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Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work
Abstract
October 01 1997 Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work Robert A. Pape Robert A. Pape Robert A. Pape is Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. He is the author of Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Robert A. Pape Robert A. Pape is Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. He is the author of Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). Online Issn: 1531-4804 Print Issn: 0162-2889 © 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.1997 International Security (1997) 22 (2): 90–136. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.2.90 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Robert A. Pape; Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security 1997; 22 (2): 90–136. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.2.90 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAll JournalsInternational Security Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.1997 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.
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Citations
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(2012) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.49-4127 · Cited by 2,169
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PAPE, R. A. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305540300073x · Cited by 1,333
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(2003) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.11952 · Cited by 301
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Escribà-Folch, A., & Wright, J. (2010) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00590.x · Cited by 275
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Metadata
- Authors
- Pape, R. A.
- Venue
- International Security
- Publisher
- MIT Press - Journals
- Published
- 1997-10
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 90-136
- ISSN
- 0162-2889 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4804
- OpenAlex
- W2060886834
- Cited by
- 1,104
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 36.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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