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COPING WITH TRAGEDIES OF THE COMMONS

Ostrom, Elinor·1999·Annual Review of Political Science
DOI 10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.493
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Abstract

▪ Abstract Contemporary policy analysis of the governance of common-pool resources is based on three core assumptions: (a) resource users are norm-free maximizers of immediate gains, who will not cooperate to overcome the commons dilemmas they face; (b) designing rules to change incentives of participants is a relatively simple analytical task; and (c) organization itself requires central direction. The chapter shows that these assumptions are a poor foundation for policy analysis. Findings from carefully controlled laboratory experiments that challenge the first assumption are summarized. A different assumption that humans are fallible, boundedly rational, and norm-using is adopted. The complexity of using rules as tools to change the structure of commons dilemmas is then discussed, drawing on extensive research on rules in field settings. Viewing all policies as experiments with a probability of failure, recent research on a different form of general organization—that of complex adaptive systems—is applied to the process of changing rules. The last sections examine the capabilities and limits of a series of completely independent resource governance systems and the importance of encouraging the evolution of polycentric governance systems.

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Metadata

Authors
Ostrom, E.
Venue
Annual Review of Political Science
Publisher
Annual Reviews
Published
1999-06
Volume
2
Issue
1
Pages
493-535
ISSN
  • 1094-2939 (ISSN-L)
  • 1545-1577
DOI
10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.493
OpenAlex
W2125342289
Cited by
1,390
References
3
FWCI
14.18
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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