WHAT DOES POLITICAL ECONOMY TELL US ABOUT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT—AND VICE VERSA?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
▪ Abstract This essay reviews how three pillars of political economy—collective action, institutions, and political market imperfections—help us answer the following question: Why do some countries develop and not others? Each advances our understanding of who wins and who loses in government decision making, generally, but only a subset of this literature helps us answer the question. The study of political market imperfections strongly suggests that the lack of credibility of pre-electoral political promises and incomplete voter information are especially robust in explaining development outcomes. From the institutional literature, the most powerful explanation of contrasting development outcomes links political checks and balances to the credibility of government commitments.
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Citations
Cites
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Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems
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“Considerable attention has, however, been dedicated to the role of political checks and balances, which make it difficult for any one political actor to act unilaterally towards citizens, and the 21 Keefer and Stasavage (2003) present another example that makes this point.”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Cited by
Political risk, institutions and foreign direct investment
Busse, M., & Hefeker, C. (2007) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.02.003 · Cited by 1,606
Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies
Keefer, P. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00282.x · Cited by 890
Self-citationHow (Not) to measure institutions
VOIGT, S. (2013) · Journal of Institutional Economics · doi:10.1017/s1744137412000148 · Cited by 329
Why we need a new theory of government
Levi, M. (2006) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592706060038 · Cited by 149
Metadata
- Authors
- Keefer, P.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Political Science
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2004-05-17
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 247-272
- ISSN
- 1094-2939 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-1577
- OpenAlex
- W3123857600
- Cited by
- 104
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 5.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Keefer, P. (2004). WHAT DOES POLITICAL ECONOMY TELL US ABOUT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT—AND VICE VERSA? Annual Review of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104846
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