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The AI Double Standard: Humans Judge All AIs for the Actions of One
Open accessAbstract
Robots and other artificial intelligence (AI) systems are widely perceived as moral agents responsible for their actions. As AI proliferates, these perceptions may become entangled via the moral spillover of attitudes towards one AI to attitudes towards other AIs. We tested how the seemingly harmful and immoral actions of an AI or human agent spill over to attitudes towards other AIs or humans in two preregistered experiments. In Study 1 ( N = 720), we established the moral spillover effect in human-AI interaction by showing that immoral actions increased attributions of negative moral agency (i.e., acting immorally) and decreased attributions of positive moral agency (i.e., acting morally) and moral patiency (i.e., deserving moral concern) to both the agent (a chatbot or human assistant) and the group to which they belong (all chatbot or human assistants). There was no significant difference in the spillover effects between the AI and human contexts. In Study 2 ( N = 684), we tested whether spillover persisted when the agent was individuated with a name and described as an AI or human, rather than specifically as a chatbot or personal assistant. We found that spillover persisted in the AI context but not in the human context, possibly because AIs were perceived as more homogeneous due to their outgroup status relative to humans. This asymmetry suggests a double standard whereby AIs are judged more harshly than humans when one agent morally transgresses. With the proliferation of diverse, autonomous AI systems, HCI research and design should account for the fact that experiences with one AI could easily generalize to perceptions of all AIs and negative HCI outcomes, such as reduced trust.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
Two preregistered vignette experiments show that an AI’s immoral action spills over to moral judgments of other AIs, including “AIs in general,” whereas a human’s immoral action did not spill over to “humans in general” in Study 2. This asymmetry suggests an “AI double standard,” with AIs judged more harshly as a group after one AI transgresses.
Key findings
- Study 1 (final N = 727) found moral spillover for both chatbot and human assistants: an immoral action increased negative moral agency and decreased positive moral agency and moral patiency toward the agent and its congruent group. For example, negative moral agency toward chatbot assistants rose from M = 2.74 (neutral) to M = 3.93 (immoral), and toward human assistants from M = 2.67 to M = 3.49 (both p < .001).
- Study 1 found no significant agent-type × valence interaction for group spillover, so spillover to chatbot assistants and human assistants did not differ significantly, contrary to H3.
- Study 2 (final N = 684) found spillover from an individuated AI agent (“Ezal”) to AIs in general: negative moral agency toward AIs increased from M = 2.51 (neutral) to M = 3.61 (immoral), positive moral agency decreased from M = 4.95 to M = 4.73, and moral patiency decreased from M = 4.28 to M = 3.65 (all p < .001).
- In Study 2, the same spillover did not occur for humans in general: negative moral agency was M = 4.05 (neutral) vs. M = 4.15 (immoral), p = .99; positive moral agency was M = 4.44 vs. M = 4.50, p = .87; moral patiency was M = 6.59 vs. M = 6.34, p = .47. The significant agent-type × valence interactions supported the AI double standard.
Methods
- Two preregistered online vignette experiments with U.S. Prolific participants. Study 1 final sample: 727 (M_age = 42.23, 50% female, 66% White); Study 2 final sample: 684 (M_age = 41.30, 50% female, 70% White).
- Study 1 used a 2 × 2 between-subjects design: agent type (chatbot assistant vs. human personal assistant) × action valence (immoral vs. morally neutral). Participants rated negative moral agency, positive moral agency, and moral patiency for the agent and the congruent group (chatbot assistants or human assistants).
- Study 2 used the same 2 × 2 design but individuated the agent with the name “Ezal,” broadened the groups to “AIs in general” and “humans in general,” and had participants rate both groups. Main analyses were 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVAs in R 4.3.1, with supplementary FDR and covariate checks.
Limitations
- The paper states that it did not explicitly test mechanisms of moral spillover, such as familiarity, similarity, or pre-existing AI attitudes; future work should vary scenarios and test boundary conditions.
- The paper reports that about 18% of recruited participants in each study were excluded for failing a reading comprehension check identifying the agent’s type, which may have skewed samples toward more attentive participants and suggests difficulty ensuring comprehension of AI-as-human-like scenarios.
- The paper notes that spillover was tested only in a particular organizational vignette setting, with immoral vs. neutral actions rather than morally positive actions, and not in real-world or longitudinal settings; the text also makes evident that findings come from hypothetical vignettes rather than actual human-AI interaction.
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In the paper
“Post-hoc Tukey's honest significant difference (HSD) tests showed that negative moral agency increased in the immoral compared to the morally neutral condition for chatbot-assigned participants (immoral: 𝑀 = 4.53, SE = 0.11; morally neutral: 𝑀 = 2.63, SE = 0.08, 𝑝 < .001)”
§ The AI Double Standard: Humans Judge All AIs for the Actions of One > 3.1.4 Agent effects (H1).
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In the paper
“In Study 1, we found that an unnamed chatbot assistant or human personal assistant's immoral behavior increased attributions of negative moral agency and decreased attributions of positive moral agency and moral patiency to the congruent groups of chatbot or human assistants.”
§ The AI Double Standard: Humans Judge All AIs for the Actions of One > 1 Introduction
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“There was also a significant difference between the group-specific effects of valence, such that moral patiency decreased more for the human than the chatbot agent (𝑝 < .001).”
§ The AI Double Standard: Humans Judge All AIs for the Actions of One > Agent's moral patiency.
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Post-hoc Tukey's HSD tests showed that moral patiency decreased in the immoral compared to the morally neutral condition for chatbot-assigned participants (immoral: 𝑀 = 3.45, SE = 0.11; morally neutral: 𝑀 = 3.23, SE = 0.11, 𝑝 < .001)”
§ The AI Double Standard: Humans Judge All AIs for the Actions of One > Agent's moral patiency.
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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In the paper
“Namely, the immoral action of one AI agent spills over to attributions of moral agency and patiency to the particular group to which the AI belongs and to AIs as a whole.”
§ The AI Double Standard: Humans Judge All AIs for the Actions of One > 1 Introduction
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
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“It is important that we consider these issues because we see in discussions the problem of treating AI as one large entity, with characteristics determined by the best existing technologies at a given time (a partially similar tendency to treat AI as a highly homogenous group rather than as a collection of diverse solutions is supported by research of Manoli et al., 2025).”
From There is no such thing as conscious artificial intelligence (2025) · cites this paper as Manoli et al., 2025
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- Consistentr(725) = 0.64reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“r (725) = .64,p < .001”
- Consistentr(725) = -0.58reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“r (725) = -.58,p < .001”
- Consistentr(725) = 0.65reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“r (725) = .65,p < .001”
- Consistentr(725) = -0.56reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“r (725) = -.56,p < .001”
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“r (386) = .51,p < .001”
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In the paper
§ The AI Double Standard: Humans Judge All AIs for the Actions of One > Agent's moral patiency.
“Post-hoc Tukey's HSD tests showed that moral patiency decreased in the immoral compared to the morally neutral condition for chatbot-assigned participants (immoral: 𝑀 = 3.45, SE = 0.11; morally neutral: 𝑀 = 3.23, SE = 0.11, 𝑝 < .001)”
§ The AI Double Standard: Humans Judge All AIs for the Actions of One > Agent's moral patiency.
“supporting H1c for each group.”
Rated major: it would touch a result — a value a result rests on, reported and recomputed p-values on opposite sides of the significance level, two passages that conflict with no sign which is right, or a cited work retracted before this paper was published.
In the paper
§ The AI Double Standard: Humans Judge All AIs for the Actions of One > 3.1.4 Agent effects (H1).
“There was also a significant difference between the group-specific effects of valence, such that negative moral agency increased more for the chatbot than the human agent (𝑝 < .001).”
§ The AI Double Standard: Humans Judge All AIs for the Actions of One > 3.1.4 Agent effects (H1).
“chatbot-assigned participants (immoral: 𝑀 = 4.53, SE = 0.11; morally neutral: 𝑀 = 2.63, SE = 0.08, 𝑝 < .001)and for human-assigned participants (immoral: 𝑀 = 5.30, SE = 0.08; morally neutral: 𝑀 = 2.67, SE = 0.09, 𝑝 < .001)”
Rated major: it would touch a result — a value a result rests on, reported and recomputed p-values on opposite sides of the significance level, two passages that conflict with no sign which is right, or a cited work retracted before this paper was published.
In the paper
§ The AI Double Standard: Humans Judge All AIs for the Actions of One > 1 Introduction
“in Study 1, the chatbot agent itself was attributed more negative moral agency and was judged more harshly as an individual than was the human agent.”
§ The AI Double Standard: Humans Judge All AIs for the Actions of One > 3.1.4 Agent effects (H1).
“chatbot-assigned participants (immoral: 𝑀 = 4.53, SE = 0.11; morally neutral: 𝑀 = 2.63, SE = 0.08, 𝑝 < .001)and for human-assigned participants (immoral: 𝑀 = 5.30, SE = 0.08; morally neutral: 𝑀 = 2.67, SE = 0.09, 𝑝 < .001)”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ The AI Double Standard: Humans Judge All AIs for the Actions of One > 3.1.5 Spillover effects (H2) and spillover asymmetry (H3).
“Human assistants also had significantly higher overall positive moral agency than chatbots (human assistants: 𝑀 = 4.71, SE = 0.06; chatbots: 𝑀 = 4.36, SE = 0.07).”
§ The AI Double Standard: Humans Judge All AIs for the Actions of One > 3.1.5 Spillover effects (H2) and spillover asymmetry (H3).
“human assistants (immoral: 𝑀 = 4.40, SE = 0.09; morally neutral: 𝑀 = 4.63, SE = 0.09, 𝑝 < .001)”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ The AI Double Standard: Humans Judge All AIs for the Actions of One > 3.2.5 Spillover effects (H2) and spillover asymmetry (H3).
“AIs had significantly higher overall positive moral agency than humans (AIs: 𝑀 = 4.71, SE = 0.07; humans: 𝑀 = 4.47, SE = 0.04).”
§ The AI Double Standard: Humans Judge All AIs for the Actions of One > 6 Conclusion
“AIs in general (immoral: 𝑀 = 4.73, SE = 0.10; morally neutral: 𝑀 = 4.95, SE = 0.09, 𝑝 < .001)”
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Liu, P., Du, M., & Li, T. (2021) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-021-09613-y · Cited by 20
It's (Not) Your Fault! Blame and Trust Repair in Human-Agent Cooperation
Buchholz, V., Kulms, P., & Kopp, S. (2017) · DuEPublico (University of Duisburg-Essen) · doi:10.17185/duepublico/44538 · Cited by 14
Yu, H., Chen, J., Dardaine, B., & Yang, F. (2023) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105476 · Cited by 13 · cited 3×
“We based the design of these experiments on previous HCI studies that used vignettes to test responses to hypothetical human-AI scenarios [27, 43, 58, 64].”
Arrambide, K., Yoon, J., MacArthur, C., Rogers, K., Luz, A., & Nacke, L. E. (2022) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3491102.3502019 · Cited by 12
Features of Moral Consideration for Artificial Entities: A Conjoint ExperimentPreprint
Ladak, A., Harris, J., & Anthis, J. R. (2023) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/235vp · Cited by 10
Self-citationArtificial Intelligence, Morality, and Sentience (AIMS) Survey: 2021Preprint
Pauketat, J. V. T., Ladak, A., & Anthis, J. R. (2022) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/dzgsb · Cited by 6
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 12
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Cited by
Public Opinion and the Rise of Digital Minds: Perceived Risk, Trust, and Regulation Support
Bullock, J. B., Pauketat, J. V. T., Huang, H., Wang, Y.-F., & Anthis, J. R. (2025) · Public Performance & Management Review · doi:10.1080/15309576.2025.2495094 · Cited by 56
Self-citationThere is no such thing as conscious artificial intelligence
Porębski, A., & Figura, J. (2025) · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-025-05868-8 · Cited by 20
“…the problem of treating AI as one large entity, with characteristics determined by the best existing technologies at a given time (a partially similar tendency to treat AI as a highly homogenous group rather than as a collection of diverse solutions is supported by research of Manoli et al., 2025).”
World‐making for a future with sentient AI
Pauketat, J. V. T., Ladak, A., & Anthis, J. R. (2024) · British Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1111/bjso.12844 · Cited by 13
Self-citationCharacterizing Relationships with Companion and Assistant Large Language Models
Manoli, A., Pauketat, J. V. T., & Anthis, J. R. (2025) · ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) · doi:10.1145/3715070.3749245 · Cited by 19
Self-citationDimensions of AI de-anthropomorphization based on impression integration theory
Li, J., Huang, J., & Ni, B. (2026) · Technology in Society · doi:10.1016/j.techsoc.2026.103352 · Cited by 6
Metadata
- Authors
- Manoli, A., Pauketat, J. V. T., & Anthis, J. R.
- Affiliations
- Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences (DE)
- Sentience Institute, New York, NY, USA
- University of Chicago (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction
- Published
- 2025-05-02
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 1-24
- ISSN
- 2573-0142 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4410049592
- Semantic Scholar
- ebbbe19f6dc410f739f3223d0f043e5e70340d2a
- Cited by
- 12
- References
- 54
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 7
- FWCI
- 6.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Keywords
- artificial intelligence, moral agency, moral patiency, human-AI interaction, double standards, chatbots, personal assistants, trust in AI, moral judgment
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-07, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-07 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.