Dissociable Neural Substrates for Agentic versus Conceptual Representations of Self
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Although humans generally experience a coherent sense of selfhood, we can nevertheless articulate different aspects of self. Recent research has demonstrated that one such aspect of self—conceptual knowledge of one's own personality traits—is subserved by ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC). Here, we examined whether an alternative aspect of “self”—being an agent who acts to achieve one's own goals—relies on cognitive processes that overlap with or diverge from conceptual operationalizations of selfhood. While undergoing fMRI, participants completed tasks of both conceptual self-reference, in which they judged their own or another person's personality traits, and agentic self-reference, in which they freely chose an object or watched passively as one was chosen. The agentic task failed to modulate vMPFC, despite producing the same memory enhancement frequently observed during conceptual self-referential processing (the “self-reference” effect). Instead, agentic self-reference was associated with activation of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS), a region previously implicated in planning and executing actions. Experiment 2 further demonstrated that IPS activity correlated with later memory performance for the agentic, but not conceptual, task. These results support views of the “self” as a collection of distinct mental operations distributed throughout the brain, rather than a unitary cognitive system.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261737 · Cited by 3,194 · cited 1×
“Similarly, the engagement of distinct cognitive processes forself-referential thought is likewise thought to underlie such diverse phenomena as the tendency to overvalue items that belong to oneself (the “the endowment effect”; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990 ); differences in the explanations given for oneʼs own be…”
BackgroundPhilosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.
Gallagher, S. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5 · Cited by 2,881 · cited 3×
“…self”); a “narrative self” that maintains our sense of personal history and autobiographical memory; and a “social self” that reflects an understanding of our roles, obligations, and rights as individuals with a specific place in our social networks (also see Boyer et al., 2005; Gallagher, 2000).”
BackgroundBuckner, R. L., & Carroll, D. C. (2007) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.004 · Cited by 2,691
Action observation activates premotor and parietal areas in a somatotopic manner: an fMRI study
Buccino, G., Binkofski, F., Fink, G. R., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., Seitz, R. J., Zilles, K., Rizzolatti, G., & Freund, H. ‐. (2001) · European Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1111/j.1460-9568.2001.01385.x · Cited by 2,488
Finding the self? An event-related fMRI study
Kelley, W. M., Macrae, C. N., Wyland, C. L., Caglar, S., Inati, S., & Heatherton, T. F. (2002) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/08989290260138672 · Cited by 1,606 · cited 4×
“…by guest on 23 August 2021 self-referential processing come about because of differences in the neural systems deployed when thinking about self and others (Heatherton et al., 2006; Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley, 2004; Kelley et al., 2002).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationCortical midline structures and the self
Northoff, G., & Bermpohl, F. (2004) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.01.004 · Cited by 1,446
The self-reference effect in memory: A meta-analysis
Symons, C. S., & Johnson, B. T. (1997) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.121.3.371 · Cited by 1,361 · cited 5×
“A highresolution T1-weighted structural scan (MP-RAGE) was conducted following the four functional runs for the agentic self-reference task and preceding the two functional runs for the conceptual self-reference task.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialDissociable Medial Prefrontal Contributions to Judgments of Similar and Dissimilar Others
Mitchell, J. P., Macrae, C. N., & Banaji, M. R. (2006) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2006.03.040 · Cited by 1,023
Self-citationMultiple routes to memory: distinct medial temporal lobe processes build item and source memories
Davachi, L., Mitchell, J. P., & Wagner, A. D. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0337195100 · Cited by 899 · cited 1×
“” Following earlier studies that have examined the neural correlates of successful encoding (Davachi, Mitchell, & Wagner, 2003 ; Brewer, Zhao, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1998 ; Kelley et al, 1998 ; Wagner et al, 1998 ), subsequent memory analysis was restricted to items judged “new” or that were remembered with high…”
ResultSelf-citationObserving the transformation of experience into memory
Paller, K. A., & Wagner, A. D. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(00)01845-3 · Cited by 852 · cited 2×
“…by guest on 23 August 2021 distinguish brain regions that make significant processing contributions to task performance from those that are coactivated by the task for extraneous or peripheral reasons (Paller & Wagner, 2002; Wagner, Koutstaal, & Schacter, 1999).”
Background
Cited by
Ochsner, K. N., Silvers, J. A., & Buhle, J. T. (2012) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2012.06751.x · Cited by 1,879
Social cognition and the cerebellum: A meta-analysis of over 350 fMRI studies
Van Overwalle, F., Baetens, K., Mariën, P., & Vandekerckhove, M. (2014) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.09.033 · Cited by 474
Dörfel, D., Lamke, J.-P., Hummel, F., Wagner, U., Erk, S., & Walter, H. (2014) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.06.051 · Cited by 322
Murray, R. J., Schaer, M., & Debbané, M. (2012) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.12.013 · Cited by 305
Neural responses to heartbeats in the default network encode the self in spontaneous thoughts
Babo-Rebelo, M., Richter, C. G., & Tallon-Baudry, C. (2016) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.0262-16.2016 · Cited by 207
“The conceptual distinction between these two self-dimensions (James, 1890; Legrand and Ruby, 2009; Christoff et al., 2011; Gallagher, 2012) has been emphasized and might prove experimentally useful (Powell et al., 2010; Christoff et al., 2011).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Powell, L. J., Macrae, C. N., Cloutier, J., Metcalfe, J., & Mitchell, J. P.
- Venue
- Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Published
- 2010-10-01
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 2186-2197
- ISSN
- 0898-929X (ISSN-L)
- 1530-8898
- OpenAlex
- W2145950868
- Cited by
- 42
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 2.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Dissociable Neural Substrates for Agentic versus Conceptual Representations of Self. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/jocn.2009.21368
- The paper
- Powell, L. J., Macrae, C. N., Cloutier, J., Metcalfe, J., & Mitchell, J. P. (2010). Dissociable Neural Substrates for Agentic versus Conceptual Representations of Self. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2009.21368
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.