CONSCIOUSNESS IS COMPUTATIONAL: THE LIDA MODEL OF GLOBAL WORKSPACE THEORY
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We argue that the functions of consciousness are implemented in a bio-computational manner. That is to say, the conscious as well as the non-conscious aspects of human thinking, planning, and perception are produced by adaptive, biological algorithms. We propose that machine consciousness may be produced by similar adaptive algorithms running on the machine.Global Workspace Theory is currently the most empirically supported and widely discussed theory of consciousness. It provides a high-level description of such algorithms, based on a large body of psychological and brain evidence. LIDA provides an explicit implementation of much of GWT, which can be shown to perform human-like tasks, such as the interactive assignment of naval jobs to sailors. Here we provide brief descriptions of both GWT and LIDA in relation to the scientific evidence bearing on consciousness in the brain. A companion article explores how this approach could lead to machine consciousness.1We also discuss the important distinction between volition and consciously mediated action selection, and describe an operational definition of consciousness via verifiable reportability. These are issues that may well bear on the possibility of machine consciousness.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Baddeley, A. D., & Hitch, G. (1974) · Psychology of Learning and Motivation · doi:10.1016/s0079-7421(08)60452-1 · Cited by 9,860
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E., & Thompson, E. (1991) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6730.001.0001 · Cited by 5,765
Intelligence without representation
Brooks, R. A. (1991) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/0004-3702(91)90053-m · Cited by 4,853
The brainweb: phase synchronization and large-scale integration
Varela, F., Lachaux, J.-P., Rodriguez, E., & Martinerie, J. (2001) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/35067550 · Cited by 4,761
Ericsson, K. A., & Kintsch, W. (1995) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.102.2.211 · Cited by 3,498
Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework
Dehaene, S. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2 · Cited by 2,498 · cited 2×
“(Baars & Franklin, 2003, Franklin et”
BackgroundIs It an agent, or just a program?: A taxonomy for autonomous agents
Franklin, S., & Graesser, A. (1997) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/bfb0013570 · Cited by 2,286 · cited 1×
“Every autonomous agent (Franklin and Graesser 1997), be it human, animal, or artificial, must frequently sample (sense) its environment and select an appropriate response (action).”
BackgroundSelf-citationDamasio, A. R. (1989) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(89)90005-x · Cited by 1,538 · cited 1×
“The idea is now favored by a number of scientists and philosophers. like Daniel Dennett and others (Damasio 1989, Edelman 1989, Freeman 1991, GW theory generates explicit predictions for conscious aspects of perception, emotion, motivation, learning, working memory, voluntary control, and self…”
BackgroundThe conscious access hypothesis: origins and recent evidence
Baars, B. J. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(00)01819-2 · Cited by 994 · cited 3×
“A sizable body of evidence suggests that consciousness is the primary agent of such a global access function in humans and other mammals (Baars, 1988, 1997, 2002, etc).”
Self-citationHow conscious experience and working memory interact
Baars, B. J., & Franklin, S. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(03)00056-1 · Cited by 541
Self-citation
Cited by
Artificial General Intelligence: Concept, State of the Art, and Future Prospects
Goertzel, B. (2014) · Journal of Artificial General Intelligence · doi:10.2478/jagi-2014-0001 · Cited by 524
LIDA: A Systems-level Architecture for Cognition, Emotion, and Learning
Franklin, S., Madl, T., D'Mello, S., & Snaider, J. (2014) · IEEE Transactions on Autonomous Mental Development · doi:10.1109/tamd.2013.2277589 · Cited by 261
Self-citationA mathematical model of embodied consciousness.
Rudrauf, D., Bennequin, D., Granic, I., Landini, G., Friston, K., & Williford, K. (2017) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.05.032 · Cited by 118
The timing of the cognitive cycle
Madl, T., Baars, B. J., & Franklin, S. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014803 · Cited by 116
“The worst identification performance of the second stimulus has been observed at delays of about 225 ms between the onsets of the two stimuli [50], which is consistent with the LIDA hypothesis that there can be only one conscious content in one cognitive cycle [8,16].”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialSelf-citationMoral consideration for AI systems by 2030
Sebo, J., & Long, R. (2025) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-023-00379-1 · Cited by 80
“Indeed, Yoshua Bengio and colleagues are the latest group to attempt to build an AI system with a global workspace [91], and Juliani et al. [92] argue that an AI system has already developed a global workspace as a side effect of other capabilities.”
Metadata
- Authors
- BAARS, B. J., & FRANKLIN, S.
- Venue
- International Journal of Machine Consciousness
- Publisher
- World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd
- Published
- 2009-06
- Volume
- 01
- Issue
- 01
- Pages
- 23-32
- ISSN
- 1793-8430 (ISSN-L)
- 1793-8473
- OpenAlex
- W2028506926
- Cited by
- 151
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 14.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: CONSCIOUSNESS IS COMPUTATIONAL: THE LIDA MODEL OF GLOBAL WORKSPACE THEORY. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1142/s1793843009000050
- The paper
- BAARS, B. J., & FRANKLIN, S. (2009). CONSCIOUSNESS IS COMPUTATIONAL: THE LIDA MODEL OF GLOBAL WORKSPACE THEORY. International Journal of Machine Consciousness. https://doi.org/10.1142/s1793843009000050
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.