Internalizing Agency of Self-Action: Perception of One's Own Hand Movements Depends on an Adaptable Prediction About the Sensory Action Outcome
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Extensive work on learning in reaching and pointing tasks has demonstrated high degrees of plasticity in our ability to optimize goal-directed motor behavior. However, studies focusing on the perceptual awareness of our own actions during motor adaptation are still rare. Here we present the first simultaneous investigation of sensorimotor adaptation on both levels, i.e., action and action perception. We hypothesized that self-action perception relies on internal predictions about the sensory action outcome that are updated in a way similar to that of motor control. Twenty human subjects performed out-and-back pointing movements that were fed back visually. Feedback was initially presented in spatiotemporal correspondence with respect to the actual finger position, but later rotated by a constant angle. When distorted feedback was applied repetitively, subjects' perceived pointing direction shifted in the direction of the trajectory rotation. A comparable perceptual reinterpretation was observed in control trials without visual feedback, indicating that subjects learned to predict the new visual outcome of their actions based on nonvisual, internal information. The perception of the world, however, remained unchanged. The changes in perception of one's own movements were accompanied by adaptive changes in motor performance of the same amount, i.e., a secondary motor compensation opposite to the direction of the imposed visual rotation. Our results show that the perception of one's own actions depends on adaptable internal predictions about the sensory action outcome, allowing us to attribute new sensory consequences of our actions to our own agency. Furthermore, they indicate that the updated sensory prediction can be used to optimize motor control.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Beyond the comparator model: A multifactorial two-step account of agency
Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., & Newen, A. (2008) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2007.03.010 · Cited by 1,050
Self-citationThe “sense of agency” and its underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms
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Learning from Sensory and Reward Prediction Errors during Motor Adaptation
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Self-citationI move, therefore I am: A new theoretical framework to investigate agency and ownership
Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., & Newen, A. (2008) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.008 · Cited by 268
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Metadata
- Authors
- Synofzik, M., Thier, P., & Lindner, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Neurophysiology
- Publisher
- American Physiological Society
- Published
- 2006-09
- Volume
- 96
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1592-1601
- ISSN
- 0022-3077 (ISSN-L)
- 1522-1598
- OpenAlex
- W2014484736
- Cited by
- 111
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 2.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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