Cited by 36Ethics and Social Impacts of AIAdversarial Robustness in Machine LearningExplainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)

Grounding and Evaluation for Large Language Models: Practical Challenges and Lessons Learned (Survey)

Open access
Kenthapadi, Krishnaram, Sameki, Mehrnoosh, Taly, Ankur·2024·Proceedings of the 30th ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining

Abstract

With the ongoing rapid adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based systems in high-stakes domains, ensuring the trustworthiness, safety, and observability of these systems has become crucial. It is essential to evaluate and monitor AI systems not only for accuracy and quality-related metrics but also for robustness, bias, security, interpretability, and other responsible AI dimensions. We focus on large language models (LLMs) and other generative AI models, which present additional challenges such as hallucinations, harmful and manipulative content, and copyright infringement. In this survey article accompanying our tutorial, we highlight a wide range of harms associated with generative AI systems, and survey state of the art approaches (along with open challenges) to address these harms.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This survey/tutorial reviews harms and practical challenges for grounding and evaluating large language models, with emphasis on hallucinations, safety, bias, robustness, privacy, calibration, and transparency. It surveys solution approaches—especially retrieval augmented generation, constrained decoding, guardrails, revision, and corpus tuning—and frames deployment around identification, measurement, mitigation, and operationalization.

Key findings

  • Grounding is defined as ensuring every claim in an LLM response can be attributed to a document in a user-specified knowledge base; it differs from factuality, which seeks attribution to commonly agreed world knowledge.
  • The paper organizes responsible AI evaluation around dimensions including truthfulness, safety and alignment, bias and fairness, robustness and security, privacy/unlearning/copyright, calibration and confidence, and transparency/causal interventions, and highlights harms such as hallucinations, jailbreaks, prompt injection, harmful content, and copyright infringement.
  • For grounding, it surveys retrieval augmented generation (RAG), constrained decoding, evaluation/guardrails/revision, and corpus tuning; RAG systems are evaluated on context relevance, answer faithfulness, and answer relevance.
  • For LLM operations, it proposes identification, measurement, mitigation (with four mitigation layers at model, safety system, application, and positioning levels), and operationalization; open challenges include imperfect retrieval, balancing grounding with creativity/helpfulness, multimodal RAG, robust guardrails, scalable privacy/unlearning, and out-of-distribution calibration.

Methods

  • Survey/tutorial article accompanying a tutorial; no original empirical study, dataset, or quantitative results are reported.
  • Synthesizes literature and industry lessons across LLM evaluation dimensions, grounding, and LLM operations/observability.
  • Presents business problems, solution approaches, and open challenges for each dimension rather than a formal systematic review protocol.

Limitations

  • The paper states many open challenges rather than resolved limitations, including imperfect retrieval, balancing grounding with creativity/helpfulness, extending RAG to multimodal settings, robust guardrails against attacks, scalable privacy/unlearning, and calibration in out-of-distribution settings.
  • Evident from the text: it is a survey/tutorial without primary experiments, quantitative benchmarks, or sample sizes, so claims are synthesized from cited work and industry practice rather than tested here.
  • Evident from the text: coverage is broad and high-level; for example, the RAG description is “only a brief overview,” and readers are referred to dedicated surveys.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/3637528.3671467

Cites

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Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

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  • Premisecitation

    Fine-tuning large language models on new information that was not acquired during pretraining can encourage the model to hallucinate.

    “Finally, a recent work shows that fine-tuning LLMs on new information that was not acquired during pretraining can encourage the model to hallucinate [38].”
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    Various methods have been proposed to detect hallucinations, from sampling-based approaches to those that use the internal states of the model.

    “A variety of methods have been proposed to detect hallucinations, ranging from sampling based approaches [75] to approaches leveraging internal states of the LLM [104].”
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    One line of research trains or fine-tunes large language models on highly curated, textbook-like datasets.

    “One line of work involves training or fine-tuning LLMs on highly curated textbook-like datasets [40,134].”
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    Several methods have been proposed to fundamentally reduce hallucinations by tuning large language models.

    “A number of methods have been proposed to fundamentally reduce hallucinations by tuning models.”
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  • Interpretationcitation

    Curating fine-tuning datasets to avoid introducing new information that was not in pretraining offers another way to reduce hallucinations.

    “Curating fine-tuning sets to avoid this issue paves another path to reducing hallucinations.”
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    Premisecitation

    In addition to response quality, practitioners must consider training data privacy, model stealing, copyright violations, and security risks like jailbreaking and prompt injection.

    “Besides evaluations of response quality, practitioners also have to worry about training data privacy, model stealing, copyright violations, and security risks such as jailbreaking [137] and prompt injection [121].”
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    Premisenone given

    Large language models and other generative AI models introduce extra difficulties, including hallucinations, harmful and manipulative content, and copyright infringement.

    “We focus on large language models (LLMs) and other generative AI models, which present additional challenges such as hallucinations, harmful and manipulative content, and copyright infringement.”
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    Premisecitation

    In large language models, a lack of truthfulness can span from subtle misrepresentations to blatant false statements, commonly called hallucinations.

    “For instance, lack of truthfulness can range from subtle misrepresentations to making blatant false statements (colloquially known as “hallucinations”) [48].”
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    Reducing hallucinations on a synthetic task has been explored as a means to reduce hallucinations on real-world downstream tasks.

    “Reducing hallucination on a synthetic task has been explored as a way to reduce hallucination on real-world downstream tasks [57].”
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    Premisecitation

    Extensive research exists on hallucinations in large language models, covering their causes and sources, and methods to evaluate how prone models are to producing them.

    “There is extensive work on hallucinations in LLMs [48,54], including, the causes and sources of hallucinations [77], and measures for evaluating LLMs based on their vulnerability to producing hallucinations [94].”
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    Premisecitation

    Several dedicated frameworks exist that describe evaluation datasets, metrics, and benchmarks for various dimensions of LLM evaluation.

    “Evaluation of LLMs is an important topic and there have been a number of dedicated frameworks [33,66,83] describing evaluation datasets, metrics, and benchmarks for various dimensions.”
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    Premisecitation

    A growing set of tools and resources has been proposed for different phases of developing large language models.

    “A growing collection of tools and resources have been proposed across different phases of LLM development [71].”
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    Premisecitation

    Early work exists on detecting and preventing hallucinations in large vision-language models and other multimodal foundation models.

    “There is also early work on detecting and preventing hallucinations in large vision language models [41] and other multimodal foundation models [128].”
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    Premisecitation

    Another approach fine-tunes large language models on preference data for factuality, using response pairs ranked by factuality.

    “Another approach involves fine-tuning LLMs on preference data for factuality, i.e., response pairs ranked by factuality [109].”
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    Premisecitation

    Alignment research is an active area, with approaches including data-efficient alignment, alternatives to RLHF, and aligning cross-modal representations.

    “Overall, alignment is an active area of research, with approaches ranging from data-efficient alignment [55] to alternatives to RLHF [25] to aligning cross-modal representations [84].”
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    Interpretationreasoning

    In some settings, the evaluation task may be too difficult even for human experts, which requires using powerful LLMs in a way that aligns with human intent.

    “In certain settings, the task to be evaluated could be too hard for even human experts (e.g., comparing two different summaries of a very large collection of documents or judging the quality of hypotheses generated based on a large volume of medical literature), necessitating the use of powerful LLMs in a manner that aligns with human intent.”
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    Premisecitation

    Current approaches to AI alignment depend on human supervision, such as reinforcement learning from human feedback, and would not be feasible once AI systems surpass human intelligence.

    “While current approaches for AI alignment rely on human ability to supervise AI (using approaches such as reinforcement learning from human feedback), these approaches would not be feasible when AI systems become smarter than humans [13].”
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    Premisecitation

    LLMs and other generative AI models exhibit novel bias categories, including gender stereotypes, exclusionary norms, disability-related biases, religious stereotypes, and sexual objectification.

    “In addition to known categories of bias observed in predictive ML models, new types of bias arise in LLMs and other generative AI models, e.g., gender stereotypes, exclusionary norms, undesirable biases towards mentions of disability, religious stereotypes, and sexual objectification [10,30,106,122].”
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    Premisecitation

    A large body of research addresses bias detection and mitigation in NLP models.

    “There is extensive work on detecting and mitigating bias in NLP models [12,14,15,22,36,98].”
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    Interpretationreasoning

    Because training datasets are enormous, auditing and updating them, or foreseeing which biases they contain, is hard.

    “Additionally, due to the sheer size of datasets used, it is difficult to audit and update the training data or even anticipate different kinds of biases that may be present.”
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    Premisecitation

    Methods for watermarking or otherwise identifying or detecting AI-generated content have been proposed.

    “Several approaches for watermarking [28,39,62] (or otherwise identifying / detecting [81]) AI generated content have been proposed.”
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    Interpretationreasoning

    Attacks that misuse combinations of models do not require aligned frontier models to produce malicious outputs and can therefore escape detection.

    “As such attacks do not require the aligned frontier models to generate malicious outputs and hence can go undetected, there is a need to extend red-teaming efforts beyond single models in isolation.”
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    Premisecitation

    Explainability methods for large language models have been extensively studied.

    “Explainability methods for LLMs have been well studied [131], including techniques such as Chain-of-Thought Prompting [120] and variants.”
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    Premisecitation

    Recent approaches for large language models include selective prediction, self-evaluation and calibration, semantic uncertainty, and self-evaluation-based selective prediction.

    “In the context of LLMs, recent approaches such as selective prediction, self-evaluation and calibration, semantic uncertainty, and self-evaluation-based selective prediction have been proposed [20] (see references there-in).”
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    Premisecitation

    Learning to defer involves understanding when humans can effectively complement AI models.

    “It also involves understanding the conditions under which humans can effectively complement AI models [24].”
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    Interpretationnone given

    Detecting personally identifiable information in large language model prompts or responses may require domain-specific modifications because what counts as personally identifiable information can differ by application.

    “Detecting PII in LLM prompts / responses can be done using off-the-shelf packages, but may require domain-specific modifications since what is considered as PII could vary based on the application.”
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    Premisecitation

    Chain-of-Thought Prompting and its variants are among the explainability methods for large language models.

    “Explainability methods for LLMs have been well studied [131], including techniques such as Chain-of-Thought Prompting [120] and variants.”
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    Premisecitation

    Causal tracing involves first finding neuron activations that are decisive for a model's factual predictions and then altering those activations to update specific factual associations.

    “This involves first identifying neuron activations that are decisive in the model's factual predictions, and then modifying these neuron activations to update specific factual associations [78].”
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    Premisecitation

    Training with demonstrations of out-of-domain, adversarial, or nonsensical prompts enables a model to generate an "I don't know" response.

    “In such cases, it is crucial to train the model to generate an “I don't know” response by including demonstrations of such scenarios in the tuning set [29,130].”
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    • Rests on an assumption: For any retrieval system, some out-of-domain, adversarial, or nonsensical prompts will still retrieve irrelevant context.
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    Premisecitation

    Mechanistic interpretability is an active research area.

    “Mechanistic interpretability [93] is another active area of research, which has the potential to be further accelerated by the availability of small language models like phi-2.”
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    Premisecitation

    RAG systems are evaluated along context relevance, answer faithfulness, and answer relevance.

    “Consequently, RAG systems are evaluated based on dimensions such as context relevance (that is, whether the retrieved context is relevant to the given prompt), answer faithfulness (that is, whether the response generated by the LLM is properly grounded in the retrieved context), and answer relevance (that is, whether the response is relevant to the user question) [27,100].”
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    • Rests on an assumption: The success of a RAG system depends on both the retrieval step and the generation step.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Comprehensive evaluations are necessary for trust in LLM applications to be achievable.

    “Without comprehensive evaluations, establishing trust in LLM-based applications becomes exceedingly difficult.”
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    Premisecitation

    A new harm category-"Disparaging, Existential, and Argumentative"-was added by Microsoft to its responsible AI evaluation for conversational AI after the Bing chatbot behaved unexpectedly.

    “As an example, Microsoft introduced a new category of harms called “Disparaging, Existential, and Argumentative” harms as part of the responsible AI evaluation for conversational AI applications in response to the unexpected behavior of the Bing AI chatbot as reported by a New York Times journalist [99].”
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    Interpretationnone given

    LLM-based grounding checks are more computationally expensive and therefore less viable as inference-time guardrails.

    “However, LLM based approaches are more computationally expensive making them less viable as inference time guardrails.”
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    Interpretationnone given

    A common caveat for constrained decoding is balancing groundedness with coherence, fluency, and helpfulness.

    “A common caveat for constrained decoding approaches is balancing groundedness with other desirable attributes like coherence, fluency, and helpfulness.”
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  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Harmful responses from large language models can vary from racially biased responses to violent, hateful, and other inappropriate responses, to responses causing social harm.

    “Similarly, harmful responses can vary from racially biased responses, to violent, hateful, and other inappropriate responses, to responses causing social harm (e.g., instruction on how to cheat in an examination without getting caught).”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    A frequent cause of grounding failures is that the LLM's parametric memory does not contain all knowledge-base information.

    “Grounding failures often occur because not all information in the knowledge base is stored in the LLM's parametric memory.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    For any retrieval system, some out-of-domain, adversarial, or nonsensical prompts will still retrieve irrelevant context.

    “no matter how effective the retrieval system is, there will always be instances of out-of-domain, adversarial, or nonsensical prompts where the retrieved context remains irrelevant.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The success of a RAG system depends on both the retrieval step and the generation step.

    “The success of a RAG system relies on the success of the retrieval step and the generation step.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Metrics like weight updates, activations, and robustness statistics are not currently available as part of LLM APIs.

    “leveraging metrics like weight updates, activations, and robustness statistics, which are not currently available as part of LLM APIs.”
5 of 5

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • The aforementioned factors require a multidisciplinary approach to LLM benchmarking, integrating insights from linguistics, ethics, and social sciences to create robust evaluation frameworks.

    “The aforementioned factors require a multidisciplinary approach to LLM benchmarking, integrating insights from linguistics, ethics, and social sciences to create robust evaluation frameworks [3], [13], [30].”

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Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Kenthapadi, K., Sameki, M., & Taly, A.
Affiliations
  • Oracle Health AI, Redwood City, CA, USA
  • Microsoft (United States) (US)
  • Google (United States) (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the 30th ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining
Publisher
ACM
Published
2024-08-24
Pages
6523-6533
OpenAlex
W4401863475
Cited by
36
References
47
Citations by year
2026: 13 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 2
FWCI
16.36
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
Keywords
large language models, generative AI, AI safety, AI evaluation, hallucinations, harmful content, copyright infringement, bias, robustness, interpretability, trustworthy AI, AI monitoring

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-08.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-08.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

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