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Estimating Welfare in Insurance Markets Using Variation in Prices*
Open accessAbstract
We provide a graphical illustration of how standard consumer and producer theory can be used to quantify the welfare loss associated with inefficient pricing in insurance markets with selection. We then show how this welfare loss can be estimated empirically using identifying variation in the price of insurance. Such variation, together with quantity data, allows us to estimate the demand for insurance. The same variation, together with cost data, allows us to estimate how insurer's costs vary as market participants endogenously respond to price. The slope of this estimated cost curve provides a direct test for both the existence and nature of selection, and the combination of demand and cost curves can be used to estimate welfare. We illustrate our approach by applying it to data on employer-provided health insurance from one specific company. We detect adverse selection but estimate that the quantitative welfare implications associated with inefficient pricing in our particular application are small, in both absolute and relative terms.
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Citations
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Sufficient Statistics for Welfare Analysis: A Bridge Between Structural and Reduced-Form Methods
Chetty, R. (2009) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.142910 · Cited by 666
Who Is Screened Out? Application Costs and the Targeting of Disability Programs
Deshpande, M., & Li, Y. (2019) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.20180076 · Cited by 534
Health Insurance for “Humans”: Information Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare
Handel, B. R., & Kolstad, J. T. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20131126 · Cited by 427
Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Ryan, S. P., Schrimpf, P., & Cullen, M. R. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.1.178 · Cited by 417
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., & Cullen, M. R.
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2010-08
- Volume
- 125
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 877-921
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W1581902747
- Cited by
- 452
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 44.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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