Power Tool or Dull Blade? Selectorate Theory for Autocracies
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article assesses the utility of selectorate theory as a tool for understanding authoritarian politics. We start by discussing the intellectual history of the selectorate concept and its original usage in the authoritarian context. We then turn our focus to the selectorate theory as developed in The Logic of Political Survival (LPS) ( Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003 ), identifying three problematic aspects of the theory and its application to authoritarian politics. First, the utility of the theory's key concepts of the selectorate and winning coalition is questionable in authoritarian systems where formal institutions to structure political transitions are absent or inconsequential. Second, measurement of the sizes of the selectorate and winning coalition is flawed, calling into question the empirical findings in LPS, such as its central claims about the survival of rulers. Third, the assumptions in the LPS version of the theory are restrictive in ways that reduce the utility of the selectorate concept relative to earlier works. We conclude that selectorate theory is a blunt instrument for understanding authoritarian rule.
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Citations
Cites
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217 · cited 1×
“In general, the idea that rulers who are accountable to broad constituencies in the polity have stronger incentives to perform well is appealing, and the application of this logic to democratic peace theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999) has been valuable.”
BackgroundCompetitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511781353 · Cited by 3,459 · cited 1×
“…the authoritarian functions of institutions usually associated with democracies, including elections, legislatures, and rule of law (Schedler 2006; Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008b; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Wang 2015; Moustafa and Ginsberg 2008; Moustafa 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010).”
BackgroundThe Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Svolik, M. W. (2012) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139176040 · Cited by 2,611
What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?
Geddes, B. (1999) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115 · Cited by 2,025
Political Institutions under Dictatorship
Gandhi, J. (2008) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510090 · Cited by 1,910
Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats
Gandhi, J., & Przeworski, A. (2007) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414007305817 · Cited by 1,523
Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization
Brownlee, J. (2007) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511802348 · Cited by 1,070
The Political Economy of Dictatorship
Wintrobe, R. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174916 · Cited by 1,008
The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism
Pepinsky, T. (2014) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123413000021 · Cited by 511
Cited by
Inclusionary regimes, party institutionalization and redistribution under authoritarianism
Pelke, L. (2020) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1786683 · Cited by 19
Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity
Panaro, A. V., & Vaccaro, A. (2023) · Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica · doi:10.1017/ipo.2022.17 · Cited by 7
Selectorate Theory in Hybrid Regimes: Comparing Hong Kong and Singapore
Wong, M. Y. H. (2018) · Government and Opposition · doi:10.1017/gov.2017.10 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Gallagher, M. E., & Hanson, J. K.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Political Science
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2015-05-11
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 367-385
- ISSN
- 1094-2939 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-1577
- OpenAlex
- W2119593786
- Cited by
- 94
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 3.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Gallagher, M. E., & Hanson, J. K. (2015). Power Tool or Dull Blade? Selectorate Theory for Autocracies. Annual Review of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-071213-041224
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