Estimated transmissibility and impact of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7 in England
Open accessPublished version of a preprint
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 63 of the 63 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 7 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
A severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variant, VOC 202012/01 (lineage B.1.1.7), emerged in southeast England in September 2020 and is rapidly spreading toward fixation. Using a variety of statistical and dynamic modeling approaches, we estimate that this variant has a 43 to 90% (range of 95% credible intervals, 38 to 130%) higher reproduction number than preexisting variants. A fitted two-strain dynamic transmission model shows that VOC 202012/01 will lead to large resurgences of COVID-19 cases. Without stringent control measures, including limited closure of educational institutions and a greatly accelerated vaccine rollout, COVID-19 hospitalizations and deaths across England in the first 6 months of 2021 were projected to exceed those in 2020. VOC 202012/01 has spread globally and exhibits a similar transmission increase (59 to 74%) in Denmark, Switzerland, and the United States.
Overview
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TL;DR
Using sequencing, mobility/contact data, and dynamic transmission models, the paper finds that SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7 (VOC 202012/01) spread substantially faster than prior lineages in England. The authors estimate it is 43 to 90% more transmissible, with no clear evidence of increased disease severity, but warn that faster spread would increase cases, hospitalizations, and the need for stronger control measures and faster vaccination.
Key findings
- In UK sequencing data, VOC 202012/01 had the highest relative population growth rate among 307 other lineages in the first 31 days after initial phylogenetic observation, and it continued to expand.
- A multinomial spline model estimated an increased growth rate of +0.104 day–1 relative to B.1.177, corresponding to a 77% increase in reproduction number R (95% CI, 73 to 81%) assuming a 5.5-day generation interval.
- Alternative analyses estimated R for VOC 202012/01 to be 43% higher (95% CI, 38 to 48%) from case-based regression, and 55% higher in Denmark, 74% higher in Switzerland, and 59% higher in the United States.
- The transmission model found no clear increase or decrease in severity, with odds ratios of 0.92 for hospitalization, 0.90 for critical illness, and 0.90 for death, but estimated transmissibility was 65% higher in the three most affected NHS regions and 82% higher across all seven regions.
Methods
- The study combined publicly available sequencing data from COG-UK, Pillar 2 testing data for S gene target failure, mobility data from Google Community Mobility, and social contact data from the CoMix survey, plus analogous sequence/RT-PCR data from Denmark, Switzerland, and the US.
- The authors used multinomial and binomial generalized linear mixed models, negative binomial state-space models, and an age- and region-structured deterministic compartmental transmission model fitted to multiple regional data streams, including deaths, hospital admissions, bed occupancy, PCR prevalence, seroprevalence, and VOC frequency.
- They compared five mechanistic hypotheses for the rapid spread, assessed model fit with deviance information criteria and short-term prediction, and ran scenario projections under varying NPIs and vaccination rollout rates.
Limitations
- The paper states that only a small number of intervention and vaccination scenarios were considered, and these should not be viewed as the only policy options.
- It states that the transmission model does not explicitly capture nursing home or hospital transmission, and regions were fit separately rather than jointly modeling between-region transmission.
- It notes uncertainty in model choice and parameter assumptions, including school-closure assumptions and NPI efficacy; these are limitations stated in the paper.
- Evident from the text: the severity analysis is based on early population-level data up to 24 December 2020, so delays from infection to hospitalization or death could obscure severity effects.
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![Fig. 2 Measuring the growth rate of VOC 202012/01. (A) Average relativized growth rate (i.e., a measure of variant fitness relative to other variants present during the 31 days after initial phylogenetic observation of a given variant) for all lineages in the COG-UK dataset, highlighting many lineages that have risen to prominence including B.1.177, the lineage with the highest relative abundance during the initial phylogenetic observation of VOC 202012/01. The shaded regions show conservative 95% rejection intervals; VOC 202012/01 is the first strain to exceed this threshold of faster relativized growth. Although many lineages exhibit above-average rates of growth, VOC 202012/01 has had the highest average relativized growth of any lineage in the history of COG-UK surveillance of SARS-COV-2. (B) Plotting all lineages’ relativized growth rates [ρ(t)] as a function of lineage age with conservative 95% rejection intervals highlights the significantly faster growth of VOC 202012/01 relative to other lineages at comparable times since their initial observation. Later declines in VOC and B.1.177 correspond to highly uncertain estimates of growth rates for data that are yet to be backfilled, so these declines in ρ(t) are sensitive to the processing of future sequences from recent dates (fig. S1). (C) Muller plots of the relative abundances of the major SARS-CoV-2 variants in the UK, based on a multinomial spline fit to COG-UK sequence data (Table 1 and table S1, separate-slopes multinomial spline model). A model extrapolation until 1 March 2021 is shown (shaded area). Minority variants are 440 circulating SARS-CoV-2 variants of low abundance. Specific colors represent the same lineages in (A) to (C). (D) Mean reproduction number over 7-day periods in 149 upper-tier local authorities of England (colored by the NHS England region they are within) plotted against the weekly proportion of Pillar 2 community SARS-CoV-2 tests with S gene target failure shows the spread of VOC 202012/01, a corresponding increase in the reproduction number in each local authority, and the eventual impact of targeted government restrictions from 20 December 2020. Testing data are shown for the week after the reproduction number estimates to account for delays from infection to test.](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/6a959b32b94b41a4aab77f4b47b25a40/estimated-transmissibility-and-impact-of-sars-cov-2-lineage-b-1-1-7-in-england-figure-2.jpg)
![Fig. 3 Comparison of possible biological mechanisms underlying the rapid spread of VOC 202012/01. Each row shows a different assumed mechanism. (A) Relative frequency of VOC 202012/01 (black line and ribbon respectively denote observed S gene target failure frequency with 95% binomial credible interval; purple line and ribbon respectively denote mean and 95% credible interval from model fit). (B) Posterior estimates (mean and 95% credible intervals) for relative odds of hospitalization (severe illness), relative odds of ICU admission (critical illness), relative odds of death (fatal illness), growth rate as a multiplicative factor per week [i.e., exp(7·∆r)], and the parameter that defines the hypothesized mechanism; all parameters are relative to those estimated for preexisting variants. (C to E) Illustrative model fits for the South East NHS England region: (C) fitted two-strain increased transmissibility model with VOC 202012/01 included; (D) fitted two-strain increased transmissibility model with VOC 202012/01 removed; (E) fitted single-strain model without emergence of VOC 202012/01. Black lines denote observed data; error bars denote the date range and 95% credible intervals for observed PCR prevalence and seroprevalence; colored lines and ribbons denote median and 95% credible intervals from model fit.](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/806d848e45ca40c19e0cc853e2b24dfc/estimated-transmissibility-and-impact-of-sars-cov-2-lineage-b-1-1-7-in-england-figure-3.jpg)

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2 Valid · 0 Not valid · 4 Not checked · 37 Own results and interpretations
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In the paper
“we did not find substantial differences in social interactions between regions of high and low VOC 202012/01 prevalence, as measured by Google mobility (11) and social contact survey data (12) from September to December 2020 (Fig. 1, E and F).”
§ Estimated transmissibility and impact of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7 in England > Characteristics of the new variant
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [11]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Partly supportedcites [12] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Methods (Survey methodology) identify this as the CoMix social-contact survey, supporting the citation’s identification of the survey. But the Results (Participant characteristics) say the data reported here were collected on 24–27 March 2020; this paper does not establish that its reported data cover September–December 2020. The comparison between regions is presented as the citing authors’ own finding, not a finding attributed to this source. (LLM, conf=0.85)
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In the paper
“This yielded an estimated increase in R for VOC 202012/01 of 43% (95% CI, 38 to 48%), increasing to a 57% (95% CI, 52 to 62%) increase if the spline was not included (Table 1, models 4a and 4b).”
§ Estimated transmissibility and impact of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7 in England > Measuring the new variant’s growth rate
hedgedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Despite these limitations, we found strong evidence that VOC 202012/01 is spreading substantially faster than preexisting SARS-CoV-2 variants.”
§ Estimated transmissibility and impact of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7 in England > Discussion Combining multiple behavioral and epidemiological data sources with statistical and dynamic modeling, we estimated that the SARS-CoV-2 variant VOC 202012/01 has a 43 to 90% (range of 95% CrIs, 38 to 130%) higher reproduction number than preexisting variants of SARS-CoV-2 in England, assuming no changes to the generation interval. On the basis of early population-level data, we were unable to identify whether the new variant is associated with higher disease severity. Theoretical considerations suggest that, in some cases, natural selection may favor reduced severity of disease in pathogens (23). For this to be true, however, the pathogen’s infectious period must be truncated by disabling symptoms or death often enough that a less-virulent mutant generates more secondary infections despite potentially being less transmissible per contact, to the extent that decreased virulence and decreased transmissibility are consequences of the same mutation (e.g., one that decreases viral load). It is far from clear that this condition holds for SARS-CoV-2, given substantial transmission before the onset of severe symptoms. Regardless, without strengthened controls, there is a clear risk that future epidemic waves may be larger—and hence associated with greater burden—than previous waves. The UK government initiated a third national lockdown on 5 January 2021 in response to the rapid spread of VOC 202012/01, including school closures. Educational settings are among the largest institutions linked to SARS-CoV-2 clusters that remained open during the November 2020 lockdown (24), which means that the enacted school and university closures may have substantially assisted in reducing the burden of COVID-19 in early 2021. The increase in transmission associated with VOC 202012/01 has crucial implications for vaccination. First, it means that prompt and efficient vaccine delivery and distribution are even more important to reduce the impact of the pandemic in the near future. Increased transmission resulting from VOC 202012/01 will raise the herd immunity threshold, so that the potential burden of SARS-CoV-2 is larger and higher vaccine coverage will be required to achieve herd immunity. It is therefore extremely concerning that VOC 202012/01 has spread to at least 114 countries globally (2). Although VOC 202012/01 was first identified in England, a rapidly spreading variant has also been detected in South Africa (25, 26), where there was a marked increase in transmission in late 2020. Another variant exhibiting immune escape has emerged in Brazil (27, 28). Thus, vaccination timelines will also be a crucial determinant of future burden in other countries where similar new variants are present. Second, there is a need to assess how VOC 202012/01 and other emerging lineages affect the efficacy of vaccines (29, 30). Vaccine developers may need to consider developing formulations with variant sequences, and they may want to initiate post-licensure studies to detect differences in efficacy between the preexisting and new variants. Licensing authorities may need to clarify abbreviated pathways to marketing for vaccines that involve altering strain formulation without any other changes to their composition. There are limitations to our analysis. We have considered a small number of intervention and vaccination scenarios, which should not be regarded as the only available options for policy-makers. Our transmission model does not explicitly capture nursing home or hospital transmission of SARS-CoV-2, and we fit the model to each region of England separately rather than pooling information across regions and explicitly modeling transmission between regions. There are also uncertainties in the choice of model used to generate these predictions, and the exact choice will yield differences in the measures needed to control the epidemic. We note that even without increased susceptibility of children to VOC 202012/01, the more efficient spread of the variant implies that the difficult societal decision of closing schools will be a key public health question for multiple countries in the months ahead. We only assess relative support in the data for the mechanistic hypotheses proposed, but there may be other plausible mechanisms driving the resurgence of cases that we did not consider, and we have not identified the specific combination of mechanisms driving the increased transmission of VOC 202012/01. We identify increased transmissibility as the most parsimonious mechanistic explanation for the higher growth rate of VOC 202012/01, but a longer infectious period also fits the data well (table S4) and is supported by longitudinal testing data (17). Our conclusions about school closures were based on the assumption that children had reduced susceptibility and infectiousness relative to adults (19), but the precise values of these parameters and the impact of school closures remain the subject of scientific debate (31). We based our assumptions about the efficacy of NPIs on the measured impact on mobility of previous national lockdowns in England, but the impact of policy options cannot be predicted with certainty. Despite these limitations, we found strong evidence that VOC 202012/01 is spreading substantially faster than preexisting SARS-CoV-2 variants. Our modeling analysis suggests that this difference could be explained by an overall higher infectiousness of VOC 202012/01, but not by a shorter generation time or immune escape alone. Further experimental work will provide insight into the biological mechanisms for our observations, but given our projections of a rapid rise in incidence from VOC 202012/01—and the detection of other novel and highly transmissible variants (25–28)—there is an urgent need to consider what new approaches may be required to sufficiently reduce the ongoing transmission of SARS-CoV-2.
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In the paper
“we found that the relative population growth rate of VOC 202012/01 in the first 31 days after its initial phylogenetic observation was higher than that of all 307 other lineages with enough observations to obtain reliable growth-rate estimates (Fig. 2A and fig. S1).”
§ Estimated transmissibility and impact of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7 in England > Measuring the new variant’s growth rate
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In the paper
“The proportion of COVID-19 cases attributable to VOC 202012/01 increased rapidly in all regions of England, following an initial expansion in the southeast (Fig. 1A)”
§ Estimated transmissibility and impact of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7 in England > Characteristics of the new variant
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“B.1.1.7 to be between 43% and 82%3 more transmissible than preexisting variants in the United Kingdom.”
From New SARS-CoV-2 Variants — Clinical, Public Health, and Vaccine Implications (2021) · cites this paper as [3]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Recently, viral variants of concern have emerged in the UK (B.1.1.7), South Africa (B.1.351), and Brazil (P.1) that harbor specific mutations in their S proteins that may be associated with increased transmissibility (50–55).”
From mRNA vaccination boosts cross-variant neutralizing antibodies elicited by SARS-CoV-2 infection (2021) · cites this paper as [53]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Several emerging viral variants of concern have been identified that have mutations in the spike protein, including the B.1.1.7 variant (originating from the UK and which has eight spike mutations92), the B.1.351 variant (originating from South Africa) and the P.1 variant (originating from Brazil and which also contains multiple mutations in the spike protein and is spreading widely)57,93.”
From Prospects for durable immune control of SARS-CoV-2 and prevention of reinfection (2021) · cites this paper as [92]
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“Epidemiological studies suggest that it was approximately 50% more transmissible than previously circulating UK variants 191,197,198 .”
From The biological and clinical significance of emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants (2021) · cites this paper as [198]
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In the citing paper
“it has been previously reported that B.1.1.7 is associated with lower Ct values, corresponding to higher VLs 3”
From Evidence for increased breakthrough rates of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern in BNT162b2-mRNA-vaccinated individuals (2021) · cites this paper as [3]
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Neumann, M., Grossegesse, M., Bourquain, D. R., Schaade, L., & Nitsche, A. (2021) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-892594/v1
Microbial Co-infections in Covid Patients: A Mini Review
Bhosale, R. K., Sakkan, S., & Padmanabhan, S. (2021) · European Journal of Biology and Biotechnology · doi:10.24018/ejbio.2021.2.5.275
Variantes Alpha y Gamma del SARS-CoV-2: revisión rápida para contribuir en la toma de decisiones
Vargas-Sandoval, G., Díaz-Jiménez, D. P., Hilarión-Gaitán, L., Maldonado, L. A. M., Obregón, K. H., Alvis-Zakzuk, N. J., Ruíz, R. C., Lozano, J., Chaparro, P., & Castañeda-Orjuela, C. A. (2021) · Salud UIS · doi:10.18273/saluduis.53.e:21023
Evaluation of the United States COVID-19 Vaccine Allocation StrategyPreprint
Islam, M. R., Oraby, T. F., McCombs, A., Chowdhury, M. M., Al-Mamun, M., Tyshenko, M. G., & Kadelka, C. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3869650
Determinants of COVID-19 hospitalizations in Slovakia
Šuster, M., Boďová, K., Nosáľ, V., et al. (2021)
Observación del plan de vacunación del COVID-19 en Colombia
Pinzón, J. E. D. (2021) · Revista Repertorio de Medicina y Cirugía · doi:10.31260/repertmedcir.01217372.1273
Matsunaga, T., Higashidate, Y., Inazawa, N., Ando, S., & Takahashi, M. (2021) · Cureus · doi:10.7759/cureus.19140
“It was reported to be more transmissible, surpassing preexisting variants of SARS-CoV-2 to emerge as the dominant SARS-CoV-2 variant in the United Kingdom [11].”
BackgroundInfluentialEsquemas completos aplicados contra COVID-19 priorizados por entidad territorial en Colombia
Pinzón, J. E. D. (2021) · Revista Repertorio de Medicina y Cirugía · doi:10.31260/repertmedcir.01217372.1262
Vaccines and Antiviral Developments for SARS-CoV-2 in the Emergence of the COVID-19 Pandemic
Muñoz‐Fontela, C., & Delgado, R. B. (2021) · Royal Society of Chemistry eBooks · doi:10.1039/9781788016858-00045
"Fuzzy Multi-Agent Simulation of COVID-19 Pandemic Spreading"
Baz, D. E. (2021) · Biomedical Journal of Scientific & Technical Research · doi:10.26717/bjstr.2021.39.006331
Some Bioinformatics Studies on SARS-CoV-2
Mitra, S. (2021) · ERA: Education and Research Archive (University of Alberta) · doi:10.7939/r3-m4k7-3914
Local occurrence and fast spread of B.1.1.7 lineage: A glimpse into Friuli Venezia Giulia
Mio, C., Secco, C. D., Marzinotto, S., Bruno, C., Pimpo, S., Betto, E., Bertoni, M., Pipan, C., Sozio, E., Tascini, C., et al. (2021) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0261229
“It has an estimated 43–90% higher transmissibility than pre-existing lineages, thus causing an increasing concerns on Covid-19 infection rate [9].”
BackgroundVidya, N., Kumaresan, A., Kalaivani, V., Kumar, A., Gurunathan, S., Selvi, R. A., Uma, R., Varsha, P., Raju, S., Sampath, P., et al. (2021) · medRxiv · doi:10.1101/2021.12.14.21251883
COVID-19 Pandemic: Analysis and Statistics of Confirmed Cases
Arceda, V. E. M., Arceda, M. A. M., & Laura, P. C. L. (2021) · IntechOpen eBooks · doi:10.5772/intechopen.98891
Covid-19 social distancing: when less is morePreprint
Neuwirth, C., & Gruber, C. (2021) · medRxiv · doi:10.1101/2021.12.07.21267415
“A sensitivity analysis showed that an increase in the basic reproduction number R0 further diminishes the effectiveness of social distancing, which is highly relevant given the presumed gains in transmissibility of newly emerging variant strains of SARS-CoV-2 (Davies et al., 2021).”
BackgroundInfluentialSARS-COV-2 В ГВИНЕЙСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКЕ: ФРАГМЕНТАРНОЕ И ПОЛНОГЕНОМНОЕ СЕКВЕНИРОВАНИЕ.Preprint
Крицкий, А., Краснов, Я., Кейта, М., Кейта, С., Витальевич, Ф. А., Шевцова, А., Гусева, Н., Kazorina, E. V., Sosedova, E. A., Katyshev, A. D., et al. (2021) · doi:10.21055/preprints-3111962
Gali, J. H., Musku, M., Reddy, D. P., Thomas, V., & Khan, E. A. (2022) · Asian Journal of Medical Sciences · doi:10.3126/ajms.v13i1.40630
Modelling the Effect of Virulent Variants with SIR
de Paris, U., Nakamura, G. M., de Paris, U., Plaszczynski, S., de Paris, U., Grammaticos, B., de Paris, U., & Badoual, M. (2021) · Nelineinaya Dinamika · doi:10.20537/nd210409 · Cited by 1
New variants of SARS-CoV-2, vaccine immune response and the Brazilian reality
Andrade, M. C., Gomes, L., Mendes, V. R., & Rosa, H. (2021) · Exploration of Immunology · doi:10.37349/ei.2021.00029
“Preliminary studies from England and Scotland further suggest that people infected with the Delta variant are twice as likely to be hospitalized compared to those infected with the Alpha variant [25].”
BackgroundInfluentialHartshorne, J., & Villiers, P. J. T. D. (2021) · AfricArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31730/osf.io/e7udq
Kayano, T., & Nishiura, H. (2022) · Mathematical Biosciences & Engineering · doi:10.3934/mbe.2022125
Basic Research Reveals the Unique Virologic Features of SARS-CoV-2
Uraki, R., Yamayoshi, S., & Kawaoka, Y. (2021) · TRENDS IN THE SCIENCES · doi:10.5363/tits.26.9_79
Contagions under control - Mathematical models to inform infectious disease prevention and control
Pham, T. M. (2022) · Utrecht University Repository (Utrecht University) · doi:10.33540/1194
Nakai, T., Umemura, Y., Nishida, T., Mitsuyama, Y., Watanabe, A., & Fujimi, S. (2022) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-1230967/v1
Зайковская, А., Gladysheva, A. V., Kartashov, M. Y., Taranov, O. S., Ovchinnikova, A. S., Shipovalov, A. V., & Пьянков, О. (2022) · doi:10.21055/preprints-3112046
Mukherjee, R., Islam, S., & Mukhopadhyay, A. (2022) · VirusDisease · doi:10.1007/s13337-022-00759-x
“SARS-CoV-2 double mutated variants, 40–80% more transmissible than wild type variant [20] first identified in UK in November’20 [15, 39, 49] might have been responsible for the second wave.”
BackgroundMutation patterns in SARS-COV-2 Alpha and Beta variants indicate non-neutral evolutionPreprint
Kurpas, M. K., & Kimmel, M. (2022) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.1101/2022.02.28.482283
“With transmissibility increased by 43-90% [4] and about twofold replicative advantage [7], Alpha variant began to spread, quickly outnumbering the original Wuhan strain.”
BackgroundMonitoring and assessment of SARS-CoV-2 evolution
Miasoiedov, V. V., Nartov, P., Yurko, K. V., Lesovoy, V., Kapustnyk, V. A., Bondarenko, A. V., Cherniak, M. Y., Yakushchenko, V. A., Кучерявченко, В. В., Maslova, V. S., et al. (2022) · Zaporozhye Medical Journal · doi:10.14739/2310-1210.2022.1.241658
Verkhivker, G. M., Agajanian, S., Kassab, R., & Krishnan, K. (2022) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.1101/2022.04.11.487920
COVID-19 in a patient with neuroendocrine pancreatic cancer – Case Report
Polz‐Dacewicz, M., Stępień, E., Dworzańska, A., et al. (2022) · Journal of Pre-Clinical and Clinical Research · doi:10.26444/jpccr/147709
Clinical Approaches to the COVID-19 Pandemic
Rogers, K. M., Maumus, M., Malone, M., Amiri-Rasavian, N., Gul, S., Savalia, N., Pearce, B., Conway, A. J., & Brenner, S. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-95164-1_1
Analysis of SARS-CoV-2 RNA Stability and Infectivity in Oropharyngeal Swab SamplesPreprint
Neumann, M., Grossegesse, M., Bourquain, D. R., Schaade, L., & Nitsche, A. (2021) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-892594/v2
Zhao, L. P., Roychoudhury, P., Jerome, K. R., Gilbert, P. B., Schiffer, J. T., Lybrand, T. P., Payne, T. H., Randhawa, A. K., Thiebaud, S. E., Mills, M. G., et al. (2021) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-888049/v2
Shingleton, J., Finnie, T., Gent, N., & Bennett, E. (2022) · Epidemiology and Infection · doi:10.1017/s0950268821002776
“This fails to accurately represent relative differences in transmissibility between variants [23, 24] as well differences in contact network structures between imported and native cases.”
BackgroundPatel, V., Pasoria, S., & Sawant, R. (2022) · Indian Journal Of Applied Research · doi:10.36106/ijar/2302694
Bayesian Inference of Dependent Population Dynamics in Coalescent ModelsPreprint
Cappello, L., Kim, J., & Palacios, J. A. (2022) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.1101/2022.05.22.492976
Filonets, T., Solovchuk, M., & Gao, W. (2022) · medRxiv · doi:10.1101/2022.06.06.22276025
Characterizing Microbial Community Composition and Function by Sequencing
Michaelsen, T. Y. (2021) · VBN Forskningsportal (Aalborg Universitet) · doi:10.54337/aau456474762
Arévalo, S. J., Silva, C. J., Calampa, C. S. U., Bouckaert, R., & Pinho, J. R. (2022) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-1709506/v1
Филипенко, М. Л., Оскорбин, И. П., Shamovskaya, D. V., Kharpov, E. A., Stepanov, A. A., Romanov, V. V., Kuznetsov, V. V., Boyarskikh, U. A., Андреевич, К. А., Pechkovsky, E. V., et al. (2022) · Bulletin of Experimental Biology and Medicine · doi:10.1007/s10517-022-05524-0
Bailey, S. F., & Akter, M. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-981-19-1356-3_5
Lu, R., Liang, K.-H., Chiang, H.-L., et al. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4141628
Demircioğlu, Ö., Kocakaya, D., Çimşit, C., Sarınoğlu, R. C., Toprak, N. Ü., & Çimşit, Ç. (2022) · Journal of Health Sciences and Medicine · doi:10.32322/jhsm.1114475
Abavisani, M., Rahimian, K., Mahdavi, B., Tokhanbigli, S., Sisakht, M. M., Farhadi, A., Kodori, M., Mahmanzar, M., & Meshkat, Z. (2022) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-1826408/v1
Cats – Revered and Reviled – and Associated Zoonoses: Killing You Softly with Feces and Fleas
Sing, A., & Berger, A. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-85877-3_23-1
Sarkar, A., Santra, D., Panja, A. S., et al. (2022) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-1581374/v1
Comparison of SARS-COV-2 Wuhan and Alpha variants: Clinical and Laboratory Highlights
timur, D., Demirpek, U., Ertek, E., Aydın, Ö. Ç., Karabıyık, T., & Kayadibi, H. (2022) · International journal of medical biochemistry/International journal of medical biochemistry : · doi:10.14744/ijmb.2022.69772
Mohan Kumar, M., Nagaraj, C., Ramashetty, M., Prakash, A., Rangaswamy, S. M., Sagar, B. G., Kushavar, A. M., & Kullolli, S. M. (2022) · International Journal of Anatomy Radiology and Surgery · doi:10.7860/ijars/2022/52413.2755
Ben-Nun, M., Riley, P., Turtle, J., & Riley, S. (2022) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010375
Predicting elimination of evolving virus variants
Hughes, E., Binny, R. N., Hendy, S. C., & James, A. (2022) · Mathematical Medicine and Biology A Journal of the IMA · doi:10.1093/imammb/dqac012
Changes in the Pathogenicity of SARS-CoV-2 According to Waves
NISHIKAWA, S., Sekimura, A., KUSUNOKI, H., et al. (2022) · JOURNAL OF THE JAPANESE ASSOCIATION OF RURAL MEDICINE · doi:10.2185/jjrm.71.101
Charlie‐Silva, I., Barbosa, A., de Pontes, L. G., Bomfim, C. G., Machado‐Santelli, G. M., Condino‐Neto, A., Guzzo, C. R., Peron, J. P. S., Medeiros, R. J., Ferraris, F. K., et al. (2022) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-2034986/v1
Gaskell, K. M., Kheir, N. E., Mirfendesky, M., et al. (2022) · medRxiv · doi:10.1101/2022.09.27.22280419
SARS-CoV-2 Vaccine Against Virus: Mission Accomplished!?
Magnus, C. L., & Schmidt, B. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-08045-6_27
Çakır, A., Şener, K., Karabulut, N., Arslan, B., Altuğ, E., Eyüpoğlu, G., & Güven, R. (2022) · Global Emergency and Critical Care · doi:10.4274/globecc.galenos.2022.35229
“[11] reported that the UK variant (lineage B.”
BackgroundLikelihood of COVID-19 reinfection in an urban community cohort in Massachusetts
Casey, S. M., Legler, A., Hanchate, A. D., & Perkins, R. B. (2022) · Dialogues in Health · doi:10.1016/j.dialog.2022.100057 · Cited by 1
“During Period-2, a relatively higher proportion of diagnosed SARS-CoV-2 infections were among [50], and the emergence of more trans-missible and virulent variants [51,52].”
A Hybrid SEIHCRDV-UKF Model for COVID-19 Prediction. Application on real-time dataPreprint
Papageorgiou, V. Ε., & Tsaklidis, G. M. (2022) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-1816184/v2
The Mediating Role of Religious Beliefs in the Relationship between Well-Being and Fear of COVID-19Preprint
Nguyen, P. T. H., Huynh, S. V., Ly, T. T., Thi, M. T. N., Nguyen, X. T. K., Nantachai, G., & Tran-Chi, V.-L. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.31219/osf.io/y5zs2
Metadata
- Authors
- Davies, N. G., Abbott, S., Barnard, R. C., Jarvis, C. I., Kucharski, A. J., Munday, J. D., Pearson, C. A. B., Russell, T. W., Tully, D. C., Washburne, A. D., Wenseleers, T., Gimma, A., Waites, W., Wong, K. L. M., van Zandvoort, K., Silverman, J. D., CMMID COVID-19 Working Group, COVID-19 Genomics UK (COG-UK) Consortium, Diaz-Ordaz, K., Keogh, R., Eggo, R. M., Funk, S., Jit, M., Atkins, K. E., & Edmunds, W. J.
- Affiliations
- London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (GB)
- Selva Analytics LLC, Bozeman, MT, USA.
- KU Leuven (BE)
- Pennsylvania State University (US)
- Centre for Statistical Methodology and Department of Medical Statistics, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK.
- Corresponding author
- Davies, Nicholas G.
- ORCID
- Davies, Nicholas G.
- Abbott, Sam
- Barnard, Rosanna C.
- Jarvis, Christopher I.
- Kucharski, Adam J.
- Munday, James D.
- Pearson, Carl A. B.
- Russell, Timothy W.
- Tully, Damien C.
- Washburne, Alex D.
- Wenseleers, Tom
- Gimma, Amy
- Waites, William
- Wong, Kerry L. M.
- van Zandvoort, Kevin
- Silverman, Justin D.
- Diaz-Ordaz, Karla
- Keogh, Ruth
- Eggo, Rosalind M.
- Funk, Sebastian
- Jit, Mark
- Atkins, Katherine E.
- Edmunds, W. John
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2021-04-09
- Volume
- 372
- Issue
- 6538
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- PMC
- PMC8128288
- OpenAlex
- W3134208712
- Semantic Scholar
- 34e9a0b4e42a4971a3a124c818045741c734fb9e
- Cited by
- 2,581
- References
- 58
- Citations by year
- 2026: 74 · 2025: 102 · 2024: 199 · 2023: 330 · 2022: 840 · 2021: 1028
- FWCI
- 215.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- medRxiv (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- ORCA Online Research @Cardiff (Cardiff University) (acceptedVersion, cc-by)
- Northumbria Research Link (Northumbria University) (acceptedVersion)
- LSHTM Research Online (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine) (acceptedVersion)
- Strathprints: The University of Strathclyde institutional repository (University of Strathclyde) (acceptedVersion)
- Informationszentrum Lebenswissenschaften (ZB MED) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Lirias (KU Leuven) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Edinburgh Research Explorer (University of Edinburgh) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Apollo (University of Cambridge) (submittedVersion)
- Apollo
- Funders
- University of Kentucky
- Universität Bern
- Universitätsspital Basel
- National Institute for Health Research (NIHR200908)
- European Commission (101003688)
- CANDU Owners Group
- Hôpitaux Universitaires de Genève
- Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich
- Université de Sfax
- UKRI Research England (NA)
- National Institute for Health Research Health Protection Research Unit in Immunisation (NIHR200929)
- United Kingdom Medical Research Council (MC_PC_19065)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Modeling and Simulation › COVID-19 epidemiological studies
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Infectious Diseases › SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19 Research
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Applied Mathematics › Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models
- Keywords
- SARS-CoV-2, B.1.1.7 variant, reproduction number, SARS-CoV-2 transmission, epidemic forecasting, COVID-19 containment measures, vaccine rollout, school closures, England
- MeSH terms
- COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2, COVID-19 Vaccines, Adolescent, Adult, Aged, Aged, 80 and over, Child, Child, Preschool, Communicable Disease Control, England, Europe, Female, Humans, Infant, Male, Middle Aged, Models, Theoretical, Mutation, Severity of Illness Index, Socioeconomic Factors, United States, Viral Load, Basic Reproduction Number, Young Adult
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-10, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-10 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.