Deeply Felt Affect: The Emergence of Valence in Deep Active Inference
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 142 of the 143 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet.
Abstract
The positive-negative axis of emotional valence has long been recognized as fundamental to adaptive behavior, but its origin and underlying function have largely eluded formal theorizing and computational modeling. Using deep active inference, a hierarchical inference scheme that rests on inverting a model of how sensory data are generated, we develop a principled Bayesian model of emotional valence. This formulation asserts that agents infer their valence state based on the expected precision of their action model—an internal estimate of overall model fitness (“subjective fitness”). This index of subjective fitness can be estimated within any environment and exploits the domain generality of second-order beliefs (beliefs about beliefs). We show how maintaining internal valence representations allows the ensuing affective agent to optimize confidence in action selection preemptively. Valence representations can in turn be optimized by leveraging the (Bayes-optimal) updating term for subjective fitness, which we label affective charge (AC). AC tracks changes in fitness estimates and lends a sign to otherwise unsigned divergences between predictions and outcomes. We simulate the resulting affective inference by subjecting an in silico affective agent to a T-maze paradigm requiring context learning, followed by context reversal. This formulation of affective inference offers a principled account of the link between affect, (mental) action, and implicit metacognition. It characterizes how a deep biological system can infer its affective state and reduce uncertainty about such inferences through internal action (i.e., top-down modulation of priors that underwrite confidence). Thus, we demonstrate the potential of active inference to provide a formal and computationally tractable account of affect. Our demonstration of the face validity and potential utility of this formulation represents the first step within a larger research program. Next, this model can be leveraged to test the hypothesized role of valence by fitting the model to behavioral and neuronal responses.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Figures










Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“This vector can be used to encode common sense and habits [34], [35], but can also be used to adapt the plans online due for instance to runtime component failure.”
From Active Inference and Behavior Trees for Reactive Action Planning and Execution in Robotics (2023) · cites this paper as [35]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“agents don’t seek only to minimize prediction error in the present but are sensitive to rates of change in prediction error minimization over time, relative to their prior expectations about that rate”
From Active inference goes to school: the importance of active learning in the age of large language models (2024) · cites this paper as [43]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Deane et al. (2020) suggest that a sensitivity to worse than expected rates of prediction error reduction over time (Kiverstein et al. 2017, 2020; Hesp et al. 2021), manifesting phenomenologically as negative affect, drives the system to switch to more tractable goals.”
From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Hesp et al. 2021
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Inference about endogenous control of self-evidencing outcomes can thus be understood as an inference about ‘subjective fitness’—the expected precision of the organism’s phenotype-congruent action model (Hesp et al. 2021).”
From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Hesp et al. 2021
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Inference about the reliability of the action model allows the system to increase or decrease precision on the current policy (Kiverstein et al. 2019; Hesp et al. 2021).”
From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Hesp et al. 2021
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Yaşlı Kadınlarda Üreme Sağlığı
Kokanalı, D., & Engin Üstün, Y. (n.d.) · DergiPark (Istanbul University) · Cited by 170,090
Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales.
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.54.6.1063 · Cited by 32,433 · cited 1×
“…standard measures of valence (e.g., self-report scales of pleasant or unpleasant subjective experience, potentiated startle responses; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; Bradley & Lang, 1994; Bublatzky, Guerra, Pastor, Schupp, & Vila, 2013) should be correlated with experimental…”
ResultReinforcement Learning: An Introduction
(2005) · IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks · doi:10.1109/tnn.2004.842673 · Cited by 24,496
Russell, J. A. (1980) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0077714 · Cited by 16,334 · cited 3×
“Some perspectives in emotion research and associated neuroscience research posit that valence is unidimensional (Russell, 1980; Barrett & Russell, 1999) and assume (for example) that a single neural system should increase (or decrease) in activity as valence changes along this dimension.”
BackgroundMeasuring emotion: The self-assessment manikin and the semantic differential
Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (1994) · Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/0005-7916(94)90063-9 · Cited by 9,538 · cited 1×
“…valence (e.g., self-report scales of pleasant or unpleasant subjective experience, potentiated startle responses; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; Bradley & Lang, 1994; Bublatzky, Guerra, Pastor, Schupp, & Vila, 2013) should be correlated with experimental inductions of uncertainty about the…”
BackgroundA neural substrate of prediction and reward
Schultz, W., Dayan, P., & Montague, P. R. (1997) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.275.5306.1593 · Cited by 9,388 · cited 1×
“AC is formally related to reward prediction error within reinforcement learning models (Friston et al., 2014; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Stauffer, Lak, & Schultz, 2014).”
BackgroundThe organization of the human cerebral cortex estimated by intrinsic functional connectivity
Thomas Yeo, B. T., Krienen, F. M., Sepulcre, J., Sabuncu, M. R., Lashkari, D., Hollinshead, M., Roffman, J. L., Smoller, J. W., Zöllei, L., Polimeni, J. R., et al. (2011) · Journal of Neurophysiology · doi:10.1152/jn.00338.2011 · Cited by 9,182
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 4×
“This framework revolves around the notion that all living systems embody statistical models of their worlds (Friston, 2010; Gallagher & Allen, 2018).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationFunctional Network Organization of the Human Brain
Power, J. D., Cohen, A. L., Nelson, S. M., Wig, G. S., Barnes, K. A., Church, J. A., Vogel, A. C., Laumann, T. O., Miezin, F. M., Schlaggar, B. L., et al. (2011) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.09.006 · Cited by 4,124
Parvalbumin neurons and gamma rhythms enhance cortical circuit performance
Sohal, V. S., Zhang, F., Yizhar, O., & Deisseroth, K. (2009) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature07991 · Cited by 2,606
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Gray, J. A. (1994). Three fundamental emotion systems. In P.Ekman & R. J.Davidson (Eds.), The nature of emotion (pp. 243–247). New York: Oxford University Press.
Cited by
A step-by-step tutorial on active inference and its application to empirical data
Smith, R., Friston, K. J., & Whyte, C. J. (2022) · Journal of Mathematical Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2021.102632 · Cited by 246
Self-citationIn the body's eye: the computational anatomy of interoceptive inference
Allen, M., Levy, A., Parr, T., & Friston, K. J. (2022) · PLOS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010490 · Cited by 185
“, whether one is certain if a heartbeat has occurred or not) inferences in hierarchical models, with temporal depth [37,47,48,70,91].”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citationSmith, R., Badcock, P., & Friston, K. J. (2021) · Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences · doi:10.1111/pcn.13138 · Cited by 174
“22 On the left, a network of abstract neuron-like nodes (and select connections) is depicted, where the higher level represents different possible concept-level inferences about one ’ s own internal state, including emotional and somatic interpretations.”
BackgroundSmith, R., Parr, T., & Friston, K. J. (2019) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02844 · Cited by 133
Self-citationFriston, K., Da Costa, L., Hafner, D., Hesp, C., & Parr, T. (2021) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_01351 · Cited by 117
Self-citationConsciousness matters: phenomenal experience has functional value
Cleeremans, A., & Tallon-Baudry, C. (2022) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niac007 · Cited by 116
“In this sense, phenomenal states answer to a subjective rather than objective fitness function (Hesp et al. 2021).”
BackgroundSandved-Smith, L., Hesp, C., Mattout, J., Friston, K., Lutz, A., & Ramstead, M. J. D. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab018 · Cited by 110
“Formal approaches to the study of the capacities for metaawareness have recently been developed that leverage ‘parametrically deep active inference’ (Hesp et al. 2021).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialSelf-citationRespiratory rhythms of the predictive mind.
Allen, M., Varga, S., & Heck, D. H. (2023) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000391 · Cited by 114
Self-citationThe neurobiology of interoception and affect
Feldman, M. J., Bliss-Moreau, E., & Lindquist, K. A. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.009 · Cited by 101
“These processes begin in the periphery but escalate in the brain.”
Representation Wars: Enacting an Armistice Through Active Inference
Constant, A., Clark, A., & Friston, K. J. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.598733 · Cited by 95
Self-citationPlay in predictive minds: A cognitive theory of play.
Andersen, M. M., Kiverstein, J., Miller, M., & Roepstorff, A. (2023) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000369 · Cited by 122
Nave, K., Deane, G., Miller, M., & Clark, A. (2020) · Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.1542 · Cited by 110
Losing Ourselves: Active Inference, Depersonalization, and Meditation
Deane, G., Miller, M., & Wilkinson, S. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.539726 · Cited by 87
“This higher-order inference about the system’s confidence in its own action model, used to modulate precision on expected free energy (Hesp et al., 2019), is a candidate computational correlate for the sense of self—the feeling of being an agent.”
BackgroundInfluentialFrom Generative Models to Generative Passages: A Computational Approach to (Neuro) Phenomenology
Ramstead, M. J. D., Seth, A. K., Hesp, C., Sandved-Smith, L., Mago, J., Lifshitz, M., Pagnoni, G., Smith, R., Dumas, G., Lutz, A., et al. (2022) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-021-00604-y · Cited by 84
“Agents are said to be experiencing, for example, mental actions such as reading (Friston et al. 2017), their own emotional states (Hesp et al. 2021), or an episode of mind wandering (Sandved-Smith et al. 2021).”
BackgroundSelf-citationCiaunica, A., Seth, A. K., Limanowski, J., Hesp, C., & Friston, K. J. (2022) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2022.103320 · Cited by 100
Self-citationSmith, R., Kirlic, N., Stewart, J. L., Touthang, J., Kuplicki, R., Khalsa, S. S., Feinstein, J., Paulus, M. P., & Aupperle, R. L. (2021) · Journal of Psychiatry and Neuroscience · doi:10.1503/jpn.200032 · Cited by 81
Self-citationThe Markov blanket trick: On the scope of the free energy principle and active inference
Raja, V., Valluri, D., Baggs, E., Chemero, A. P., & Anderson, M. L. (2021) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2021.09.001 · Cited by 104
Schiller, D., Yu, A. N. C., Alia‐Klein, N., Becker, S., Cromwell, H. C., Dolcos, F., Eslinger, P. J., Frewen, P., Kemp, A. H., Pace-Schott, E. F., et al. (2023) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105450 · Cited by 102
“In enactive approaches, the mechanism of arousal might be formalized as changes in an organism’s self-assessed preparedness for the environment, wherein this evaluation is based on the predicted impact of possible actions (Barrett and Simmons, 2015; Hesp et al., 2021b; Seth and Friston, 2016).”
Gut inference: A computational modelling approach
Smith, R., Mayeli, A., Taylor, S., Al Zoubi, O., Naegele, J., & Khalsa, S. S. (2021) · Biological Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2021.108152 · Cited by 66
Self-citationDeep active inference agents using Monte-Carlo methods
Fountas, Z., Sajid, N., Mediano, P. A. M., & Friston, K. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2006.04176 · Cited by 64
Self-citationEverything is connected: Inference and attractors in delusions
Adams, R. A., Vincent, P., Benrimoh, D. A., Friston, K. J., & Parr, T. (2021) · Schizophrenia Research · doi:10.1016/j.schres.2021.07.032 · Cited by 72
Self-citationPattern breaking: a complex systems approach to psychedelic medicine
Hipólito, I., Mago, J., Rosas, F. E., & Carhart-Harris, R. L. (2023) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niad017 · Cited by 79
“The sense of interconnectedness that can arise within and after psychedelic experiences is also relevant, and the ‘symmetry theory of valence’ (Hesp et al. 2021, Smith et al. 2021) and the notion that self-organized criticality within and between systems may relate to positively valenced feeling…”
Arnaldo, I., Corcoran, A. W., Friston, K. J., & Ramstead, M. J. D. (2022) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2022.104590 · Cited by 56
“Recent work has argued that emotional valence, which represents the positive and negative attributes of emotional states, emerges from the perceived fit between an organism and their environment (Hesp et al., 2021).”
Self-citationAn Introduction to Predictive Processing Models of Perception and Decision‐Making
Sprevak, M. D., & Smith, R. S. (2023) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/tops.12704 · Cited by 85
“…2019; Parr & Friston, 2018; Parr, Rikhye, Halassa, & Friston 2020), cardiac interoception and affective valence (Allen, Levy, Parr, & Friston, 2019; Hesp et al., 2021; Hesp et al., 2020), emotion learning and emotional awareness (and how they can be interfered with in clinical contexts; Smith et…”
BackgroundSelf-citationDeterding, S., Andersen, M. M., Kiverstein, J., & Miller, M. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.924953 · Cited by 54
“Recently, error dynamics have been used to develop a PP account of emotional experience, particularly affective valence and mood (Joffily and Coricelli, 2013; Van de Cruys, 2017; Kiverstein et al., 2019; Hesp et al., 2021).”
BackgroundMethodSafron, A. (2021) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e23060783 · Cited by 52
“That is, more changeable patterns will be more likely to violate expectations—by virtue of being difficult to precisely track—and so experiencing/remembering will likely be dominated by transitions between pleasure and pain, especially if accompanied by precipitous or punctuated alterations [76,248,374,380,428].”
BackgroundInfluentialA Step-by-Step Tutorial on Active Inference and its Application to Empirical Data
Smith, R., Friston, K., & Whyte, C. (2021) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/b4jm6 · Cited by 51
Self-citationExpecting some action: predictive processing and the construction of conscious experience
Nave, K., Deane, G., Miller, M., & Clark, A. (2022) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-022-00644-y · Cited by 50
Trust as Extended Control: Human-Machine Interactions as Active Inference
Schoeller, F., Miller, M. M., Salomon, R., & Friston, K. J. (2021) · Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnsys.2021.669810 · Cited by 62
“Valence systems provide the agent with a domain general controller capable of tracking changes in error managements and adjusting precision expectations relative to those changes (Kiverstein et al., 2019; Hesp et al., 2021).”
BackgroundSelf-citationPredictive processing models and affective neuroscience
Lee, K. M., Ferreira‐Santos, F., & Satpute, A. B. (2021) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.09.009 · Cited by 58
Metzinger, T. K. (2024) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/15196.001.0001 · Cited by 101
Active inference models do not contradict folk psychology
Smith, R. S., Ramstead, M. J. D., & Kiefer, A. B. (2022) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03480-w · Cited by 61
“…of interest pertains to recent proposals on possible correlates of affective states within the predictive processing and free energy framework (Hesp et al., 2021; Joffily & Coricelli, 2013; Smith et al., 2019a, 2019b; Van de Cruys, 2017), which suggest that affective states and responses…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationSmith, R. S., Moutoussis, M., & Bilek, E. (2021) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-021-89047-0 · Cited by 53
Self-citationThe Brain Is Adaptive Not Triune: How the Brain Responds to Threat, Challenge, and Change
Steffen, P. R., Hedges, D., & Matheson, R. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychiatry · doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2022.802606 · Cited by 60
Affective experience in the predictive mind: a review and new integrative account
Fernandez Velasco, P., & Loev, S. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02755-4 · Cited by 43
Preventing antisocial robots: A pathway to artificial empathy
Christov‐Moore, L., Reggente, N., Vaccaro, A. G., Schoeller, F., Pluimer, B. R., Douglas, P. K., Iacoboni, M., Man, K., Damásio, A. R., & Kaplan, J. (2023) · Science Robotics · doi:10.1126/scirobotics.abq3658 · Cited by 59
Luppi, A. I., Mediano, P. A. M., Rosas, F. E., Harrison, D. J., Carhart-Harris, R. L., Bor, D., & Stamatakis, E. A. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab027 · Cited by 51
Cognition as Morphological/Morphogenetic Embodied Computation In Vivo
Dodig-Crnković, G. (2022) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e24111576 · Cited by 48
“belief states are viewed through the lens of resolving uncertainty as the mathematical image of angst and anxiety, [86,87].”
BackgroundAn Active-Inference Approach to Second-Person Neuroscience
Lehmann, K., Bolis, D., Friston, K. J., Schilbach, L., Ramstead, M. J. D., & Kanske, P. (2023) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916231188000 · Cited by 62
“We want to provide an intuitive account for a broad audience but refer the interested reader to publications that have elaborated more formal descriptions (e.g., Friston et al., 2021; Hesp et al., 2021; Sandved-Smith, 2021).”
BackgroundSelf-citationActive Inference and Behavior Trees for Reactive Action Planning and Execution in Robotics
Pezzato, C., Corbato, C. H., Bonhof, S., & Wisse, M. (2023) · IEEE Transactions on Robotics · doi:10.1109/tro.2022.3226144 · Cited by 44
“The authors in [34] and [35] provided a step-by-step tutorial on active inference with fully worked out toy examples including multiple factors and modalities.”
BackgroundMethodDeane, G. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab024 · Cited by 38
“Inference about endogenous control of self-evidencing outcomes can thus be understood as an inference about ‘subjective fitness’—the expected precision of the organism’s phenotypecongruent action model (Hesp et al. 2021).”
BackgroundAn active inference perspective for the amygdala complex
Sladky, R., Kargl, D., Haubensak, W. E., & Lamm, C. (2023) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2023.11.004 · Cited by 47
“This implementation is computationally feasible by hierarchical control loops acting on different timescales [85,102,103], possibly implemented in brain areas connected to the amygdala depending on the imminence of danger [104].”
Order and change in art: towards an active inference account of aesthetic experience
de Cruys, S. V., Frascaroli, J., & Friston, K. J. (2023) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2022.0411 · Cited by 56
“The fact that our own actions underwrite the positive aha experience may indicate that affective valence specifically tracks the confidence (a.k.a. precision) with which actions can be expected to quickly minimize uncertainty [13,33].”
BackgroundSelf-citationUnderstanding, Explanation, and Active Inference
Parr, T., & Pezzulo, G. (2021) · Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnsys.2021.772641 · Cited by 36
Self-citationWiese, W., & Friston, K. J. (2021) · Philosophies · doi:10.3390/philosophies6010018 · Cited by 44
“The parametric depth [102] corresponds to the depth of the hierarchy in which internal states parameterise probability distributions over the parameters of hierarchically subordinate probability distributions.”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe Problem of Meaning: The Free Energy Principle and Artificial Agency
Kiverstein, J. D., Kirchhoff, M. D., & Froese, T. (2022) · Frontiers in Neurorobotics · doi:10.3389/fnbot.2022.844773 · Cited by 48
Learned uncertainty: The free energy principle in anxiety
McGovern, H. T., De Foe, A., Biddell, H., Leptourgos, P., Corlett, P., Bandara, K., & Hutchinson, B. T. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.943785 · Cited by 33
“, 2019a; Gerrans and Murray, 2020), and negative mood and affect (Joffily and Coricelli, 2013; Van de Cruys, 2017; Hesp et al., 2021).”
BackgroundYoo, J., Jaśko, K., & Winkielman, P. (2023) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2023.0326 · Cited by 44
“More specifically, some PPF papers talk about ‘ affective charge, which specifies changes in the expected precision of (i.e. confidence in) one ’ s action model ’ [67].”
BackgroundMetacognitive Feelings: A Predictive-Processing Perspective
Velasco, P. F., & Loev, S. (2024) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916231221976 · Cited by 75
“Another family of theories focuses on PE dynamics and posits that affective dimensions correspond to informational aspects of PE reduction (Fernandez Velasco & Loev, 2021; Hesp et al., 2021; Joffily & Coricelli, 2013; Van de Cruys, 2017; Van de Cruys & Wagemans, 2011).”
InfluentialAesthetics and predictive processing: grounds and prospects of a fruitful encounter
Frascaroli, J., Leder, H., Brattico, E., & de Cruys, S. V. (2023) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2022.0410 · Cited by 54
“PP accounts have also been given for many other crucial psychological phenomena, including attention [40], affect and valence [41 – 43] curiosity [44,45], motivation [46], well-being [47] and a wide range of psychopathological conditions [48,49].”
BackgroundTucker, D. M., & Luu, P. (2023) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhad085 · Cited by 33
An active inference account of protective behaviours during the COVID-19 pandemic
Bottemanne, H., & Friston, K. J. (2021) · Cognitive Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3758/s13415-021-00947-0 · Cited by 33
Self-citationThe thermodynamics of cognition: A mathematical treatment
Déli, É., Peters, J. F., & Kisvárday, Z. F. (2021) · Computational and Structural Biotechnology Journal · doi:10.1016/j.csbj.2021.01.008 · Cited by 33
“itive or negative energy conditions [62,71].”
BackgroundMetacognition as a Consequence of Competing Evolutionary Time Scales
Kuchling, F., Fields, C., & Levin, M. G. (2022) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e24050601 · Cited by 32
“These valence representations can then in turn be optimized by leveraging the (Bayes-optimal) updating term for subjective fitness, tracking changes in fitness estimates and lending a sign to otherwise unsigned divergences between predictions and outcomes [99].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSmith, R. S., Varshney, L. R., Nagayama, S., Kazama, M., Kitagawa, T., Shunsuke, M., & Ishikawa, Y. (2022) · International Journal of Wellbeing · doi:10.5502/ijw.v12i4.2659 · Cited by 32
Self-citationParvizi-Wayne, D., Sandved-Smith, L., Pitliya, R. J., Limanowski, J., Tufft, M. R. A., & Friston, K. J. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1354719 · Cited by 44
“As recent work by Fernández Velasco and Loev (2024) makes clear, Hesp et al. (2021)’s notion of “deeply felt affect” and that of “error dynamics” are convergent: with respect to flow, according to both accounts, the positive valence associated with flow states is rooted in the organism’s ability to…”
BackgroundSelf-citationHesp, C., Tschantz, A., Millidge, B., Ramstead, M. J. D., Friston, K. J., & Smith, R. S. (2020) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-64919-7_18 · Cited by 34
Self-citationConstant, A., Hesp, C., Davey, C. G., Friston, K. J., & Badcock, P. B. (2021) · Computational Psychiatry · doi:10.5334/cpsy.70 · Cited by 38
Self-citationDissolving the self:Active inference, psychedelics, and ego-dissolution
Deane, G. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.i · Cited by 37
Mental distress through the prism of predictive processing theory
Van de Cruys, S., & Van Dessel, P. (2021) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.07.006 · Cited by 28
Synthesising boredom: a predictive processing approach
Darling, T. (2023) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04380-3 · Cited by 33
“…of) bore-dom, I have carefully navigated through different kinds of active inference; namely, interoceptive inference; (e.g. Barrett et al., 2016 ; Seth & Friston, 2016), emotional inference (e.g. Barrett, 2014 ; Smith et al., 2019 ) and affective inference (Clark et al., 2018; Hesp et al., 2021).”
InfluentialA Variational Approach to Scripts
Albarracin, M., Constant, A., Friston, K. J., & Ramstead, M. J. D. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.585493 · Cited by 35
“Active inference is an increasingly popular enactive modeling framework that is used to explain the behavioral dynamics of living creatures, i.e., their patterns of action, perception, emotions, attention, etc. (Da Costa et al., 2020; Hesp et al., 2021).”
MethodSelf-citationLutz, A., Abdoun, O., Dor‐Ziderman, Y., Trautwein, F., & Berkovich‐Ohana, A. (2024) · Biological Psychiatry Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging · doi:10.1016/j.bpsc.2024.11.008 · Cited by 58
What Might Interoceptive Inference Reveal about Consciousness?
Nikolova, N., Waade, P. T., Friston, K. J., & Allen, M. (2022) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-021-00580-3 · Cited by 27
“This is often situated in an across-scales blanket-oriented formal ontology where reality is described as a nested hierarchy of Markov Blanket structures, that is, statistical separations of internal states from external states (Clark, 2017; Hesp, Ramstead, et al., 2019; Kirchhoff et al., 2018).”
Self-citationMotive control of unconscious inference: The limbic base of adaptive Bayes
Tucker, D. M., & Luu, P. (2021) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.05.029 · Cited by 32
Hohwy, J. (2021) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-021-00578-x · Cited by 39
YANAGISAWA, H. (2021) · Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fncom.2021.698252 · Cited by 41
“In a model setting where an agent’s action changes hidden states, and the agent’s preference of sensory outcomes can be predefined as a prior, the confidence (or precision) of an agent’s action model or the notion of affective charge is adopted to estimate emotional valence as a state of metacognitive level of a deep…”
BackgroundLove songs and serenades: a theoretical review of music and romantic relationships
Bamford, J. S., Vigl, J., Hämäläinen, M., & Saarikallio, S. H. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1302548 · Cited by 36
“As described earlier, these effects are largely driven by sensorimotor synchronization and coordination, the predictability of these actions and their activating reward networks (Clayton et al., 2020; Hesp et al., 2021; Bamford, 2022).”
BackgroundRelative fluency (unfelt vs felt) in active inference
Brouillet, D., & Friston, K. J. (2023) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2023.103579 · Cited by 36
Self-citationA beautiful loop: An active inference theory of consciousness.
Laukkonen, R., Friston, K., & Chandaria, S. (2025) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106296 · Cited by 45
“…parametric depth can be instantiated with a few carefully chosen parameters: e.g., “ likelihood precision ” or “ policy precision ” (Allen et al., 2019; Hesp et al., 2019; Parr and Friston, 2017, 2019; Schwartenbeck et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2019), epistemic depth is about the entire deep…”
Self-citationA roadmap on learning and reasoning for distributed computing continuum ecosystems
Morichetta, A., Pujol, V. C., & Dustdar, S. (2021) · IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Communications (EDGE) · doi:10.1109/edge53862.2021.00021 · Cited by 28
“in [32] and then formalized in the work of Whyte and Smith [33] develop the conceptualization of a predictive Global Neuronal Workspace.”
BackgroundHorowitz, A. H., Jain, A., Schoeller, F., & Maes, P. (2020) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-020-77951-w · Cited by 26
Enactive-Dynamic Social Cognition and Active Inference
Hipólito, I., & van Es, T. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.855074 · Cited by 33
“social cognition and the processes underwriting enculturation (Hesp et al. 2021; Smith, Ramstead and Kiefer, 2021; Bouizegarene et al. 2020; Vasil et al. 2020; Veissière et al., 2020; Bolis and Schilbach, 2019; Constant et al. 2018; Gallagher and Allen, 2018).”
BackgroundPredictive processing and relevance realization: exploring convergent solutions to the frame problem
Andersen, B. P., Miller, M. M., & Vervaeke, J. (2022) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-022-09850-6 · Cited by 32
“A corollary of this view is that they will also be more sensitive to the rate of error accumulation (Hesp et al., 2021; Kiverstein et al., 2019; Van de Cruys et al., 2017; Wilkinson et al., 2019).”
Body as First Teacher: The Role of Rhythmic Visceral Dynamics in Early Cognitive Development
Corcoran, A. W., Perrykkad, K., Feuerriegel, D., & Robinson, J. (2023) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916231185343 · Cited by 21
“…experience do not appear to ascribe any special role to the body—rather, affective states are characterized in terms of domain-general computational mechanisms that track the evolution of prediction error dynamics over time (Hesp et al., 2021; Joffily & Coricelli, 2013; Van de Cruys, 2017).”
Sandved-Smith, L., Bogotá, J. D., Hohwy, J., Kiverstein, J. D., & Lutz, A. (2025) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niaf016 · Cited by 34
“Metacognitive systems have been modelled using deep parametric active inference (Hesp et al. 2021, Sandved-Smith et al. 2021).”
TTOM in action: Refining the variational approach to cognition and culture
Veissière, S. P. L., Constant, A., Ramstead, M. J. D., Friston, K. J., & Kirmayer, L. J. (2020) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x20000011 · Cited by 23
Self-citationYoung, H. A., Gaylor, C. M., de‐Kerckhove, D., & Benton, D. (2021) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-021-89417-8 · Cited by 20
The fear-avoidance model as an embodied prediction of threat
Varangot‐Reille, C., Pezzulo, G., & Thacker, M. A. (2024) · Cognitive Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3758/s13415-024-01199-4 · Cited by 24
“…and prominent neuro-scientific paradigm that aims to explain the complexities of consciousness, perception, and behavior (Friston & Frith, 2015; Hesp et al., 2021; Mann et al., 2022; Nave et al., 2022; Parr et al., 2022; Parr & Friston, 2017; Pezzulo et al., 2015; Ramstead et al., 2022; Seth,…”
Sarasso, P., Francesetti, G., Roubal, J., Gecele, M., Ronga, I., Neppi-Mòdona, M., & Sacco, K. (2022) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2022.906188 · Cited by 24
Resilience and active inference
Miller, M. M., Albarracin, M., Pitliya, R. J., Kiefer, A. B., Mago, J., Gorman, C., Friston, K. J., & Ramstead, M. J. D. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1059117 · Cited by 30
“In recent work on active inference (Hesp et al., 2021), affective inference is formalized as a form of second-order inference: these are inference about our inferences, which take posterior state estimations at one level of the generative model and pass them onto a super-ordinate layer, as data requiring further expla…”
BackgroundSelf-citationSurfing uncertainty with screams: predictive processing, error dynamics and horror films
Miller, M. M., White, B. P., & Scrivner, C. (2023) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2022.0425 · Cited by 29
Computational models of the “active self” and its disturbances in schizophrenia
Möller, T. J., Georgie, Y. K., Schillaci, G., Voss, M., Hafner, V. V., & Kaltwasser, L. (2021) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2021.103155 · Cited by 24
Krupnik, V. (2024) · Frontiers in Neural Circuits · doi:10.3389/fncir.2024.1283372 · Cited by 19
“In one version of this idea, change in the rate of prediction error minimization has been conceptualized as an “affective charge” which serves to update the precision of the very action model meant to minimize the prediction error (Hesp et al., 2021).”
BackgroundInfluentialStructure learning enhances concept formation in synthetic Active Inference agents
Neacsu, V., Mirza, M. B., Adams, R. A., & Friston, K. J. (2022) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0277199 · Cited by 27
“of as being either extrapersonal [10] or the body [17], or both [9].”
BackgroundSelf-citationFeeling our place in the world: an active inference account of self-esteem
Albarracin, M., Bouchard-Joly, G., Sheikhbahaee, Z., Miller, M. D., Pitliya, R. J., & Poirier, P. (2024) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niae007 · Cited by 38
“According to Hesp (2021), valence is intricately linked to the concept of affective charge (AC), which provides a quantitative measure of the congruence between predicted and realized outcomes.”
InfluentialChronoPilot — Modulating Time Perception
Botev, J., Drewing, K., Hamann, H., Khaluf, Y., Simoens, P., & Vatakis, A. (2021) · IEEE International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Virtual Reality (AIVR) · doi:10.1109/aivr52153.2021.00049 · Cited by 18
“Moreover, they have been used to model psychological and cognitive factors in time perception, like valence [15] and short-term memory [16].”
MethodModeling Cognitive-Affective Processes With Appraisal and Reinforcement Learning
Zhang, J. E., Broekens, J., & Jokinen, J. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Affective Computing · doi:10.1109/taffc.2024.3470555 · Cited by 25
“This approach aligns with the suggestion that emotional valence can be viewed as analogous to reward prediction error in RL models [12], [50].”
Bistable perception, precision and neuromodulation
Novický, F., Parr, T., Friston, K. J., Mirza, M. B., & Sajid, N. (2023) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhad401 · Cited by 21
“, internal process that change posterior beliefs by regulating precision (Limanowski & Friston, 2018; Metzinger, 2017) – and can be added via a hierarchical model in which slower parts of the model modulate the precision terms that influence faster dynamics (Hesp et al., 2021).”
Self-citationMishra, S., Srinivasan, N., & Tiwary, U. S. (2022) · Brain Sciences · doi:10.3390/brainsci12060702 · Cited by 20
On the minimal theory of consciousness implicit in active inference
Whyte, C. J., Corcoran, A. W., Robinson, J., Smith, R., Moran, R. J., Parr, T., Friston, K. J., Seth, A. K., & Hohwy, J. (2026) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2025.11.002 · Cited by 15
“In an important study testing some basic predictions of the neural process theory associated with active inference, Smith et al, (2021) leveraged a novel gastrointestinal perception paradigm that had participants report the presence (or absence) of vibrations of varying magnitude in their stomachs…”
Self-citationFree energy model of emotional valence in dual-process perceptions
YANAGISAWA, H., Wu, X., Ueda, K., & Kato, T. (2022) · Neural Networks · doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2022.10.027 · Cited by 23
“formalized valence as the variation of confidence (or precision) in one’s action model based on (expected) free energy (Hesp et al., 2021).”
BackgroundPreferences need inferences: Learning, valuation, and curiosity in aesthetic experiencePreprint
de Cruys, S. V., Bervoets, J., & Moors, A. (2021) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/zh6nt · Cited by 23
Interoceptive Technologies for Psychiatric Interventions: From Diagnosis to Clinical ApplicationsPreprint
Schoeller, F., Horowitz, A. H., Maes, P., Jain, A., Reggente, N., Christov‐Moore, L., Trousselard, M., Klein, A., Barca, L., Pezzulo, G., et al. (2022) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/sqr6z · Cited by 15
Self-citationThe Human AffectomePreprint
Schiller, D., Yu, A. N. C., Alia‐Klein, N., Becker, S., Cromwell, H. C., Dolcos, F., Eslinger, P. J., Frewen, P., Kemp, A. H., Pace-Schott, E. F., et al. (2022) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/9nu32 · Cited by 31
A model of time-varying music engagement
Omigie, D., & Mencke, I. (2023) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2022.0421 · Cited by 16
“Inter-estingly, this proposition that valence is inferred from model fitness [95], is in line with findings that positive valence begets behaviours that show greater reliance on prior expectations [96,97].”
BackgroundResultEmotion dynamics as hierarchical Bayesian inference in time
Majumdar, G., Yazin, F., Banerjee, A., & Roy, D. (2022) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhac305 · Cited by 14
Pattern Breaking: A Complex Systems Approach to Psychedelic MedicinePreprint
Hipólito, I., Mago, J., Rosas, F. E., & Carhart-Harris, R. L. (2022) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/ydu3h · Cited by 13
An active inference approach to second-person neurosciencePreprint
Lehmann, K., Bolis, D., Ramstead, M. J. D., Friston, K. J., & Kanske, P. (2022) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/6y5ve · Cited by 13
Self-citationDi Paolo, L. D., White, B., Guénin-Carlut, A., Constant, A., & Clark, A. (2024) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2023.0148 · Cited by 14
Metadata
- Authors
- Hesp, C., Smith, R., Parr, T., Allen, M., Friston, K. J., & Ramstead, M. J. D.
- Affiliations
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research (US)
- Aarhus University (DK)
- Corresponding author
- Hesp, Casper
- Smith, Ryan
- Parr, Thomas
- Allen, Micah
- Friston, Karl J.
- Ramstead, Maxwell J. D.
- Venue
- Neural Computation
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Published
- 2021-02-01
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 398-446
- ISSN
- 0899-7667 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-888X
- PMC
- PMC8594962
- OpenAlex
- W3108742966
- Cited by
- 246
- References
- 126
- Citations by year
- 2026: 32 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 40 · 2023: 40 · 2022: 47 · 2021: 38
- FWCI
- 19.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Neural Computation (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- William K. Warren Foundation
- Aarhus Universitet
- McGill University
- Wellcome Trust (R272-2017-4345, 088130, 754513, 088130/Z/09/Z)
- European Commission (HORIZON2020, 754513)
- Rosetrees Trust (173346)
- Aarhus Universitets Forskningsfond (754513, R272-2017-4345)
- Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (406.18, 406.18.535)
- Lundbeckfonden (R272‐2017‐4345, 754513)
- Canada First Research Excellence Fund
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
- H2020 Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (754513, HORIZON2020, R272-2017-4345)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Psychiatry, Mental Health, Neuroscience
- Keywords
- emotional valence, second-order beliefs, metacognition, Bayesian inference, top-down modulation, T-maze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.