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Cited by 3,894

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies

Open access
Bertrand, M., Schoar, A.·2003·The Quarterly Journal of Economics
DOI 10.1162/003355303322552775
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Abstract

This paper investigates whether and how individual managers affect corporate behavior and performance. We construct a manager-firm matched panel data set which enables us to track the top managers across different firms over time. We find that manager fixed effects matter for a wide range of corporate decisions. A significant extent of the heterogeneity in investment, financial and organizational practices of firms can be explained by the presence of manager fixed effects. We identify specific patterns in managerial decision making that appear to indicate general differences in "style" across managers. Moreover, we show that management style is significantly related to manager fixed effects in performance and that managers with higher performance fixed effects receive higher compensation and are more likely to be found in better governed firms. In a final step, we tie back these findings to observable managerial characteristics. We find that executives from earlier birth cohorts appear on average to be more conservative; on the other hand, managers who hold an MBA degree seem to follow on average more aggressive strategies.

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Research works printed but not linked: 21

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  18. den Steen Van, 2001, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School of Management Working Paper No., 4224
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  21. Wasserman, Noam, Nitin Nohria, and Bharat Anand, "When Does Leadership Matter? The Contingent Opportunities View of CEO Leadership," Working Paper, Harvard University, 2002. · DOI

Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Bertrand, M., & Schoar, A.
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2003-11-01
Volume
118
Issue
4
Pages
1169-1208
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
DOI
10.1162/003355303322552775
OpenAlex
W1677595927
Cited by
3,894
References
0
FWCI
96.98
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.