C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Remote attestation is a crucial security service particularly relevant to increasingly popular IoT (and other embedded) devices. It allows a trusted party (verifier) to learn the state of a remote, and potentially malware-infected, device (prover). Most existing approaches are static in nature and only check whether benign software is initially loaded on the prover. However, they are vulnerable to runtime attacks that hijack the application's control or data flow, e.g., via return-oriented programming or data-oriented exploits. As a concrete step towards more comprehensive runtime remote attestation, we present the design and implementation of Control-FLow ATtestation (C-FLAT) that enables remote attestation of an application's control-flow path, without requiring the source code. We describe a full prototype implementation of C-FLAT on Raspberry Pi using its ARM TrustZone hardware security extensions. We evaluate C-FLAT's performance using a real-world embedded (cyber-physical) application, and demonstrate its efficacy against control-flow hijacking attacks.
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“The second one was presented by Abera et al. who managed to devise a Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software (C-FLAT) to verify remotely the CFI on a given embedded device in [246].”
From Robotics cyber security: vulnerabilities, attacks, countermeasures, and recommendations (2022) · cites this paper as [246]
Citations
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Cited by
Iqbal, W., Abbas, H., Daneshmand, M., Rauf, B., & Bangash, Y. A. (2020) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.2997651 · Cited by 356
“C-FLAT [91] and LO-FAT [92] offered accurate attestation by manipulating attesting run time for the execution path of a program in IoT embedded end nodes.”
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“who managed to devise a Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software (C-FLAT) to verify remotely the CFI on a given embedded device in [246].”
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Abera, T., Asokan, N., Davi, L., Ekberg, J.-E., Nyman, T., Paverd, A., Sadeghi, A.-R., & Tsudik, G.
- Affiliations
- Technische Universität Darmstadt (DE)
- Aalto University (FI)
- Trustonic, Helsinki, Finland
- University of California, Irvine (US)
- ORCID
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2016-10-24
- Pages
- 743-754
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2752493903
- Cited by
- 258
- References
- 41
- Citations by year
- 2026: 20 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 33 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 3
- FWCI
- 12.57
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (CRC1119)
- Suomen Akatemia (283135)
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security (14089-503866-DS)
- Seventh Framework Programme (643964)
- National Security Agency (H98230-15-1-0276)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
- Keywords
- remote attestation, control-flow integrity, return-oriented programming, Internet of Things security, embedded devices, ARM TrustZone, control flow hijacking, Raspberry Pi
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