.
Key findings
- In UK sequencing data, VOC 202012/01 had the highest relative population growth rate among 307 other lineages in the first 31 days after initial phylogenetic observation, and it continued to expand.
- A multinomial spline model estimated an increased growth rate of +0.104 day–1 relative to B.1.177, corresponding to a 77% increase in reproduction number R (95% CI, 73 to 81%) assuming a 5.5-day generation interval.
- Alternative analyses estimated R for VOC 202012/01 to be 43% higher (95% CI, 38 to 48%) from case-based regression, and 55% higher in Denmark, 74% higher in Switzerland, and 59% higher in the United States.
- The transmission model found no clear increase or decrease in severity, with odds ratios of 0.92 for hospitalization, 0.90 for critical illness, and 0.90 for death, but estimated transmissibility was 65% higher in the three most affected NHS regions and 82% higher across all seven regions.
Methods
- The study combined publicly available sequencing data from COG-UK, Pillar 2 testing data for S gene target failure, mobility data from Google Community Mobility, and social contact data from the CoMix survey, plus analogous sequence/RT-PCR data from Denmark, Switzerland, and the US.
- The authors used multinomial and binomial generalized linear mixed models, negative binomial state-space models, and an age- and region-structured deterministic compartmental transmission model fitted to multiple regional data streams, including deaths, hospital admissions, bed occupancy, PCR prevalence, seroprevalence, and VOC frequency.
- They compared five mechanistic hypotheses for the rapid spread, assessed model fit with deviance information criteria and short-term prediction, and ran scenario projections under varying NPIs and vaccination rollout rates.
Limitations
- The paper states that only a small number of intervention and vaccination scenarios were considered, and these should not be viewed as the only policy options.
- It states that the transmission model does not explicitly capture nursing home or hospital transmission, and regions were fit separately rather than jointly modeling between-region transmission.
- It notes uncertainty in model choice and parameter assumptions, including school-closure assumptions and NPI efficacy; these are limitations stated in the paper.
- Evident from the text: the severity analysis is based on early population-level data up to 24 December 2020, so delays from infection to hospitalization or death could obscure severity effects.
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![Fig. 2 Measuring the growth rate of VOC 202012/01. (A) Average relativized growth rate (i.e., a measure of variant fitness relative to other variants present during the 31 days after initial phylogenetic observation of a given variant) for all lineages in the COG-UK dataset, highlighting many lineages that have risen to prominence including B.1.177, the lineage with the highest relative abundance during the initial phylogenetic observation of VOC 202012/01. The shaded regions show conservative 95% rejection intervals; VOC 202012/01 is the first strain to exceed this threshold of faster relativized growth. Although many lineages exhibit above-average rates of growth, VOC 202012/01 has had the highest average relativized growth of any lineage in the history of COG-UK surveillance of SARS-COV-2. (B) Plotting all lineages’ relativized growth rates [ρ(t)] as a function of lineage age with conservative 95% rejection intervals highlights the significantly faster growth of VOC 202012/01 relative to other lineages at comparable times since their initial observation. Later declines in VOC and B.1.177 correspond to highly uncertain estimates of growth rates for data that are yet to be backfilled, so these declines in ρ(t) are sensitive to the processing of future sequences from recent dates (fig. S1). (C) Muller plots of the relative abundances of the major SARS-CoV-2 variants in the UK, based on a multinomial spline fit to COG-UK sequence data (Table 1 and table S1, separate-slopes multinomial spline model). A model extrapolation until 1 March 2021 is shown (shaded area). Minority variants are 440 circulating SARS-CoV-2 variants of low abundance. Specific colors represent the same lineages in (A) to (C). (D) Mean reproduction number over 7-day periods in 149 upper-tier local authorities of England (colored by the NHS England region they are within) plotted against the weekly proportion of Pillar 2 community SARS-CoV-2 tests with S gene target failure shows the spread of VOC 202012/01, a corresponding increase in the reproduction number in each local authority, and the eventual impact of targeted government restrictions from 20 December 2020. Testing data are shown for the week after the reproduction number estimates to account for delays from infection to test.](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/6a959b32b94b41a4aab77f4b47b25a40/estimated-transmissibility-and-impact-of-sars-cov-2-lineage-b-1-1-7-in-england-figure-2.jpg)
![Fig. 3 Comparison of possible biological mechanisms underlying the rapid spread of VOC 202012/01. Each row shows a different assumed mechanism. (A) Relative frequency of VOC 202012/01 (black line and ribbon respectively denote observed S gene target failure frequency with 95% binomial credible interval; purple line and ribbon respectively denote mean and 95% credible interval from model fit). (B) Posterior estimates (mean and 95% credible intervals) for relative odds of hospitalization (severe illness), relative odds of ICU admission (critical illness), relative odds of death (fatal illness), growth rate as a multiplicative factor per week [i.e., exp(7·∆r)], and the parameter that defines the hypothesized mechanism; all parameters are relative to those estimated for preexisting variants. (C to E) Illustrative model fits for the South East NHS England region: (C) fitted two-strain increased transmissibility model with VOC 202012/01 included; (D) fitted two-strain increased transmissibility model with VOC 202012/01 removed; (E) fitted single-strain model without emergence of VOC 202012/01. Black lines denote observed data; error bars denote the date range and 95% credible intervals for observed PCR prevalence and seroprevalence; colored lines and ribbons denote median and 95% credible intervals from model fit.](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/806d848e45ca40c19e0cc853e2b24dfc/estimated-transmissibility-and-impact-of-sars-cov-2-lineage-b-1-1-7-in-england-figure-3.jpg)

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2 Valid · 0 Not valid · 4 Not checked · 37 Own results and interpretations
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In the paper
“we did not find substantial differences in social interactions between regions of high and low VOC 202012/01 prevalence, as measured by Google mobility (11) and social contact survey data (12) from September to December 2020 (Fig. 1, E and F).”
§ Estimated transmissibility and impact of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7 in England > Characteristics of the new variant
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [11]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Partly supportedcites [12] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Methods (Survey methodology) identify this as the CoMix social-contact survey, supporting the citation’s identification of the survey. But the Results (Participant characteristics) say the data reported here were collected on 24–27 March 2020; this paper does not establish that its reported data cover September–December 2020. The comparison between regions is presented as the citing authors’ own finding, not a finding attributed to this source. (LLM, conf=0.85)
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In the paper
“This yielded an estimated increase in R for VOC 202012/01 of 43% (95% CI, 38 to 48%), increasing to a 57% (95% CI, 52 to 62%) increase if the spline was not included (Table 1, models 4a and 4b).”
§ Estimated transmissibility and impact of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7 in England > Measuring the new variant’s growth rate
hedgedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Despite these limitations, we found strong evidence that VOC 202012/01 is spreading substantially faster than preexisting SARS-CoV-2 variants.”
§ Estimated transmissibility and impact of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7 in England > Discussion Combining multiple behavioral and epidemiological data sources with statistical and dynamic modeling, we estimated that the SARS-CoV-2 variant VOC 202012/01 has a 43 to 90% (range of 95% CrIs, 38 to 130%) higher reproduction number than preexisting variants of SARS-CoV-2 in England, assuming no changes to the generation interval. On the basis of early population-level data, we were unable to identify whether the new variant is associated with higher disease severity. Theoretical considerations suggest that, in some cases, natural selection may favor reduced severity of disease in pathogens (23). For this to be true, however, the pathogen’s infectious period must be truncated by disabling symptoms or death often enough that a less-virulent mutant generates more secondary infections despite potentially being less transmissible per contact, to the extent that decreased virulence and decreased transmissibility are consequences of the same mutation (e.g., one that decreases viral load). It is far from clear that this condition holds for SARS-CoV-2, given substantial transmission before the onset of severe symptoms. Regardless, without strengthened controls, there is a clear risk that future epidemic waves may be larger—and hence associated with greater burden—than previous waves. The UK government initiated a third national lockdown on 5 January 2021 in response to the rapid spread of VOC 202012/01, including school closures. Educational settings are among the largest institutions linked to SARS-CoV-2 clusters that remained open during the November 2020 lockdown (24), which means that the enacted school and university closures may have substantially assisted in reducing the burden of COVID-19 in early 2021. The increase in transmission associated with VOC 202012/01 has crucial implications for vaccination. First, it means that prompt and efficient vaccine delivery and distribution are even more important to reduce the impact of the pandemic in the near future. Increased transmission resulting from VOC 202012/01 will raise the herd immunity threshold, so that the potential burden of SARS-CoV-2 is larger and higher vaccine coverage will be required to achieve herd immunity. It is therefore extremely concerning that VOC 202012/01 has spread to at least 114 countries globally (2). Although VOC 202012/01 was first identified in England, a rapidly spreading variant has also been detected in South Africa (25, 26), where there was a marked increase in transmission in late 2020. Another variant exhibiting immune escape has emerged in Brazil (27, 28). Thus, vaccination timelines will also be a crucial determinant of future burden in other countries where similar new variants are present. Second, there is a need to assess how VOC 202012/01 and other emerging lineages affect the efficacy of vaccines (29, 30). Vaccine developers may need to consider developing formulations with variant sequences, and they may want to initiate post-licensure studies to detect differences in efficacy between the preexisting and new variants. Licensing authorities may need to clarify abbreviated pathways to marketing for vaccines that involve altering strain formulation without any other changes to their composition. There are limitations to our analysis. We have considered a small number of intervention and vaccination scenarios, which should not be regarded as the only available options for policy-makers. Our transmission model does not explicitly capture nursing home or hospital transmission of SARS-CoV-2, and we fit the model to each region of England separately rather than pooling information across regions and explicitly modeling transmission between regions. There are also uncertainties in the choice of model used to generate these predictions, and the exact choice will yield differences in the measures needed to control the epidemic. We note that even without increased susceptibility of children to VOC 202012/01, the more efficient spread of the variant implies that the difficult societal decision of closing schools will be a key public health question for multiple countries in the months ahead. We only assess relative support in the data for the mechanistic hypotheses proposed, but there may be other plausible mechanisms driving the resurgence of cases that we did not consider, and we have not identified the specific combination of mechanisms driving the increased transmission of VOC 202012/01. We identify increased transmissibility as the most parsimonious mechanistic explanation for the higher growth rate of VOC 202012/01, but a longer infectious period also fits the data well (table S4) and is supported by longitudinal testing data (17). Our conclusions about school closures were based on the assumption that children had reduced susceptibility and infectiousness relative to adults (19), but the precise values of these parameters and the impact of school closures remain the subject of scientific debate (31). We based our assumptions about the efficacy of NPIs on the measured impact on mobility of previous national lockdowns in England, but the impact of policy options cannot be predicted with certainty. Despite these limitations, we found strong evidence that VOC 202012/01 is spreading substantially faster than preexisting SARS-CoV-2 variants. Our modeling analysis suggests that this difference could be explained by an overall higher infectiousness of VOC 202012/01, but not by a shorter generation time or immune escape alone. Further experimental work will provide insight into the biological mechanisms for our observations, but given our projections of a rapid rise in incidence from VOC 202012/01—and the detection of other novel and highly transmissible variants (25–28)—there is an urgent need to consider what new approaches may be required to sufficiently reduce the ongoing transmission of SARS-CoV-2.
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In the paper
“we found that the relative population growth rate of VOC 202012/01 in the first 31 days after its initial phylogenetic observation was higher than that of all 307 other lineages with enough observations to obtain reliable growth-rate estimates (Fig. 2A and fig. S1).”
§ Estimated transmissibility and impact of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7 in England > Measuring the new variant’s growth rate
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In the paper
“The proportion of COVID-19 cases attributable to VOC 202012/01 increased rapidly in all regions of England, following an initial expansion in the southeast (Fig. 1A)”
§ Estimated transmissibility and impact of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7 in England > Characteristics of the new variant
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“B.1.1.7 to be between 43% and 82%3 more transmissible than preexisting variants in the United Kingdom.”
From New SARS-CoV-2 Variants — Clinical, Public Health, and Vaccine Implications (2021) · cites this paper as [3]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Recently, viral variants of concern have emerged in the UK (B.1.1.7), South Africa (B.1.351), and Brazil (P.1) that harbor specific mutations in their S proteins that may be associated with increased transmissibility (50–55).”
From mRNA vaccination boosts cross-variant neutralizing antibodies elicited by SARS-CoV-2 infection (2021) · cites this paper as [53]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Several emerging viral variants of concern have been identified that have mutations in the spike protein, including the B.1.1.7 variant (originating from the UK and which has eight spike mutations92), the B.1.351 variant (originating from South Africa) and the P.1 variant (originating from Brazil and which also contains multiple mutations in the spike protein and is spreading widely)57,93.”
From Prospects for durable immune control of SARS-CoV-2 and prevention of reinfection (2021) · cites this paper as [92]
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“Epidemiological studies suggest that it was approximately 50% more transmissible than previously circulating UK variants 191,197,198 .”
From The biological and clinical significance of emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants (2021) · cites this paper as [198]
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In the citing paper
“it has been previously reported that B.1.1.7 is associated with lower Ct values, corresponding to higher VLs 3”
From Evidence for increased breakthrough rates of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern in BNT162b2-mRNA-vaccinated individuals (2021) · cites this paper as [3]
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Steinberg, A. P., Silander, O., & Kussell, E. L. (2023) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2206945119 · Cited by 16
“During the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, population genomics has played an invaluable role in tracking the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and its variants (12–14), as well as understanding correlations between genomic substitutions and transmission patterns (15–19).”
Mabuka, T., Naidoo, N., Ncube, N., Yiga, T., Ross, M. D., Kurehwa, K., Nyathi, M. N., Silaji, A., Ndemera, T., Lemeke, T., et al. (2023) · JMIRx Med · doi:10.2196/34598 · Cited by 17
“Some of the mutations observed in these lineages showed increased affinity by the spike protein in SARS-CoV-2 to the human ACE 2 receptors [49,50].”
BackgroundFactor Xa cleaves SARS-CoV-2 spike protein to block viral entry and infection
Dong, W., Wang, J., Tian, L., Zhang, J., Settles, E. W., Qin, C., Kollath, D. R., Itogawa, A. N., Celona, K. R., Yi, J., et al. (2023) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-023-37336-9 · Cited by 13
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Martinez-Boubeta, C., & Simeonidis, K. (2021) · Environmental Research · doi:10.1016/j.envres.2021.112054 · Cited by 11
Kobayashi, K., Tachibana, M., & Tsutsumi, Y. (2021) · Innate Immunity · doi:10.1177/17534259211043159 · Cited by 13
COVID-19’s U.S. Temperature Response Profile
Carson, R. T., Carson, S. L., Dye, T. K., Mayfield, S. A., Moyer, D., & Yu, C. A. (2021) · Environmental and Resource Economics · doi:10.1007/s10640-021-00603-8 · Cited by 12
“This time frame was chosen to avoid confusing temperature amplification with the more infectious Alpha (B.1.1.7) variant (Davies 2021), which starts to become an important factor in early 2021.”
MethodInfluentialClustering spatio-temporal series of confirmed COVID-19 deaths in Europe
Bucci, A., Ippoliti, L., Valentini, P., et al. (2021) · Spatial Statistics · doi:10.1016/j.spasta.2021.100543 · Cited by 12
Dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern (VOC) in Bangladesh during the first half of 2021
Afrin, S. Z., Islam, M. T., Paul, S. K., Kobayashi, N., & Parvin, R. (2021) · Virology · doi:10.1016/j.virol.2021.10.005 · Cited by 14
SARS-CoV-2: Vaccinology and Emerging therapeutics; Challenges and Future Developments
Adesokan, A. M., Obeid, M. A., & Lawal, A. F. (2022) · Therapeutic Delivery · doi:10.4155/tde-2021-0075 · Cited by 12
Reyné, B., Richard, Q., Selinger, C., Sofonea, M. T., Djidjou‐Demasse, R., & Alizon, S. (2022) · Mathematical Modelling of Natural Phenomena · doi:10.1051/mmnp/2022008 · Cited by 13
“5 [11, 19].”
BackgroundEvolutionary history of the SARS-CoV-2 Gamma variant of concern (P.1): a perfect storm
Yépez, Y., Marcano-Ruiz, M., Bezerra, R. S., Fam, B., Ximenez, J. P., Silva, W. A., Jr., & Bortolini, M. C. (2022) · Genetics and Molecular Biology · doi:10.1590/1678-4685-gmb-2021-0309 · Cited by 16
The variant‐specific burden of SARS‐CoV‐2 in Michigan: March 2020 through November 2021
Petrie, J. G., Eisenberg, M. C., Lauring, A. S., Gilbert, J., Harrison, S. M., DeJonge, P. M., & Martin, E. T. (2022) · Journal of Medical Virology · doi:10.1002/jmv.27982 · Cited by 10
Piantham, C., Linton, N. M., Nishiura, H., & Ito, K. (2021) · medRxiv · doi:10.1101/2021.03.17.21253775 · Cited by 10
Yaniv, K., Ozer, E., & Kushmaro, A. (2021) · medRxiv · doi:10.1101/2021.07.14.21260495 · Cited by 14
Waning, Boosting and a Path to Endemicity for SARS-CoV-2Preprint
Keeling, M. J., Thomas, A. C., Hill, E. M., Thompson, R. N., Dyson, L., Tildesley, M. J., & Moore, S. (2021) · medRxiv · doi:10.1101/2021.11.05.21265977 · Cited by 13
“The second wave began in September of 2020 and was exacerbated by the emergence of the Alpha variant [9-11]; it reached a peak of 4134 hospital admissions on 12th January 2021 before declining.”
BackgroundVelu, P., Cong, L., Rand, S., Qiu, Y., Zhang, Z., Zhang, J., Guo, J., Ruggiero, P., Sukhu, A. C., Fauntleroy, K. A., et al. (2022) · Diagnostic Microbiology and Infectious Disease · doi:10.1016/j.diagmicrobio.2022.115789 · Cited by 11
Mastrorosa, I., Cozzi‐Lepri, A., Colavita, F., Lalle, E., Mazzotta, V., Cimaglia, C., Paulicelli, J., Matusali, G., Fabeni, L., Carletti, F., et al. (2022) · Journal of Clinical Virology · doi:10.1016/j.jcv.2022.105299 · Cited by 12
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Salzberger, B., Mellmann, A., Bludau, A., Ciesek, S., Corman, V., Dilthey, A., Donker, T., Eckmanns, T., Egelkamp, R., Gatermann, S., et al. (2023) · Infection · doi:10.1007/s15010-023-02040-9 · Cited by 10
The impact of spatial connectivity on NPIs effectiveness
Sabbatini, C. E., Pullano, G., Domenico, L. D., Rubrichi, S., Bansal, S., & Colizza, V. (2024) · BMC Infectious Diseases · doi:10.1186/s12879-023-08900-x · Cited by 15
“They were meant to manage a rapidly evolving context characterized by the emergence of the first variant of concern [11, 12] and the rollout of vaccination [1], while pandemic fatigue developed in the population [13–15].”
BackgroundPotential zoonotic spillover at the human–animal interface: A mini-review
Fauziah, I., Nugroho, H. A., Yanthi, N. D., Tiffarent, R., & Saputra, S. (2024) · Veterinary World · doi:10.14202/vetworld.2024.289-302 · Cited by 15
“Infection caused by Delta variant was associated with a higher likelihood of hospitalization compared to Alpha variant, indicating increased virulence [101,102].”
BackgroundChinazzi, M., Davis, J. T., y Piontti, A. P., Mu, K., Gozzi, N., Ajelli, M., Perra, N., & Vespignani, A. (2024) · Epidemics · doi:10.1016/j.epidem.2024.100757 · Cited by 13
“The increase of transmissibility was introduced following previous studies indicating that the Alpha variant was 30% – 70% more transmissible with respect to ancestral SARS-CoV-2 lineages (NERVTAG, 2020; PHE, 2021; Davies et al., 2021).”
ResultPritchard, E., Vihta, K.-D., Eyre, D. W., et al. (2024) · American Journal of Epidemiology · doi:10.1093/aje/kwae091 · Cited by 11
Evolution of SARS-CoV-2 in the murine central nervous system drives viral diversification
Class, J., Simons, L. M., Lorenzo-Redondo, R., Achi, J. G., Cooper, L. M., Dangi, T., Penaloza‐MacMaster, P., Ozer, E. A., Lutz, S. E., Rong, L., et al. (2024) · Nature Microbiology · doi:10.1038/s41564-024-01786-8 · Cited by 13
“The continued evolution of SARS-CoV-2 has resulted in the emergence of new viral variants with enhanced fitness 11–16 .”
Galmiche, S., Coustaury, C., Charniga, K., Grant, R., Cauchemez, S., Fontanet, A. L., The Western European Covid-19 Excess Mortality Working Group, Autran, B., Barnbrook, M., Barros, H., et al. (2024) · BMC Global and Public Health · doi:10.1186/s44263-024-00103-z · Cited by 18
“The more transmissible and virulent B.1.1.7 (Alpha) variant was first detected in the UK in late 2020 [51, 52].”
InfluentialLiu, W., Ye, W., Zhao, Z., et al. (2021) · China CDC Weekly · doi:10.46234/ccdcw2021.177 · Cited by 11
Hou, X.-D., Zhang, Z., Gao, J., & Wang, Y. (2021) · Molecular Systems Design & Engineering · doi:10.1039/d1me00086a · Cited by 10
Mutation profile of SARS-CoV-2 genome in a sample from the first year of the pandemic in Colombia
Gálvez, J. M., Chaparro-Solano, H. M., Pinzón-Rondón, Á. M., Albornóz, L. L., Oviedo, J. M. P., Zapata-Gómez, F. A., Patiño-Aldana, A. F., Hernandez-Rodríguez, A. D., Quiroz, M. A. D., & Ruiz-Sternberg, Á. M. (2021) · Infection Genetics and Evolution · doi:10.1016/j.meegid.2021.105192 · Cited by 11
A Promising Vaccination Strategy against COVID-19 on the Horizon: Heterologous Immunization
Mattoo, S.-U.-S., & Myoung, J. (2021) · Journal of Microbiology and Biotechnology · doi:10.4014/jmb.2111.11026 · Cited by 13
An overview of Brazilian working age adults vulnerability to COVID-19
de Souza, F. S. H., Hojo-Souza, N. S., de Oliveira, D. C. R., Silva, C. M., & Guidoni, D. L. (2022) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-022-06641-6 · Cited by 11
Kittikraisak, W., Hunsawong, T., Punjasamanvong, S., Wongrapee, T., Suttha, P., Piyaraj, P., Leepiyasakulchai, C., Tanathitikorn, C., Yoocharoen, P., Jones, A. R., et al. (2021) · Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses · doi:10.1111/irv.12975 · Cited by 11
Increase in Viral Load in Patients With SARS-CoV-2 Delta Variant Infection in the Republic of Korea
Kim, J., Rhee, J. E., Yoo, M., Kim, H. M., Lee, N., Woo, S., Jo, H. J., Kwon, D., Lee, S., Yoo, C., et al. (2022) · Frontiers in Microbiology · doi:10.3389/fmicb.2022.819745 · Cited by 11
Fusogenicity and neutralization sensitivity of the SARS-CoV-2 Delta sublineage AY.4.2
Saunders, N., Planas, D., Bolland, W., Rodriguez, C., Fourati, S., Buchrieser, J., Planchais, C., Prot, M., Staropoli, I., Guivel‐Benhassine, F., et al. (2022) · EBioMedicine · doi:10.1016/j.ebiom.2022.103934 · Cited by 13
Song, L., Liu, H., Brinkman, F. S. L., Gill, E. E., Griffiths, E., Hsiao, W., Kallesøe, S. S., Moreira, S., Domselaar, G. V., Zawati, M. H., et al. (2022) · Frontiers in Genetics · doi:10.3389/fgene.2021.716541 · Cited by 14
“Although it is impossible to fully quantify, failing to detect more virulent and or deadly VOCs in a timely manner would likely cause substantial delays in enacting the appropriate response measures (Davies et al., 2021).”
BackgroundBongiorno, C., & Zino, L. (2022) · Applied Network Science · doi:10.1007/s41109-022-00449-z · Cited by 11
“fr/ leschiff resclesdu- syste meeduca tif6515), and by tailoring the epidemic progression model to COVID-19, by calibrating the epidemic parameters utilizing reliable estimations from the epidemiology literature (Prem 2020; Zhang et al. 2020; Davies et al. 2021; Dattner et al. 2021).”
BackgroundMethodAutio, A., Kettunen, J., Nevalainen, T., Kimura, B., & Hurme, M. (2022) · Immunity & Ageing · doi:10.1186/s12979-022-00268-x · Cited by 13
Zaykovskaya, A. V., Gladysheva, A. V., Kartashov, M. Y., Taranov, O. S., Ovchinnikova, A. S., Shipovalov, A. V., & Pyankov, O. V. (2022) · Problems of Particularly Dangerous Infections · doi:10.21055/0370-1069-2022-1-94-100 · Cited by 11
Gorgels, K. M. F., Dingemans, J., van der Veer, B. M. J. W., Hackert, V., Hensels, A. Y. J., den Heijer, C. D. J., van Alphen, L. B., Savelkoul, P. H. M., & Hoebe, C. J. P. A. (2022) · BMC Infectious Diseases · doi:10.1186/s12879-022-07121-y · Cited by 12
Quantitation of SARS-CoV-2 neutralizing antibodies with a virus-free, authentic test
Roessler, J., Pich, D., Albanese, M., Wratil, P. R., Krähling, V., Hellmuth, J. C., Scherer, C., von Bergwelt‐Baildon, M., Becker, S., Keppler, O. T., et al. (2022) · PNAS Nexus · doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgac045 · Cited by 16
Goethem, N. V., Vandromme, M., Oyen, H. J. V., Haarhuis, F., Brondeel, R., Catteau, L., André, E., Cuypers, L., Blot, K. Y., & Serrien, B. (2022) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0269138 · Cited by 11
“7 variant is 43– 90% more transmissible than pre-existing variants [33] and that the B.”
BackgroundBenchmark datasets for SARS-CoV-2 surveillance bioinformatics
Xiaoli, L., Hagey, J. V., Park, D. J., Gulvik, C. A., Young, E. L., Alikhan, N.-F., Lawsin, A., Hassell, N., Knipe, K. M., Oakeson, K. F., et al. (2022) · PeerJ · doi:10.7717/peerj.13821 · Cited by 13
COVID-19: Vaccines and therapeutics
Swapna, P., Birudukota, N. V. S., & Kamal, A. (2022) · Bioorganic & Medicinal Chemistry Letters · doi:10.1016/j.bmcl.2022.128987 · Cited by 15
Guzman-Rincon, L. M., Hill, E. M., Dyson, L., Tildesley, M. J., & Keeling, M. J. (2023) · Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series C (Applied Statistics) · doi:10.1093/jrsssc/qlad056 · Cited by 16
Sunagawa, J., Park, H., Kim, K. S., Komorizono, R., Choi, S., Torres, L. R., Woo, J., Jeong, Y. D., Hart, W. S., Thompson, R. N., et al. (2023) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-023-43043-2 · Cited by 12
Drivers and impact of the early silent invasion of SARS-CoV-2 Alpha
Faucher, B., Sabbatini, C. E., Czuppon, P., Kraemer, M. U. G., Lemey, P., Colizza, V., Blanquart, F., Boëlle, P., & Poletto, C. (2024) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-024-46345-1 · Cited by 13
“The alert triggered heightened genomic surveillance worldwide, reinstated lockdown measures in the UK, and resulted in border screening and travel bans in countries connected to the UK 23,28 – 30 .”
InfluentialRoumani, F., Azinheiro, S., de Sousa, H. M. L., et al. (2021) · Viruses · doi:10.3390/v13050940 · Cited by 11
SARS-CoV-2 Portrayed against HIV: Contrary Viral Strategies in Similar Disguise
Duerr, R., Crosse, K. M., Valero-Jimenez, A. M., & Dittmann, M. (2021) · Microorganisms · doi:10.3390/microorganisms9071389 · Cited by 13
“Epidemiological studies suggest that the UK variant correlates with higher viral loads in patients [306], a >40% increased epidemiological growth [307,308], a longer duration of acute infection [309], and increased severity/death rate, particularly in patients of higher age and with comorbidities [310-313].”
BackgroundJha, N., Hall, D., Kanakan, A., Mehta, P., Maurya, R., Mir, Q., Gill, H. M., Janga, S. C., & Pandey, R. (2021) · Frontiers in Genetics · doi:10.3389/fgene.2021.753648 · Cited by 11
Simons, L. M., Lorenzo-Redondo, R., Gibson, M., Kinch, S. L., Vandervaart, J. P., Reiser, N. L., Eren, M., Lux, E., McNally, E. M., Tambur, A. R., et al. (2022) · Open Forum Infectious Diseases · doi:10.1093/ofid/ofac027 · Cited by 11
David, S., Dorado, G., Duarte, E. L., David-Bosne, S., Trigueiro-Louro, J. M., & Rebelo‐de‐Andrade, H. (2022) · Immunogenetics · doi:10.1007/s00251-022-01261-w · Cited by 13
End-point RT-PCR based on a conservation landscape for SARS-COV-2 detection
Cruz‐Rangel, A., Gómez-Romero, L., Cisneros-Villanueva, M., de Anda‐Jáuregui, G., Luna-Pineda, V. M., Cedro‐Tanda, A., Campos‐Romero, A., Mendoza-Vargas, A., Reyes‐Grajeda, J. P., Hidalgo‐Miranda, A., et al. (2022) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-022-07756-6 · Cited by 11
Potent Anti‐SARS‐CoV‐2 Efficacy of COVID‐19 Hyperimmune Globulin from Vaccine‐Immunized Plasma
Yu, D., Li, Y., Hong, L., Wu, J., Hu, Y., Peng, Y., Li, T., Hou, J., Huang, W., Guan, L., et al. (2022) · Advanced Science · doi:10.1002/advs.202104333 · Cited by 15
Evolutionary history of the SARS-CoV-2 Gamma variant of concern (P.1): a perfect storm
Mora, Y. B. Y., Marcano-Ruiz, M., Bezerra, R. D. S., Fam, B. S. D. O., Ximenez, J. P. B., Silva, W. A., & Bortolini, M. C. (2022) · LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) · Cited by 11
Molecular Analysis of SARS-CoV-2 Lineages in Armenia
Avetyan, D., Hakobyan, S., Nikogհosyan, M., Ghukasyan, L., Khachatryan, G., Sirunyan, T., Muradyan, N., Zakharyan, R., Chavushyan, A., Hayrapetyan, V., et al. (2022) · Viruses · doi:10.3390/v14051074 · Cited by 10
Althobaity, Y. M., Wu, J., & Tildesley, M. J. (2022) · Infectious Disease Modelling · doi:10.1016/j.idm.2022.08.005 · Cited by 17
Buss, L., Junior, C. A. P., Whittaker, C., Salomon, T., Oikawa, M. K., Pereira, R. H. M., Moura, I. C. G., Delerino, L., França, R. F. D. O., Miyajima, F., et al. (2022) · Vaccines · doi:10.3390/vaccines10091437 · Cited by 10
“We fit a multinomial model to weekly variant counts with calendar time as the predictor variable and a two-knot cubic spline [4] using the nnet package [21] in R (version 4.”
BackgroundMethodEndo, A., CMMID COVID-19 Working Group, Uchida, M., Liu, Y., Atkins, K. E., Kucharski, A. J., Funk, S., Abbas, K., van Zandvoort, K., Bosse, N. I., et al. (2022) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2203019119 · Cited by 14
“Studies suggested that the Alpha variant is ∼50% more transmissible (74) and also, has a relative risk of 1.”
BackgroundSelf-citationMatthews, A. M., Biel, T., Ortega-Rodriguez, U., Falkowski, V. M., Bush, X., Faison, T., Xie, H., Agarabi, C., Rao, V. A., & Ju, T.-Z. (2022) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0278294 · Cited by 9
The changing health impact of vaccines in the COVID-19 pandemic: A modeling study
Cohen, J. A., Stuart, R. M., Panovska‐Griffiths, J., Mudimu, E., Abeysuriya, R., Kerr, C. C., Famulare, M., & Klein, D. J. (2023) · Cell Reports · doi:10.1016/j.celrep.2023.112308 · Cited by 14
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A SARS-CoV-2: Companion Animal Transmission and Variants Classification
Pandit, R., & Matthews, Q. L. (2023) · Pathogens · doi:10.3390/pathogens12060775 · Cited by 15
Ghoula, M., Kongmeneck, A. D., Eid, R., Camproux, A., & Moroy, G. (2023) · The Journal of Physical Chemistry B · doi:10.1021/acs.jpcb.3c01467 · Cited by 12
Quantification of the spread of SARS-CoV-2 variant B.1.1.7 in SwitzerlandPreprint
Chen, C., Nadeau, S., Topolsky, I., Manceau, M., Huisman, J. S., Jablonski, K. P., Fuhrmann, L., Dreifuss, D., Jahn, K., Beckmann, C., et al. (2021) · medRxiv · doi:10.1101/2021.03.05.21252520 · Cited by 10
Impact of vaccination and non-pharmaceutical interventions on SARS-CoV-2 dynamics in SwitzerlandPreprint
Shattock, A. J., Rutte, E. A. L., Dünner, R. P., Sen, S., Kelly, S. L., Chitnis, N., & Penny, M. A. (2021) · medRxiv · doi:10.1101/2021.04.14.21255503 · Cited by 11
Warne, B., Enright, J. A., Metaxaki, M., Fuller, S., Samworth, R. J., Weale, G., Holgate, J., Samtani, V., Brierley, C., Aggarwal, D., et al. (2021) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-520626/v1 · Cited by 10
Wohl, S., Lee, E. C., DiPrete, B. L., & Lessler, J. (2022) · medRxiv · doi:10.1101/2021.12.30.21268453 · Cited by 12
Surface Inactivation of Highly Mutated SARS-CoV-2 Variants of Concern: Alpha, Delta, and Omicron
Bobrin, V. A., Chen, S. R., Reyes, C. F. G., Smith, T., Purcell, D. F. J., Armstrong, J. W., McAuley, J., & Monteiro, M. J. (2022) · Biomacromolecules · doi:10.1021/acs.biomac.2c00801 · Cited by 11
Genomic Epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2 in Western Burkina Faso, West Africa
Sawadogo, Y., Galal, L., Belarbi, E., Zongo, A., Schubert, G., Leendertz, F. H., Kanteh, A., Sesay, A. K., Erhart, A., Bañuls, A., et al. (2022) · Viruses · doi:10.3390/v14122788 · Cited by 11
SARS-CoV-2 epidemiology, kinetics, and evolution: A narrative review
Alizon, S., & Sofonea, M. T. (2025) · Virulence · doi:10.1080/21505594.2025.2480633 · Cited by 16
“Indeed, an analysis of 2,245,263 positive SARS-CoV -2 community tests and 17,452 COVID-19 deaths found a hazard of death associated with SGTF increased by 39 % to 72 % [131].”
Elsharkawy, A., Jahantigh, H. R., Guglani, A., Stone, S., Arora, K., & Kumar, M. (2025) · Frontiers in Immunology · doi:10.3389/fimmu.2025.1557535 · Cited by 14
“The Alpha variant contains 17 nonsynonymous mutations including mutations in the RBD region such as E484K, S494P, P681H and N501Y (15, 16).”
Bridging the Covid-19 data and the epidemiological model using the time-varying parameter SIRD model
Çakmaklı, C., & Şimşek, Y. (2024) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/j.jeconom.2024.105787 · Cited by 16
Altered Local Interactions and Long-Range Communications in UK Variant (B.1.1.7) Spike Glycoprotein
Borocci, S., Cerchia, C., Grottesi, A., Sanna, N., Prandi, I. G., Abid, N., Beccari, A. R., Chillemi, G., & Talarico, C. (2021) · International Journal of Molecular Sciences · doi:10.3390/ijms22115464 · Cited by 9
“Such variant, also termed the “UK variant”, is defined by 17 mutations, eight of which are in the S glycoprotein (see Figure 1B), and was estimated as having a 43–90% higher reproduction number than preexisting non-VOC variants [28].”
BackgroundMohandas, S., Yadav, P., Nyayanit, D. A., Shete, A., Sarkale, P., Hundekar, S., Kumar, S., & Lole, K. (2021) · Vector Borne and Zoonotic Diseases · doi:10.1089/vbz.2021.0032 · Cited by 9
Benefits And Risks Of Administering Monoclonal Antibody Therapy For Coronavirus (COVID-19)
Brobst, B., & Borger, J. (2021) · StatPearls · Cited by 10
Statistical Challenges in Tracking the Evolution of SARS-CoV-2
Cappello, L., Kim, J., Liu, S., & Palacios, J. A. (2022) · Statistical Science · doi:10.1214/22-sts853 · Cited by 10
“Here, one can resort to standard statistical tests for detecting changes in mean or distribution (Volz et al., 2021a, Volz et al., 2021b, Davies et al., 2021, Leung et al., 2021).”
BackgroundMethodInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Davies, N. G., Abbott, S., Barnard, R. C., Jarvis, C. I., Kucharski, A. J., Munday, J. D., Pearson, C. A. B., Russell, T. W., Tully, D. C., Washburne, A. D., Wenseleers, T., Gimma, A., Waites, W., Wong, K. L. M., van Zandvoort, K., Silverman, J. D., CMMID COVID-19 Working Group, COVID-19 Genomics UK (COG-UK) Consortium, Diaz-Ordaz, K., Keogh, R., Eggo, R. M., Funk, S., Jit, M., Atkins, K. E., & Edmunds, W. J.
- Affiliations
- London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (GB)
- Selva Analytics LLC, Bozeman, MT, USA.
- KU Leuven (BE)
- Pennsylvania State University (US)
- Centre for Statistical Methodology and Department of Medical Statistics, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK.
- Corresponding author
- Davies, Nicholas G.
- ORCID
- Davies, Nicholas G.
- Abbott, Sam
- Barnard, Rosanna C.
- Jarvis, Christopher I.
- Kucharski, Adam J.
- Munday, James D.
- Pearson, Carl A. B.
- Russell, Timothy W.
- Tully, Damien C.
- Washburne, Alex D.
- Wenseleers, Tom
- Gimma, Amy
- Waites, William
- Wong, Kerry L. M.
- van Zandvoort, Kevin
- Silverman, Justin D.
- Diaz-Ordaz, Karla
- Keogh, Ruth
- Eggo, Rosalind M.
- Funk, Sebastian
- Jit, Mark
- Atkins, Katherine E.
- Edmunds, W. John
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2021-04-09
- Volume
- 372
- Issue
- 6538
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- PMC
- PMC8128288
- OpenAlex
- W3134208712
- Semantic Scholar
- 34e9a0b4e42a4971a3a124c818045741c734fb9e
- Cited by
- 2,581
- References
- 58
- Citations by year
- 2026: 74 · 2025: 102 · 2024: 199 · 2023: 330 · 2022: 840 · 2021: 1028
- FWCI
- 215.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- medRxiv (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- ORCA Online Research @Cardiff (Cardiff University) (acceptedVersion, cc-by)
- Northumbria Research Link (Northumbria University) (acceptedVersion)
- LSHTM Research Online (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine) (acceptedVersion)
- Strathprints: The University of Strathclyde institutional repository (University of Strathclyde) (acceptedVersion)
- Informationszentrum Lebenswissenschaften (ZB MED) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Lirias (KU Leuven) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Edinburgh Research Explorer (University of Edinburgh) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Apollo (University of Cambridge) (submittedVersion)
- Apollo
- Funders
- University of Kentucky
- Universität Bern
- Universitätsspital Basel
- National Institute for Health Research (NIHR200908)
- European Commission (101003688)
- CANDU Owners Group
- Hôpitaux Universitaires de Genève
- Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich
- Université de Sfax
- UKRI Research England (NA)
- National Institute for Health Research Health Protection Research Unit in Immunisation (NIHR200929)
- United Kingdom Medical Research Council (MC_PC_19065)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Modeling and Simulation › COVID-19 epidemiological studies
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Infectious Diseases › SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19 Research
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Applied Mathematics › Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models
- Keywords
- SARS-CoV-2, B.1.1.7 variant, reproduction number, SARS-CoV-2 transmission, epidemic forecasting, COVID-19 containment measures, vaccine rollout, school closures, England
- MeSH terms
- COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2, COVID-19 Vaccines, Adolescent, Adult, Aged, Aged, 80 and over, Child, Child, Preschool, Communicable Disease Control, England, Europe, Female, Humans, Infant, Male, Middle Aged, Models, Theoretical, Mutation, Severity of Illness Index, Socioeconomic Factors, United States, Viral Load, Basic Reproduction Number, Young Adult
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-10, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-10 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.