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Collective Action Theory and the Dynamics of Complex Societies

DeMarrais, Elizabeth, Earle, Timothy·2017·Annual Review of Anthropology
DOI 10.1146/annurev-anthro-102116-041409
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Abstract

Collective action theory, as formulated in the social sciences, posits rational social actors who regularly assess the actions of others to inform their own decisions to cooperate. In anthropological archaeology, collective action theory is now being used to investigate the dynamics of large-scale polities of the past. Building on the work of Margaret Levi, collective action theorists argue that the more principals (rulers) depended on the populace for labor, tribute, or other revenues, the greater the agency (or “voice”) a population had in negotiating public benefits. In this review, we evaluate collective action theory, situating it in relation to existing theoretical approaches that address cooperation, consensus building, and nonelite agency in the past. We draw specific attention to the importance of analyzing agency at multiple scales as well as how institutions articulate shared interests and order sociopolitical and economic interaction. Finally, we argue for a new synthesis of political economy approaches with collective action theory.

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  • Work parties provided labor for construction, hunting, feasts, funerals, and other activities, and were a form of collective action and source of social power.

    “A form of collective action and source of social power (see DeMarrais and Earle 2017;Guyer 1996;Norman 2015;Stahl 2015), work parties also provided labor for construction, hunting, feasts, funerals, and much more (Gombe 1986).”

    From New Perspectives on the Political Economy of Great Zimbabwe (2020) · cites this paper as DeMarrais and Earle 2017

  • The establishment of relationships of reciprocity that ensured a given social unit could call upon the collective labor of another was important.

    “Rather, the establishment of relationships of reciprocity that ensured a given social unit could call upon the collective labor of another was important (e.g., Blanton and Fargher 2009;DeMarrais and Earle 2017).”

    From New Perspectives on the Political Economy of Great Zimbabwe (2020) · cites this paper as DeMarrais and Earle 2017

  • The construction of drystone walls by communal work parties and other forms of labor shows the efficacy of cooperation and collective action in building prestige and status symbols.

    “The construction of drystone walls (Fig. 7) by communal work parties and other forms of labor shows the efficacy of cooperation and collective action in building prestige and status symbols (DeMarrais and Earle 2017).”

    From New Perspectives on the Political Economy of Great Zimbabwe (2020) · cites this paper as DeMarrais and Earle 2017

  • Institutions articulate shared interests, order sociopolitical and economic interactions, manage conflict, and make interactions more predictable, while they formalize power relations and relations in general.

    “Institutions articulate shared interests, order sociopolitical and economic interactions, manage conflict, and make interactions more predictable, while they formalize power relations and relations in general (DeMarrais & Earle 2017).”

    From African American Archaeology, for Now (2022) · cites this paper as DeMarrais & Earle 2017

  • Institutions leave archaeological traces to the extent that they are associated with buildings, rituals, meeting places, objects, and symbols.

    “Institutions do indeed “leave archaeological traces to the extent that they are associated with buildings, rituals, meeting places, objects, and symbols” (DeMarrais & Earle 2017, p. 196).”

    From African American Archaeology, for Now (2022) · cites this paper as DeMarrais & Earle 2017

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Metadata

Authors
DeMarrais, E., & Earle, T.
Venue
Annual Review of Anthropology
Publisher
Annual Reviews
Published
2017-10-23
Volume
46
Issue
1
Pages
183-201
ISSN
  • 0084-6570
  • 1545-4290
DOI
10.1146/annurev-anthro-102116-041409
Cited by
113
References
1
Language
en

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