The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Architectural support for copy and tamper resistant software
Open accessAbstract
Although there have been attempts to develop code transformations that yield tamper-resistant software, no reliable software-only methods are know. This paper studies the hardware implementation of a form of execute-only memory (XOM) that allows instructions stored in memory to be executed but not otherwise manipulated. To support XOM code we use a machine that supports internal compartments---a process in one compartment cannot read data from another compartment. All data that leaves the machine is encrypted, since we assume external memory is not secure. The design of this machine poses some interesting trade-offs between security, efficiency, and flexibility. We explore some of the potential security issues as one pushes the machine to become more efficient and flexible. Although security carries a performance penalty, our analysis indicates that it is possible to create a normal multi-tasking machine where nearly all applications can be run in XOM mode. While a virtual XOM machine is possible, the underlying hardware needs to support a unique private key, private memory, and traps on cache misses. For efficient operation, hardware assist to provide fast symmetric ciphers is also required.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A., & Adleman, L. (1983) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/357980.358017 · Cited by 13,012
Handbook of applied cryptography
(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.34-4512 · Cited by 10,357
A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
Elgamal, T. (1985) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/tit.1985.1057074 · Cited by 8,059
Kocher, P., Jaffe, J., & Jun, B. (1999) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-48405-1_25 · Cited by 7,407
On the security of public key protocols
Dolev, D., & Yao, A. (1983) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/tit.1983.1056650 · Cited by 5,833
The protection of information in computer systems
Saltzer, J. H., & Schroeder, M. D. (1975) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/proc.1975.9939 · Cited by 2,126
HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., & Canetti, R. (1997) · doi:10.17487/rfc2104 · Cited by 2,031
Software protection and simulation on oblivious RAMs
Goldreich, O., & Ostrovsky, R. (1996) · Journal of the ACM · doi:10.1145/233551.233553 · Cited by 1,617
Protection of information in computer systems
Saltier, J. H., & Schroeder, M. P. (1975) · IEEE CSIT Newsletter · doi:10.1109/csit.1975.6498831 · Cited by 1,419
On the (Im)possibility of Obfuscating Programs
Barak, B., Goldreich, O., Impagliazzo, R., Rudich, S., Sahai, A., Vadhan, S., & Yang, K. (2001) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-44647-8_1 · Cited by 1,286
Cited by
(2016) · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Cited by 1,288
Innovative instructions and software model for isolated execution
McKeen, F., Alexandrovich, I., Berenzon, A., Rozas, C. V., Shafi, H., Shanbhogue, V., & Savagaonkar, U. R. (2013) · Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy · doi:10.1145/2487726.2488368 · Cited by 1,095
Lest we remember: cold-boot attacks on encryption keys
Halderman, J. A., Schoen, S. D., Heninger, N., Clarkson, W., Paul, W., Calandrino, J. A., Feldman, A. J., Appelbaum, J., & Felten, E. W. (2009) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/1506409.1506429 · Cited by 980
Terra: a virtual machine-based platform for trusted computing
Garfinkel, T., Pfaff, B., Chow, J., Rosenblum, M., & Boneh, D. (2003) · ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review · doi:10.1145/1165389.945464 · Cited by 887
Self-citationPinocchio: Nearly Practical Verifiable Computation
Parno, B., Howell, J., Gentry, C., & Raykova, M. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.47 · Cited by 864
Secure program execution via dynamic information flow tracking
Suh, G. E., Lee, J. W., Zhang, D., & Devadas, S. (2004) · Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems · doi:10.1145/1024393.1024404 · Cited by 740
Watermarking, tamper-proofing, and obfuscation - tools for software protection
Collberg, C. S., & Thomborson, C. (2002) · IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering · doi:10.1109/tse.2002.1027797 · Cited by 735
Obfuscation of executable code to improve resistance to static disassembly
Linn, C., & Debray, S. (2003) · Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/948109.948149 · Cited by 602
VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX
Schuster, F., Costa, M., Fournet, C., Gkantsidis, C., Peinado, M., Mainar-Ruiz, G., & Russinovich, M. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.10 · Cited by 595
Security in embedded systems: Design challenges
Ravi, S., Raghunathan, A., Kocher, P., & Hattangady, S. (2004) · ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/1015047.1015049 · Cited by 463
Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven
Baumann, A., Peinado, M., & Hunt, G. (2015) · ACM Transactions on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/2799647 · Cited by 463
AEGIS: architecture for tamper-evident and tamper-resistant processing
Suh, G. E., Clarke, D., Gassend, B., van Dijk, M., & Devadas, S. (2014) · 25th Anniversary International Conference on Supercomputing Anniversary Volume - · doi:10.1145/2591635.2667184 · Cited by 439
Chen, X., Garfinkel, T., Lewis, E. C., Subrahmanyam, P., Waldspurger, C. A., Boneh, D., Dwoskin, J., & Ports, D. R. K. (2008) · Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems · doi:10.1145/1346281.1346284 · Cited by 415
Self-citationSecurity as a new dimension in embedded system design
Kocher, P., Lee, R., McGraw, G., Raghunathan, A., & Ravi, S. (2004) · Proceedings of the 41st annual Design Automation Conference · doi:10.1145/996566.996771 · Cited by 394
Controlled physical random functions
Gassend, B., Clarke, D., van Dijk, M., & Devadas, S. (2003) · 18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 2002. Proceedings. · doi:10.1109/csac.2002.1176287 · Cited by 380
Keystone: an open framework for architecting trusted execution environments
Lee, D., Kohlbrenner, D., Shinde, S., Asanović, K., & Song, D. (2020) · Proceedings of the Fifteenth European Conference on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/3342195.3387532 · Cited by 379
Zhang, F., Chen, J., Chen, H., & Zang, B. (2011) · Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles · doi:10.1145/2043556.2043576 · Cited by 372
Shielding applications from an untrusted cloud with Haven
Baumann, A., Peinado, M., & Hunt, G. C. (2014) · Operating Systems Design and Implementation · doi:10.5555/2685048.2685070 · Cited by 359
Eliminating the hypervisor attack surface for a more secure cloud
Szefer, J., Keller, E., Lee, R. B., & Rexford, J. (2011) · Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/2046707.2046754 · Cited by 286
RIFLE: An Architectural Framework for User-Centric Information-Flow Security
Vachharajani, N., Bridges, M. J., Chang, J., Rangan, R., Ottoni, G., Blome, J. A., Reis, G. A., Vachharajani, M., & August, D. I. (2005) · 37th International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO-37'04) · doi:10.1109/micro.2004.31 · Cited by 270
Parno (2016) · doi:10.1145/2856449 · Cited by 212
Using ARM trustzone to build a trusted language runtime for mobile applications
Santos, N., Raj, H., Saroiu, S., & Wolman, A. (2014) · Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems · doi:10.1145/2541940.2541949 · Cited by 192
A Formal Foundation for Secure Remote Execution of Enclaves
Subramanyan, P., Sinha, R., Lebedev, I., Devadas, S., & Seshia, S. A. (2017) · Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3133956.3134098 · Cited by 119
Metadata
- Authors
- Thekkath, D. L. C., Mitchell, M., Lincoln, P., Boneh, D., Mitchell, J., & Horowitz, M.
- Venue
- ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News
- Published
- 2000-11-12
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 168-177
- ISSN
- 0163-5964 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2108255910
- Cited by
- 597
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 10.41
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.